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legislation mandating minimum specific nurse-to-patient ratios for every unit in general acute care hospitals.
This attempt to improve quality and ensure a minimum standard for it through control of a production input
has sparked substantial interest as similar bills have been considered in other states and at the federal level.
This study contributes to the literature on the law in a number of ways. First, it considers the law’s structure
with respect to its stated quality objectives using an economic framework. In doing so, issues of production
efficiency and incentives for quality improvement are addressed. Existing literature on the law’s quality effects
are also examined.
This study additionally offers new empirical analyses on the law’s effects. These include descriptive analyses,
examining increases in nurse wages in California as the short-run supply of nurses remained inelastic to the
growing demand. It also provides the first examination of the law’s impact on hospital and emergency
department (ED) closure and downsizing of mental health services precipitated by its cost shock. Using
matching and other techniques, I find compelling evidence that the law led to significant increases in hospital
and ED closures. Specifically, California hospitals had a 2.25 (p=0.020) and 2.84 (p<0.001) times greater
hazard rate of hospital and ED closure, respectively, in the years following the law’s passage compared to their
matched controls. The results also suggest that mental health services may have decreased due to the law.
Among hospitals in California, those with low nurse-staffing levels pre-passage of the law were most affected
for these outcomes, consistent with expectations.
In addition to the above outcomes, this study provides the first examination of patients’ demand response to
hospitals’ changes precipitated by the law. Findings from this analysis point to variation across patients with
those seeking elective services being much more responsive than patients with urgent, sudden health needs.
The results also highlight contrasting patient responses to the law’s different after-effects.
Policymakers elsewhere should consider other legislative approaches than minimum nurse-to-patient ratios
for safeguarding and improving quality.
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vABSTRACT
CALIFORNIA’S MINIMUM NURSE-STAFFING LAW AND ITS IMPACT ON
HOSPITAL CLOSURE, SERVICE MIX, AND PATIENT HOSPITAL CHOICE
Emi Terasawa
Guy David
In 1999, amid growing concerns regarding quality of care, California became the first U.S. state to
pass legislation mandating minimum specific nurse-to-patient ratios for every unit in general acute
care hospitals. This attempt to improve quality and ensure a minimum standard for it through
control of a production input has sparked substantial interest as similar bills have been considered
in other states and at the federal level.
This study contributes to the literature on the law in a number of ways. First, it considers the
law’s structure with respect to its stated quality objectives using an economic framework. In doing
so, issues of production efficiency and incentives for quality improvement are addressed. Existing
literature on the law’s quality effects are also examined.
This study additionally offers new empirical analyses on the law’s effects. These include descrip-
tive analyses, examining increases in nurse wages in California as the short-run supply of nurses
remained inelastic to the growing demand. It also provides the first examination of the law’s impact
on hospital and emergency department (ED) closure and downsizing of mental health services pre-
cipitated by its cost shock. Using matching and other techniques, I find compelling evidence that
the law led to significant increases in hospital and ED closures. Specifically, California hospitals
had a 2.25 (p=0.020) and 2.84 (p<0.001) times greater hazard rate of hospital and ED closure, re-
spectively, in the years following the law’s passage compared to their matched controls. The results
also suggest that mental health services may have decreased due to the law. Among hospitals in
California, those with low nurse-staffing levels pre-passage of the law were most affected for these
outcomes, consistent with expectations.
In addition to the above outcomes, this study provides the first examination of patients’ demand
response to hospitals’ changes precipitated by the law. Findings from this analysis point to variation
vi
across patients with those seeking elective services being much more responsive than patients with
urgent, sudden health needs. The results also highlight contrasting patient responses to the law’s
different after-effects.
Policymakers elsewhere should consider other legislative approaches than minimum nurse-to-
patient ratios for safeguarding and improving quality.
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1Chapter 1
Introduction
In October 1999, amid growing concerns regarding quality of care, California became the first U.S.
state to pass legislation mandating minimum specific nurse-to-patient ratios for every unit in gen-
eral acute care (GAC) hospitals.1 This legislative attempt to create a minimum quality standard
through control of a production input has sparked considerable interest among multiple parties.
These have included researchers and policymakers not only within California but also across the
country as other states have considered adopting similar legislation. In recent years, a number of
studies have emerged assessing the various effects of the law, known as Assembly Bill 394 (AB 394).
These studies have roughly fallen into two categories—those that focus on the law’s intended effects
and those that explore its unintended consequences. Analyses in the former category have included
work addressing the impact on quality of care as measured by selected outcomes [Bolton et al., 2007,
Cook et al., 2012, Donaldson et al., 2005, Mark et al., 2013, Spetz, 2009, Spetz et al., 2013], hospi-
tals’ nurse-staffing levels [Conway et al., 2008] and skill mix [McHugh et al., 2011], and nurse job
satisfaction [Aiken et al., 2010, Chapman et al., 2009, Spetz, 2008, Spetz and Herrera, 2010]. Anal-
yses in the latter category have included studies examining the impact on nurse wages [Mark et al.,
2009, Munnich, 2014], hospital prices [Antwi et al., 2009], hospital uncompensated care spending
[Reiter et al., 2010], and occupational injury and illness rates for nurses [Leigh et al., 2015].2
This study contributes to the literature on the law’s unintended effects with the aim of providing a
1The law defined nurses as licensed registered nurses (RNs), licensed vocational nurses (LVNs), and licensed
psychiatric technicians (LPTs). LPTs, however, were only allowed to give care in psychiatric units. Additionally,
LVNs could only compose up to 50% of the minimum nurse staffing requirement and did not count toward the
mandated ratios for triage and trauma care in emergency departments or intensive care newborn nurseries.
2Donaldson and Shapiro [2010] provide a review of many of these papers.
2more complete picture of its impact. In particular, it examines the law’s resulting cost shock on three
outcomes with potential negative implications for patient access to care—hospital closure, emergency
department (ED) closure, and downsizing of mental health services. In addition to assessing the law’s
effect on these outcomes, the study examines patients’ demand response to changes that occurred
across hospitals precipitated by the law.
This dissertation proceeds in three main parts. The first part provides background on the law
and evaluates its structure and expected impact on hospitals within an economic framework. In
the process, I discuss the law’s effect on hospital production and cost functions, which inform my
empirical analyses, along with hospital behavior. I also discuss the ability and efficiency of the law
in accomplishing its stated objective regarding quality of care and offer an alternative theory behind
it based on rent-seeking by nurses. This is followed by a summary of the literature and findings to
date on the law’s impact on quality of care.
The next two parts present my empirical analyses. The first of these begins with descriptive anal-
yses on two consequences of the law that impacted hospitals’ cost functions—an increase in nurse-
staffing levels in hospitals across the state and an increase in nurse wages as the short-run supply of
nurses remained inelastic to the growing demand for them. I hypothesize that the resulting shock
to hospitals’ cost functions may have prompted hospitals to downsize or close low margin units that
were now no longer sustainable. I further postulate that in extreme cases where such actions couldn’t
relieve financial strain, hospitals may have been forced to close. To test these hypotheses, I investi-
gate the law’s effect on the three outcomes previously mentioned—hospital closure, ED closure, and
reduction of mental health services. This work ties into the literature on the determinants of hospital
and ED closure [Bazzoli and Andes, 1995, Hsia et al., 2011, Liu et al., 2011, Lynch and Ozcan, 1994,
Lynn and Wertheim, 1993, Office of Inspector General, Department of HHS, 2003, Sloan et al., 2010]
and also relates to work on the downsizing of low margin services [Banks et al., 1997, 1999, Chen et al.,
2009, David and Helmchen, 2006, David et al., 2011, Norton and Staiger, 1994, Vladeck, 2006].
In the dissertation’s final part, I shift focus from the behavior of hospitals to the response of
patients. As previously mentioned, AB 394 produced significant changes for California hospitals both
through its nurse-staffing and skill-mix requirements as well as their resulting nurse wage increases.
In this portion of my study, I investigate whether patients were responsive to these changes that
altered the hospital landscape as revealed through their hospital choice selections. The question
of whether patients were responsive to the collection of changes taking place across hospitals as a
3result of the law is interesting on multiple levels. On a fundamental level, it sheds light on whether
patients are sensitive in general to changes in hospitals’ care processes with possible implications
for the strength or weakness of non-price demand side competition. It also reveals how patients
perceived the value of the changes precipitated by the law. Such perceptions could be positive,
negative, or neutral. For instance, if the law produced better quality of care, nurse responsiveness,
and few downsides, the changes could be positively regarded. If, on the other hand, the law prompted
hospitals to hire cheaper lower quality nurses to save on expenses but still adhere to the “letter of
the law” or downgrade investments in other inputs, the changes could be negatively viewed by
patients. Such responses are interesting not only for how they illuminate patients’ valuation of the
law’s impact but also for their implications for hospitals.
For my analysis, I focus on traditional Medicare patients and contrast two main types—1) pa-
tients who are likely to actively choose their hospitals and 2) patients who do not due to the urgency
and sudden emergence of their care needs. If patients are, in fact, responsive to operational changes
undertaken by hospitals, such effects should be more strongly present among the former than the
latter. Comparing these two groups therefore provides a falsification check of my results. To allow
for lagged patient responses, I assess and contrast the demand response for two time periods—an
early period (1999–2002) and a later period (2003–2006). Identification of effects comes from ex-
ploiting variation across hospitals’ pre-passage nurse-staffing levels to gauge which hospitals most
likely experienced the biggest changes to their operations due to the law. This is operationalized in
the models through two independent variables that incorporate this staffing information and tease
apart two effects associated with the law’s impact on hospitals.
This dissertation is organized into 8 chapters. Chapter 2 provides a short overview of the history
of California’s minimum nurse-staffing law, describing why it was passed and its specifics. Chapter 3
discusses the law within the context of an economic framework. Chapter 4 summarizes the literature
that has been performed to date on its impact on quality of care. Chapter 5 provides descriptive
analyses on the law’s increase in nurse staffing and the rise in nurse wages. Chapter 6 presents the
first part of my main empirical analysis, evaluating the law’s impact on hospital and ED closure and
downsizing of mental health services. Chapter 7 discusses my second main analysis, examining the
demand response of patients. Chapter 8 concludes.
4Chapter 2
California’s Minimum
Nurse-Staffing Law (AB 394)
The passage of California’s minimum nurse-staffing law, known as Assembly Bill (AB) 394, “The
Safe Staffing Law,” represented a major legislative victory for the state’s nurse unions. For over six
years, they had lobbied for passage of the bill with multiple bills presented before the State Assembly
(1993: AB 1445; 1997: AB 695) [California Nurses Association, 2004]. At the time of its passage,
two key factors—a policy opening and a political opening—presented the necessary conditions to
propel its ratification. The policy opening came in the form of a number of reports that described
California hospitals as hiring increasing numbers of unlicensed medical personnel in lieu of nurses due
to cost-cutting pressures from managed care [Spetz, 2000]. Such accounts, coupled with California’s
low rank of 49th in the country in nurses per capita [Dauner, 2004], offered disturbing implications
for patient safety and quality of care. The political opening that facilitated the bill’s passage arrived
in the form of Democrat Gray Davis’ election as governor of California in the fall of 1998. This
marked a turning point for the nurse unions, who found an ally in the new governor in contrast to
his predecessor, the Republican Pete Wilson. In the fall of 1999, Governor Davis signed AB 394 into
law, ending the legislation’s streak of gubernatorial vetoes over the past six years [Spetz, 2000].
California’s minimum nurse-staffing law proved highly polarizing. Proponents of the law led by
the nurse unions argued that the nurse-staffing ratios would help to safeguard quality of care for
patients and improve working conditions for nurses. They maintained that the latter would not
only reduce medical errors through more reasonable workloads for nurses but also increase nurse
satisfaction, helping to combat the nurse shortage problem. Critics and opponents of the law led
by the California Hospital Association responded with vigorous protests, arguing it was a simplistic
5one-size fits all solution that verged on the paternalistic and failed to consider the particulars of
their institutions such as teaching status and case mix.
The proposed law was, in fact, quite rigorous and represented a radical expansion of previous
nurse-staffing requirements that had been adopted over 20 years prior but had only pertained to
critical and intensive care units (Health & Safety Code ξ 1294, Title 22, California Code of Reg-
ulations). The law specified minimum nurse-to-patient ratios for every unit in general acute care
(GAC) hospitals. Furthermore, 24-hour continuous staffing compliance was required, leaving hospi-
tals no leeway in adherence to the rule. Nurses on meal or restroom breaks had to be covered at
all times, and no averaging was allowed. This requirement was of particular concern to hospitals,
many of which had to create “float pools” to ensure adequate staff to cover nurses on meal breaks
[Spetz, 2009]. (California labor laws strictly regulate the length and number of meal breaks an
employee must receive based on their shift length.) Contingencies like too many nurses calling in
sick or surges in patient admissions were also considerations. In addition to the 24-hour continu-
ous staffing requirement, the law stated that licensed vocational nurses (LVNs), a less skilled and
cheaper type of nurse, could only compose up to 50% of the minimum nurse-staffing requirement
and didn’t count toward ratios for triage and trauma in emergency departments or intensive care
newborn nurseries.3 Hospitals objected to these stipulations, arguing that the law failed to take into
account the particular needs of their institutions and severity of their patients.
The public comment period that followed the law’s passage was extremely lengthy. The Depart-
ment of Health Services, which had been tasked with setting the ratios, found the assignment more
challenging than expected, since no prior work existed in this area. Although implementation of
the law was originally scheduled for January 1, 2002, draft regulations were not introduced until
2002, and final passage did not occur until 2003. Implementation of the mandated nurse ratios was
ultimately pushed to 2004 with updates in 2005 and 2008. The final ratios represented a compromise
between those proposed by the nurses union and the hospital association as shown in Table 2.1.
A number of attempts have been made to overturn the law, all of which have failed to date.
In December 2003, hospitals represented by the California Healthcare Association filed a lawsuit
against the Department of Health Services protesting the law’s 24-hour continuous staffing com-
pliance requirement. These arguments were rejected in court on the grounds that repeal of this
requirement would render the law meaningless [Chapman et al., 2009]. In November 2004, Governor
3RNs and LVNs differ in the types of responsibilities they can legally assume in care settings. For instance, LVNs
are not permitted to administer intravenous medications or perform patient assessments in contrast to RNs.
6Hospital Unit AB 394 SEIU Proposal CHA Proposal
Behavioral Health & Psychiatric Units 1:6 1:3 1:12
Emergency Departments 1:4 1:3 1:6
Triage (RN only) 1:1
Radio (RN only) 1:1
Trauma 1:1 1:1
Critical Care 1:2 1:2 1:2
General Medical-Surgical 1:6, on 1/1/05 1:5 1:4† 1:10
ICU/CCU 1:2 1:2 1:2
Labor & Delivery 1:2 1:2 1:3
Ante Partum (not active labor) 1:4
Postpartum (mothers only) 1:6 1:6‡ 1:8
Couplets (moms & babies) 1:4
Combined Labor & Delivery 1:3
Mixed Units 1:6, on 1/1/05 1:5
Neonatal ICU (RN only) 1:2
Operating Room (RN only) 1:1 1:1
Pediatrics 1:4 1:3 1:6
Post-Anesthesia Care Unit 1:2 1:2
Specialty Care (oncology & dialysis) 1:5, on 1/1/08 1:4 1:10
Step-Down Unit 1:4, on 1/1/08 1:3 1:3 1:6
Telemetry Unit 1:5, on 1/1/08 1:4 1:3 1:10
Well-Baby Nursery 1:8 1:4 – 1:6 1:8
SEIU: Service Employees International Union (union representing nurses in California)
CHA: California Hospital Association
Note: 1/1/05 changes upheld by California Supreme Court on March 15, 2005.
† California Nurses Association (CNA) proposed 1:3.
‡ CNA proposed 1:5.
Table 2.1 – Nurse-to-patient ratios implemented and proposed.
Arnold Schwarzenegger introduced emergency regulation and initiatives to modify the law, arguing
that it had resulted in the closure of 11 emergency rooms [California Department of Health Services,
2004]. These regulations were heavily protested by the California Nurses Association and found to be
illegal by a California court [Appleby, 2005, Marshall, 2005]. Figure 2.1 provides a visual depiction
of these and other notable events in the law’s timeline.
Although a number of years have elapsed since the passage California’s nurse-staffing law, its
after-effects continue to be assessed. These effects are of interest not only to stakeholders and poli-
cymakers within California but also to those across the country as similar nurse-staffing legislation
is debated and considered.
States where nurse-to-patient ratio legislation has been introduced although not passed include
Washington, Arizona, Missouri, Illinois, West Virginia, Florida, Texas, Kentucky, D.C., Maine, and
Pennsylvania.4 Within the last year, bills have been introduced in states including Massachusetts
4Maine and D.C. passed but later repealed nurse ratio legislation.
7(HB 1958, SB 1206), New Jersey (AB 647, SB 1183), New York (AB 1548, SB 782), and Michigan
(HB 5013, SB 574). Active lobbying efforts led by nurse unions have also continued in North and
South Carolina, Arkansas, and Texas.
In addition to activity at the state level, nurse-staffing reform efforts have occurred at the federal
level. In 2009, Senator Barbara Boxer (D) of California introduced Senate Bill 1031, the “National
Nursing Shortage Reform and Patient Advocacy Act” that would establish minimum nurse-to-patient
ratios in hospitals across the country. Although the bill failed to advance past committee hearings,
it was later reintroduced to the 2011–2012 session of the U.S Congress as well as the current session
(2015–2016) by Senator Boxer and Representative Janice Schakowsky (D) of Illinois as Senate and
House Bills 992 and 2187 and then as bills 864 and 1602, respectively.
CA AB 394 Timeline
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Figure 2.1 – California AB 394 timeline.
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Economic Framework
AB 394 raises a wide range of economic issues. These are laid out in this chapter and provide
the basis and motivation for the analyses in Chapter 5–7. The chapter is organized into five main
sections. The first begins by considering the original premise for the law—that California hospitals
were operating below quality of care and patient safety levels deemed desirable by regulators. Using
a simple model, I illustrate how that might occur and the relationship between quality of care,
demand, and how hospitals select their quality levels. The second section considers the manner in
which AB 394 was designed to improve quality of care indirectly through its minimum nurse-to-
patient ratios. This is presented in the context of economic theory around production functions.
In the process, I discuss the ability and efficiency of the law in accomplishing its stated objective
regarding quality of care. The third section describes the direct impact of the minimum nurse-to-
patient ratios on hospitals’ production processes and cost functions, focusing on hospitals for whom
the law’s constraint was binding. In doing so, four scenarios are contrasted. These consist of prior
to AB 394 and then the short-, medium-, and long-terms following it. The fourth section discusses
hospital behavior in response to the law’s impact on production and costs and the resulting effect
on profits. This is done for the case of a monopolist and then for a multi-hospital market in which
competition is present. The final section revisits the design of AB 394 in light of the law’s stated
objective and considers other ways in which the law could have been structured to achieve its stated
objective. It also presents an alternative interpretation of the law based on a theory of rent-seeking
9by nurses.
3.1 A simple model of hospital quality and output
As discussed earlier, the original premise for AB 394 was that California hospitals were operating
below quality of care and patient safety levels deemed acceptable by regulators. In thinking about
the law’s design and consequences, it’s helpful to first understand the relationship among quality,
demand, and costs, and how hospitals select their quality levels. Throughout this discussion, I
use a simple model with the following assumptions. The first is that hospitals maximize profits.
Although not-for-profit and government hospitals can have other objectives, profit-maximization
provides a useful benchmark. Additionally, this assumption has been used in other studies like
Acemoglu and Finkelstein [2006] and is generally consistent with the empirical literature reviewed
by Sloan [2000] that found no differences in behavior between for-profit and not-for-profit hospitals.
The second assumption is that hospitals are price-takers in their input markets. The final assumption
is that hospitals face downward-sloping demand curves. For hospitals in multi-firm markets, this
results from differentiation and barriers to entry that limit competition.5
Under the above assumptions, hospitals, such as those prior to AB 394, face the following un-
constrained maximization
max
X,S
pi(X,S) = R(X,S)− C(X,S) (3.1)
where X is quantity, S is quality, R is revenue, and C is cost. Higher quality affects equation 3.1
by increasing demand but also entailing higher costs. Figure 3.1 provides a graphical illustration for
a hypothetical hospital. As shown in the figure, higher quality shifts the demand curve upward so
that it commands a higher price
(
δP
δS > 0
)
, but this also comes at a higher cost
(
δC
δS > 0
)
. Higher
quantity, on the other hand, decreases price
(
δP
δX < 0
)
and increases costs
(
δC
δX > 0
)
.
Hospitals select their optimal levels of quantity and quality (X∗, S∗) such that the first-order con-
ditions (FOCs) of equation 3.1 are satisfied. In other words, marginal revenue must equal marginal
cost for both quantity and quality:
MRX = MCX (3.2)
MRS = MCS (3.3)
5This additionally assumes that hospitals are not exclusively treating patients with regulated prices.
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Figure 3.1 – Demand and marginal cost curves for different levels of quality, S (hypothetical
hospital). The graph on the left illustrates how higher levels of quality (i.e., S1 < S2 < S3) shift demand
upwards. These higher levels of quality, however, come at a higher cost as shown in the graph on the right.
(Additionally, for a regular relative maximum, it’s assumed that the second-order conditions are
also met so that the profit function, pi(X,S), is negative definite with piXX < 0, piSS < 0, and
piXXpiSS − pi2XS > 0.)
The level of quality that a hospital selects thus relates to the demand responsiveness to quality
(i.e., the extent to which demand shifts upward for higher quality levels) and its cost of supplying
higher quality levels (i.e., the extent to which the hospital’s marginal and average cost curves increase
with higher quality). All else equal, higher demand responsiveness increases the level of quality
selected, while higher costs decrease it. Consequently, the profit-maximizing level of quality may
not necessarily be the best quality level nor meet the minimum level desired by regulators.
3.1.1 Factors influencing demand responsiveness to quality
Different factors influence how much demand increases with quality. One of the most fundamental
of these is whether patients are able to discern quality. If patients are not able to detect it, demand
will not be sensitive to quality, regardless of whether it is, in fact, valued. Other factors influencing
demand sensitivity to quality include willingness and ability to pay. In short, if quality can’t be
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discerned or if there’s insufficient ability or willingness to pay for it, the quality level provided by
hospitals may be below regulators’ desired levels.6
3.1.2 Quality of care versus patient perceived quality
It should be noted that the quality discussed here in this chapter refers to quality of care as targeted
by regulators and proponents of AB 394. (This is quality that is typically evaluated in terms of
outcome measures.) This is not patient perceived quality, which is more broadly defined. Patient
perceived quality may include factors that affect patient experience and perceptions but not nec-
essarily impact outcomes. These include hospital room amenities, bedside manner of caregivers,
number of staff, newness and amount of high-tech equipment, etc. Consequently, demand sensitivity
could be high to patient perceived quality, while also being low to quality of care.
3.1.3 Hospitals’ cost functions associated with quality
As previously noted, a hospital’s selected quality level also depends on its cost function for quality.
(The hospital’s profit-maximizing S∗ requires that MRS(S∗) = MCS(S∗).) These cost functions
vary across hospitals due to differences in their production functions for quality. (This is discussed
further in the next section.) All else equal, hospitals with higher cost functions will be less likely to
meet the minimum quality level desired by regulators.
3.2 AB 394 and hospital quality of care
As previously discussed, the original premise for AB 394 was that quality of care and patient safety
were below desirable levels among California hospitals due to substitution of unlicensed personnel
(e.g., nurse aides) for licensed nurses. Advocates of the law argued that mandating fixed minimum
nurse-to-patient ratios and skill-mix requirements would help to ensure that the minimum desirable
quality level would be achieved. The structure of the law, however, fails to guarantee this outcome.
Additionally, it’s unclear if the hospitals targeted by the law’s minimum nurse-to-patient ratios were
operating below the regulators’ desired quality level. This can be seen in the context of a production
function framework and relates to two concepts—substitutability of inputs and variable productivity
of inputs across firms. The first concept refers to a firm’s ability to substitute one combination of
6Hospitals may provide a minimum level of quality such that they’re not subject to lawsuits.
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inputs for another to achieve the same outcome (e.g., a hospital might be able to substitute 2 nurse
aides for 1 LVN to achieve the same outcome).7 The second concept refers to differences across firms
that result in the same combination of factor inputs producing different levels of output.
3.2.1 Substitutability of inputs
Figure 3.2 illustrates the concept of substitutability of inputs for a hypothetical hospital with X0
patients and a production function for quality (S) that depends on its number of nurses (N) and
other inputs (Z) (e.g., nurse aides, physicians, equipment, etc). SAB in Figure 3.2 depicts the
hospital’s isoquality curve for X0 patients for the regulators’ minimum level of desired quality. NAB
identifies the law’s minimum number of nurses required for X0 patients.
Substitutability of Inputs
O
th
er
 In
pu
ts
 (Z
)
Nurses (N)
SAB
C1 C2
NAB
Isoquality, SAB (desired by regulators)
Isocost, C1
Original cost-minimizing point A
Nurse requirement (NAB)
New cost-minimizing point B
Isocost, C2
Figure 3.2 – Substitutability of inputs for production of quality for a hypothetical hospital. The
above graph shows the cost-minimizing combination of inputs for the production of quality before and after AB
394 for a hypothetical hospital. Point A corresponds to the cost-minimizing combination before AB 394. At
this point, the hospital achieved the regulators’ desired level of quality, SAB , even though it failed to meet the
law’s mandated nurse-staffing level, NAB , due to substitution of inputs. Point B represents the hospital’s new
cost-minimizing input combination under the law’s nurse-staffing mandate. At this point, the hospital achieves
the same quality as before but now incurs higher costs (C2 > C1).
For the hospital, efficient production of SAB for X0 patients requires it to operate at Point A
(red cross) in Figure 3.2. This represents the cost-minimizing input combination of N and Z given
7In many production processes, inputs have some degree of substitutability and are not perfect complements. For
nurses, it’s plausible that some substitutability exists with other inputs.
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the wage of nurses and the price of other inputs. (The isocost line, C1, corresponds to the cost
at this point with its slope equaling the ratio of nurse wages to the price of other inputs.) This
cost-minimizing input combination at Point A, however, fails to meet the law’s minimum number
of nurses, NAB , even though it achieves the regulators’ desired level of quality, SAB . Under the
law’s constraints, the hospital would need to increase its number of nurses regardless of its quality
level corresponding to SAB . The hospital’s new cost-minimizing input combination under the law’s
staffing requirement would be Point B (red circle). With this input combination, the hospital has
the same quality as before but now incurs higher costs at C2.
3.2.2 Variable productivity of inputs across firms
As noted previously, the same combination of inputs can produce different levels of output across
firms (i.e., inputs may have different output elasticities across firms).8 In the case of hospitals’
production of quality, these productivity differences can reflect a variety of hospital-specific factors,
including different nurse hiring practices (e.g., minimum number of years of experience), onsite
training and education, severity of patients, physical structure of the hospital, etc. As a result, the
same nurse-staffing levels may produce different levels of quality at different hospitals. For example,
a hospital with a highly experienced team of nurses may achieve a higher quality level than a
hospital with same number of nurses but who are much less experienced. Similarly, a hospital
treating relatively healthy patients may achieve a higher quality level than a hospital treating highly
complicated patients with the same nurse-staffing levels.
3.2.3 Expectations regarding quality of care
As shown above, nurse-staffing level is not a direct indicator of quality of care. Furthermore, requiring
hospitals to increase their nurse-staffing levels will increase costs but may not necessarily increase
quality. More specifically, a mandated increase in nurses will increase the MCS portion of the
hospital’s first-order condition, MRS = MCS , but will not guarantee that the hospital’s new optimal
level of quality will be higher than before. Hospitals’ choice of quality level will continue to be the
one that maximizes profits together with X. In other words, without structuring the law to impose
a direct constraint on quality as shown below,
8In a Cobb-Douglas production function specification, these output elasticities correspond to inputs’ exponents.
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max
X,S
pi(X,S) = R(X,S)− C(X,S)
subject to
S ≥ SAB
it is unclear whether the desired minimum quality level will be achieved. Consequently, the
question of whether AB 394 increased quality of care and patient safety remains an empirical issue.
A number of studies have sought to examine this, as discussed in Chapter 4. Though many have
been descriptive in nature or encountered data issues, most do not to point to any clear quality
improvements.
3.3 AB 394 and hospital production process for patients
treated
This section sets aside quality and discusses the law’s effect on hospital production with respect to
number of patients treated, X, an area that ties into the empirical analyses in Chapters 5 and 6.
This is discussed for a hypothetical hospital for whom the law’s staffing constraint was binding. The
hospital’s production function for patients is assumed to depend on three components—its staffing
level of skilled nurses (i.e., RNs) Ns, unskilled nurses (i.e., LVNs) Nu, and other inputs K. K is
assumed to be fixed in the short-term but is able to be changed in the medium- and long-terms.
Additionally, the output elasticities of inputs are assumed to be fixed in the short- and medium-
terms and only changeable in the long-term. Four scenarios are presented corresponding to the
period before the law and then the short-, medium-, and long-terms following it.
3.3.1 Prior to AB 394
Figure 3.3 illustrates the hypothetical hospital’s cost-minimizing input combination of skilled and
unskilled nurses prior to AB 394 for X0 (400 patients) and fixed K. Here the isocost line C0
represents the minimum cost attainable for the nurse inputs with its slope equal to the ratio of
wages for skilled to unskilled nurses. The dashed blue isonurse line, N0, shows the total number of
nurses used at the cost-minimizing combination Point A (21.4, 34.2), corresponding to 55.6. This
translates to a patient-to-nurse ratio of 7.2 and a ratio of skilled to total nurses of 0.385.
The hospital’s set of cost-minimizing input combinations for different levels of X can be used to
trace its expansion path as shown in Figure 3.4 with the dashed red line. The isocost lines C0, C1,
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Figure 3.3 – Before AB 394: cost-minimizing combination of skilled and unskilled nurses for
X0 for a hypothetical hospital. Point A (red cross) denotes the cost-minimizing combination of skilled and
unskilled nurses for X0 (400 patients) for a hypothetical hospital prior to AB 394 (X = f(Ns, Nu,K)). As
shown by the isonurse line N0, Point A corresponds to 55.6 nurses for a patient-to-nurse ratio of 7.2.
and C2 display the minimum costs achievable for the output levels X0, X1, and X2, respectively.
These, in turn, feed into the hospital’s cost function for X, which is used in its profit maximization.
3.3.2 After AB 394
AB 394 imposed two constraints on hospitals’ production of X. These consisted of a minimum
nurse-staffing level and a minimum nurse skill-mix. These constraints are shown below with RAB
denoting the law’s minimum nurse-to-patient ratio.
Staffing requirement: Ns +Nu ≥ XRAB (3.4)
Skill-mix requirement: Ns ≥ 0.5XRAB (3.5)
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Figure 3.4 – Before AB 394: expansion path for the hypothetical hospital. The dashed red line
shows the expansion path for the hypothetical hospital prior to AB 394. The expansion path feeds into the
hospital’s cost function for X, used in its profit maximization.
Short-term
Figure 3.5 provides a graphical illustration of the law’s impact in the short-term for the same
hypothetical hospital as before. The dashed green isonurse line, NAB , depicts the law’s staffing
requirement, assumed here to be a maximum patient-to-nurse ratio of 6. The dotted red line provides
guidance on the law’s skill-mix requirement. To meet the minimum skill-mix, hospitals operating
on the isonurse line NAB would need to be below its intersection with the dotted red line. Under
the law’s constraints, the hospital’s new cost-minimizing combination of skilled and unskilled nurses
with fixed K is Point B (red circle). At this point, nurse costs total Cshort and represent an increase
over the previous amount of C0. (The isocost line Cshort assumes that the ratio of wages for skilled
to unskilled nurses did not change.)
A similar analysis can be extended to other levels of X to examine the law’s impact on the
hospital’s expansion path and the extent to which it altered the hospital’s cost function for X.9
9For hospitals with homothetic production functions and constant or increasing returns to scale, cost increases
would be observed at all levels of X. For the short-term scenario with fixed K, a hospital’s cost function can be found
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Figure 3.5 – Short-term following AB 394: new cost-minimizing combination of skilled and
unskilled nurses for X0 for a hypothetical hospital. Point B (red circle) denotes the new cost-minimizing
combination of skilled and unskilled nurses under AB 394’s constraints for staffing (NAB) and skill-mix for X0
(400 patients). At this point, nurse costs total Cshort and represent an increase over the previous amount of C0.
Medium-term
As action permits, hospitals for whom the law was binding will take steps to mitigate the law’s
adverse effect on their cost of production and profits. In the medium-term, this may include reduc-
tions of other factor inputs K that were fixed in the short-term. Figure 3.6 provides an illustration
of this. Xmed0 represents a new isoquant for the same output level (i.e., 400 patients) generated
through a reduction in K that shifted Xmed0 to the right of X0. (With reduced K, more nurses
are required to produce the same output level, hence the isoquant’s shift to the right.) With this
isoquant Xmed0, the new cost-minimizing combination of nurses corresponds to Point D (green cir-
cle), which satisfies the law’s staffing and skill-mix requirements. At this point, the production cost
for nurses corresponds to Cmed a reduction from the short-term cost of Cshort shown in Figure 3.5.
via the following:
min
Ns,Nu
C(Ns, Nu, K¯) subject to X = f(Ns, Nu, K¯), Ns +Nu ≥ XRAB , and Ns ≥ 0.5XRAB
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The total cost of production is also lower than for the short-term, since K is also lower. (It still,
however, exceeds the total production cost prior to the law.)
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Figure 3.6 – Medium-term following AB 394: new cost-minimizing combination of skilled and
unskilled nurses for Xmed0 with reduced K for a hypothetical hospital. Point D (green circle) denotes
the new cost-minimizing combination of skilled and unskilled nurses for the hospital’s adjusted isoquant Xmed0
(400 patients) with reduced K. At this point, the law’s requirements for nurse-staffing level (NAB) and skill-mix
are met. Additionally, the production costs are lower than for the short-term scenario.
Long-term
In the long-term, hospitals may further modify their production processes in ways that alter the
productivity of their inputs (i.e., their output elasticities). In the case of hospitals that had to
increase their nurse-staffing levels to comply with AB 394’s mandated level, this could include
changing technologies or investments to enhance the productivity of their larger staff of nurses. This
could include software, equipment, or training programs that improve the workflow and output of
nurses and enable reductions in other inputs for lower total production costs.
Figure 3.7 provides an illustration of the hypothetical hospital’s adjustment of its production
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Figure 3.7 – Long-term following AB 394: new cost-minimizing combination of skilled and un-
skilled nurses for Xlong0 with altered productivity parameters for a hypothetical hospital. Point
E (blue asterisk) denotes the new cost-minimizing combination of skilled and unskilled nurses for the hospital’s
adjusted isoquant Xlong0 (400 patients) with altered productivity parameters for the inputs.
process in the long-term following AB 394. Xlong0 represents the new isoquant for the same output
level of 400 patients as before but with altered productivity parameters. As shown in the graph,
Point E (blue asterisk) is the cost-minimizing combination of skilled and unskilled nurses for this
isoquant Xlong0, satisfying the law’s requirements for nurse staffing (NAB) and skill-mix. In contrast
to the medium-term shown in Figure 3.6, Point E represents a tangency between the isoquant and
its isocost line. Additionally, in the long-run, the new production process enables a lower cost of K,
which generates lower total production costs than in the medium-term.
3.4 Hospital behavior
This section discusses expectations for hospitals in the short-term following the law. Monopolists
are considered first followed by multi-hospital markets.
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3.4.1 Monopolists
As previously discussed, prior to the law, hospitals faced an unconstrained maximization of their
profits (equation 3.1). Under the law, hospitals faced the following constrained maximization where
the law’s constraints were realized in their revised cost function, CAB :
max
X,S
pi(X,S) = R(X,S)− CAB(X,S) (3.6)
(As shown later in Chapter 5, not only were hospitals’ cost functions affected by the law’s nurse-
staffing ratios, they also experienced increases from rising nurse wages as the short-run supply
remained relatively inelastic to the growing demand.) For monopolists for whom the law was non-
binding, no change would be observed—the law would not alter their profit-maximizing selections
of X and S. For monopolists for whom the law was binding, their production costs would increase
as illustrated previously. Faced with this, these hospitals would be expected to take actions to
minimize the resulting effect on their profits. For the simple case of a hospital with a single unit,
this would include scaling back services to the new point X∗new where its marginal revenue equaled
its new marginal cost, MRX(X∗new) = MCABX(X
∗
new). (Similar revisions would also be considered
for quality S with changes depending its marginal revenue and new marginal cost.) Under these
revisions, profits would be less than before the law but maximized under its new constraints at
(PnewX∗new −ACnewX∗new) where ACnew represents the hospital’s new average cost. In extreme
cases where the law’s requirements forced the hospital’s average cost curve above its demand curve
such that the hospital would be operating in the “red” at any level of X (and S), closure of the
facility would be expected in the absence of outside intervention.
The above concepts can be extended to the case where hospitals offer a mix of services each
having a different demand curve, cost function, and staffing constraint, as with general acute care
hospitals. When faced with the law’s cost shock, hospitals would be expected to rebalance their
mix of services along the lines previously discussed, feasibility permitting (i.e., services would be
adjusted such that their marginal revenue equaled their marginal cost).10 For services and units
where profits were now negative, downsizing or closure of the service or unit could occur. Such
actions are most likely for services and units that were low margin prior to the law and thus more
susceptible to being pushed into the “red” with the law’s staffing requirements that increased costs.
10Some units and services may have interdependencies that would need to be accounted for in these adjustments.
Similarly, others might be required at some minimum level to maintain the hospital’s license.
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3.4.2 Multi-hospital markets
For multi-hospital markets, the impact of AB 394 is considerably more complex than for monopolists.
For these markets prior to AB 394, differences would be expected across hospitals due to comparative
advantages. These differences could include their nurse-staffing levels, which as previously discussed,
reflect hospitals’ production functions both in terms of productivity and substitutability of inputs as
well as their level of quality selected. Across these hospitals, the law’s constraints would be expected
to affect them to varying degrees with low nurse-staffing hospitals being most adversely affected.
As with the monopolist hospitals for whom the law was binding, these hospitals would be expected
to respond with actions to mitigate the law’s negative effects on their profits. These could include
downsizing or closures of units that were now unprofitable. In extreme cases where these actions
were insufficient, facility closure could result. These actions would have ramifications for the other
hospitals in the market to extent that they competed with each other. This, in turn, could prompt
changes to their profit-maximizing levels of X and S.
In short, for multi-hospital markets, the law’s impact on hospital profits is more complicated than
in the monopolist case and could be positive or negative. As previously eluded to, this depends on
two factors—the law’s effect on the hospital’s cost function and the law’s effect on the other hospitals
in its market, which in turn, impacts its demand. For instance, if the law prompted facility closures
or large service reductions among competitor hospitals, the remaining hospitals could experience an
increase in market power and profits. If instead the law lessened differentiation with competitor
hospitals so that competition intensified (e.g., hospitals now operated at the same quality level),
hospitals could experience a reduction in profits.
3.5 An alternative theory — rent-seeking by nurses
As previously noted in Section 3.2, although the law’s stated intent was to improve quality of care
and ensure a minimum standard for it, the law was not structured to directly achieve this. This
includes both the manner in which it targeted facilities (i.e., it’s uncertain whether its targeted
facilities were low quality) and its method for quality improvement. This is in contrast to other
quality improvement initiatives that have made quality outcomes their direct focus and benchmark
for achievement. Some of these initiatives like the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services’
Hospital Readmissions Reduction Program have received criticism regarding their structure and may
22
be vulnerable to gaming attempts, but their design more directly reflects an attempt to incentivize
higher quality.11 Programs structured along these lines additionally allow for greater efficiency in
achieving their quality outcomes, because hospitals are not constrained with respect to their inputs
and approach to quality improvement.
The structure of AB 394 suggests an alternative motivation for the law different from quality
improvement—namely, that of rent-seeking by nurses. Rent-seeking describes behavior designed
to appropriate wealth from another party without value creation. In many ways, rent-seeking by
nurses could be argued in light of the circumstances leading up to the law along with its structure
and aftermath. As noted in Chapter 2, the run-up to the law’s passage involved extensive lobbying
by California’s nurse unions and political action. Additionally, the law’s main focus and effect was
to force hospitals to increase their nurse-staffing levels, not necessarily improve quality. This had
two main consequences that clearly benefited nurses. The first was a potential lightening of nurses’
workloads at the hospitals at which staffing increases occurred. The second and arguably more
significant consequence was a dramatic increase in nurse wages (shown in Chapter 5) as the short-
run supply of nurses proved inelastic to the growing demand for them across the state. For RNs, this
amounted to an inflation-adjusted wage increase of 35% from the law’s pre-passage period to 2006,
two years after the law’s implementation deadline. As described in Chapter 4, it’s unclear if any
quality of care improvements occurred. Unsurprisingly, nurse satisfaction was documented to have
increased. Viewed through this lens, nurses won rents through political means and lobbying, but
it’s unclear if patients were better off. In fact, patients may have faced higher prices and reduced
choice of care facilities for services.
11Hospitals operating under programs of this sort face objective functions along the lines of the following where
Smin is the regulator’s minimum acceptable quality level.
max
X,S
pi(X,S) = R(X,S)− C(X,S) subject to S ≥ Smin.
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Chapter 4
The Literature on AB 394 and
Quality of Care
Although nurses are generally regarded as an important component in quality of care,12 it’s
unclear whether mandating hospitals to maintain minimum nurse-to-patient ratios would improve
quality. Since 2005, a number of studies have been published aimed at addressing this in the
context of AB 394. These studies have examined a varied set of quality-related measures. They’ve
also implemented a diverse set of analytic approaches with different degrees of rigor in terms of
identifying causal effects. Although the findings across these studies have been somewhat mixed,
they generally don’t point to clear quality effects. These results, however, may be regarded with
some caution as limitations exist. These include issues around study design, data sources (e.g.,
convenience samples and reporting changes in administrative claims datasets), and a limited set of
outcomes in the more rigorous studies. The following sections provide an overview of the quality
studies performed to date.
4.1 Quality measures and analytic approaches
As previously noted, the studies on AB 394 and quality have examined a range of measures. The
most frequently analyzed have consisted of patient safety indicators (PSIs) that represent nurse-
sensitive preventable events, as designated by the National Quality Forum or the Agency for Health
Care Research and Quality (AHRQ). Chief among these have been “failure to rescue” (FTR) and
12One of the chief mechanisms attributed to nurses’ influence on quality is their monitoring and surveillance of
patients, which constitutes a primary responsibility [Fagin and Fund, 2001]. During this process, nurses are expected
to recognize impending or current problems and coordinate actions to mitigate them. Examples of this include
identifying the signs of postoperative infections and ensuring that appropriate treatment is administered and taking
action to prevent patient falls and pressure ulcers. These actions can be essential for preventing patient harm and in
some cases even saving lives.
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hospital-acquired pressure ulcers. (FTR describes patient death from complications that could have
been prevented under normal circumstances.) Other safety events that have been examined to a
lesser extent include infections due to medical care, falls, pneumonia mortality, and postoperative
events such as deep vein thrombosis (DVT)/pulmonary embolism (PE), sepsis, pneumonia, and
respiratory failure. In addition to these clinical measures, more general risk-adjusted mortality and
risk-adjusted complications have been assessed.
Non-clinical and process-oriented measures have also been examined in some studies. These
include emergency department (ED) wait times for patients, use of restraints, time to first antibiotics
for pneumonia patients, percentage of acute cardiac syndrome (ACS) patients receiving aspirin, and
length of stay. Two studies have also examined general patient satisfaction (and complaints) and
impressions of quality of care as reported by hospital leaders and staff.
The analytic approaches have been quite diverse across studies examining AB 394 and quality.
They have included case studies, descriptive comparisons pre- and post-AB 394’s implementation
using convenience samples, cross-sectional correlation analyses, and interviews with hospital leaders
and staff among others. A minority have sought to use more rigorous techniques to identify causal
effects. A summary is presented in the following sections organized by general type of analysis.
4.2 Studies reporting descriptive results
The first two studies to be published on AB 394 and quality were Donaldson et al. [2005] and
Bolton et al. [2007], the latter being an update of the former. The authors used convenience samples
of 68 and 67 California hospitals, respectively, that participated in the California Nursing Outcomes
Coalition. (The samples represented less than 20% of California hospitals.) Hospitals included
in the study were required to have data during a pre- and a post-implementation period, defined
as the first two quarters of 2002 and 2004, respectively. For Bolton et al. [2007], a second post-
implementation period was also included, consisting of the first two quarters of 2005. The authors
compared the incidence rate of patient falls, hospital-acquired pressure ulcers, and restraint use pre-
and post-implementation of AB 394, using repeated measures analysis of variance. The authors
found no significance difference for any of the outcomes between the pre- and post-periods. It’s
unclear, however, if the results may have been different if non-convenience samples had been used
or if other refinements had been made (e.g., excluding hospitals that had received waivers for the
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law, focusing on hospitals with the greatest staffing increases if sample size allowed).
The next study that emerged on quality and AB 394 used a different dataset with a more
complete capture of California hospitals, obtained from California’s Office of State Health Planning
and Development (OSHPD). The authors for this study descriptively assessed trends for quality-
related measures among California hospitals over 1999–2006. The measures consisted of length
of stay and six AHRQ outcomes that were constructed using AHRQ’s software. These included
pressure ulcers, FTR, DVT, pneumonia mortality, and postoperative pneumonia and sepsis. Plots
were constructed for each quality measure showing the mean incidence rate across California hospitals
for each year. The authors noted no visual change in the trends of any of the measures around the
time of AB 394’s implementation.
Other descriptive studies that have been conducted include Aiken et al. [2010] and Hickey et al.
[2011]. The former used a merged dataset for California, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania, com-
prised of nurse-staffing information collected from nurse surveys in 2006 and state hospital discharge
databases. For each hospital, the percentage of nurses was computed who reported that their last
patient workload was at or below AB 394’s mandated level for their unit. This percentage was then
included as an independent variable in logistic regressions examining quality-related measures from
the nurse surveys. Additional covariates were included to control for hospital and nurse character-
istics. The authors found a significant negative correlation between greater adherence to AB 394’s
staffing ratios and the following nurse-reported outcomes—1) complaints from patients or families,
2) verbal abuse by patients, and 3) poor or fair outcomes. Logistic regressions were also constructed
to examine 30-day inpatient mortality and FTR with an independent variable included for nurses’
patient workload. Regressions were run separately for each state with patient and hospital charac-
teristics included as control variables. The authors found a significant positive association between
patient workloads for nurses and 30-day mortality and FTR rates. It should be noted that these re-
sults are consistent with the extensive literature documenting the general association between higher
nurse-staffing levels and higher quality.13 They’re also consistent with expectations—if nurses are
an input in hospitals’ production of quality, higher staffing levels of them should, on average, be
associated with higher quality, especially in the absence of nurse-staffing constraints (as is the case
with New Jersey and Pennsylvania). This correlation between nurses and quality, however, does not
eludicate whether AB 394 increased quality of care in California.
13Seminal papers in this area include Aiken et al. [2002] and Needleman et al. [2002].
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In Hickey et al. [2011], the authors assessed changes in outcomes pre- and post-AB 394’s imple-
mentation among pediatric cardiac surgery patients in California versus other states, using AHRQ’s
Hospital Cost and Utilization Project’s Kid’s Inpatient Database. The pre-implementation period
was defined as 2003, while the post-implementation period was defined as 2006. The outcomes in-
cluded mortality and complications, both of which were standardized using the ratio of observed to
expected rates. Fourteen California hospitals were included in the analysis. Standardized mortality
rates numerically declined from the pre- to the post-implementation period for both the California
and non-California groups from being higher than expected to lower than expected. Standardized
complication rates, by contrast, increased in California from the pre- to the post-implementation
period, while those in the non-California group decreased. Statistical comparison tests were not
performed for either outcome.
4.3 Studies reporting qualitative results or based on a case
study
Two of the ten studies on AB 394 and quality used either qualitative methods or data from
a single hospital center. In the first of these, Chapman et al. [2009], the authors conducted semi-
structured interviews with leaders at California hospitals to inquire about the effects of AB 394
at their facilities. Twenty hospitals were initially approached, including both financially weak and
financially strong facilities before the law’s implementation. Twenty-three leaders from 12 hospitals
agreed to participate. Hospital leaders reported an increase in ED wait times and a delay in admitting
patients to intensive care units. They also said that they didn’t think that the nurse ratios had had
an impact on quality or had increased patient satisfaction.
In the second study, Weichenthal and Hendey [2011], the authors examined chart review and
monitoring data from the ED of the University Medical Center in Fresno, an urban university
teaching hospital that largely serves an indigent population.14 The authors compared a range of
outcomes pre- and post-implementation of AB 394, corresponding to 2003 and 2004, respectively.
The outcomes consisted of the percentage of patients who left the ED without being seen, reported
medical errors, the percentage of ACS patients receiving aspirin while in the ED, time to first
antibiotics for pneumonia patients, and a variety of ED wait time measures. These measures included
14The hospital had an annual patient census of 57,000 patient visits during the study period and was the only level
1 trauma and burn center in the region.
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room time (time from registration until being placed in a room), through-put time (time from
registration to discharge), and admission time (time from registration until the admission order was
entered). Over the study time period, the hospital’s number of full-time equivalent (FTE) nurses
in its ED didn’t change, but the hospital had to curtail the number of patients in parts of its ED
to comply with the law’s nurse ratio mandate. The authors found a significant increase in ED
wait times for all time measures. They also found a significant improvement in time to antibiotic
administration in pneumonia patients, however, they noted that this may have been negated by the
increase in ED wait times. Surprisingly, there was a significant decrease in patients who left without
being seen, but the authors acknowledged that this might reflect the lower number of patients seen in
the post-implementation year. No change was observed for aspirin administration for ACS patients
or reported medication errors.
4.4 Studies targeting causal effects
Three papers have been published to date with study designs aimed at exploring causal effects of
AB 394 on quality. The first by Cook et al. [2012] used data from OSHPD and an instrumental
variable approach to examine hospitals’ change in outcomes from a pre- to a post-implementation
period in relation to concurrent changes in nurse staffing. The pre- and post-implementation pe-
riods were defined as 2001–2002 and 2005–2006, respectively, and two AHRQ PSI outcomes were
considered—FTR and pressure ulcers—using the AHRQ PSI software. Nurse-staffing levels were
based on hospitals’ general medical-surgical units. The authors found no significant effects on FTR.
Based on a review of the data, they opted not to examine pressure ulcers due to changes that occurred
in their reporting over the study time period related to payment modifications and requirements
from the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS).
The remaining two studies that sought to identify causal effects used difference-in-differences ap-
proaches but with different data sources. The first, by Mark et al. [2013], used three datasets to com-
pare hospitals in California to those in 12 other states over three time periods—a pre-implementation
period (2002–2003), an initial implementation period (January 2004–March 2005), and a final im-
plementation period (April 2005–December 2006). Hospitals were separated into quartiles based
on their pre-implementation nurse-staffing level. For California hospitals, their nurse-staffing quar-
tile was based on unit-level data from OSHPD, which provided nurse productive hours and patients
days for general medical-surgical units. For non-California hospitals, their nurse-staffing quartile was
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based on their nurse FTE information from the American Hospital Association (AHA) database.
(The nurse FTE information from AHA included ambulatory and ancillary services as well as inpa-
tient services. As a result, the authors applied an adjustment factor to try to isolate the inpatient
component. The authors acknowledged that the adjustment factor did not account for hospital
composition of units that can affect staffing, creating potential inaccuracies. Also, assumptions had
to be made to reconcile AHA nurse FTE information with OSHPD nurse staffing information.) Four
AHRQ PSIs were examined, using the AHRQ software. These consisted of FTR (PSI 4), infections
due to medical care, particularly those due to IV lines and catheters (PSI 7), postoperative respi-
ratory failure (PSI 11), and postoperative sepsis (PSI 13). The difference-in-differences regressions
used a Poisson specification and controlled for patient acuity and time and hospital fixed effects.
The authors found that licensed nurses increased significantly more in California hospitals than
those in other states from the pre-implementation to the initial and final periods for all staffing
quartiles. For hospitals in the lowest nurse-staffing quartile, FTR decreased significantly more for
those in California than those in the other states for the initial and final periods. This trend was also
observed for hospitals in the highest nurse-staffing quartile for the final period. For hospitals in the
second highest nurse-staffing quartile, infections significantly increased for those in California versus
those in the other states for the initial period. No significant change was observed for postoperative
respiratory failure or sepsis. Similar to Cook et al. [2012], the authors observed that data for the
AHRQ PSIs, excluding FTR, may be compromised, however, due to coding changes that took place
over the study time period. (Medicare implemented a requirement that all secondary diagnoses in
patient discharge records be coded as to whether they were present-on-admission, a component used
in AHRQ’s PSI software for all outcomes except FTR.)
The final study by Spetz et al. [2013] used an approach similar to Mark et al. [2013] but avoided
the latter’s inconsistencies in nurse-staffing information from different datasets by focusing instead
on only the California OSHPD data. The authors separated hospitals into quartiles based on their
pre-regulation (1999–2001) nurse-staffing level in their general medical-surgical unit. Outcomes
for California hospitals in these staffing quartiles were then compared in a difference-in-differences
framework for four time periods—pre-regulation, transitional (2002–2003), initial (2004), and final
(2005–2006). Six AHRQ PSIs were examined, using the AHRQ PSI software. Four of these out-
comes corresponded to those used in Mark et al. [2013]—FTR (PSI 4), selected infections due to
medical care (PSI 7), postoperative respiratory failure (PSI 11), and postoperative sepsis (PSI 13).
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Additionally, pressure ulcers (PSI 3) and postoperative DVT/PE (PSI 12) were examined. Length of
stay was also assessed for patients experiencing a PSI, excluding those who died in hospital. (Length
of stay was examined on the grounds that if higher nurse staffing improved nurse surveillance of pa-
tients, then emergent complications may have been recognized and treated earlier, shortening length
of stay.) A difference-in-differences Poisson regression was constructed, controlling for patient acuity
and hospital characteristics. The authors found a significant improvement in FTR for the lowest
nurse staffing quartile compared to the highest one for the final period. The lowest nurse staffing
quartile also had less of an increase in postoperative DVT/PE and sepsis for the initial and final
periods compared to the highest staffing quartile. (It should be noted, however, that changes in
coding practices for these outcomes may have compromised these findings.) The authors addition-
ally found that length of stay decreased significantly among patients experiencing selected infections
with greater decreases observed in hospitals in the lower pre-regulation staffing quartiles.
4.5 Summary
Although a number of studies have sought to address the quality effects of AB 394, the impact of
the law remains somewhat unclear. This is partially due to mixed results across studies as well
as the limited number having rigorous analytic designs that test for causal effects. An additional
complication to this is the questionable reliability of many of the claims-based PSI measures used
in the more rigorous studies. As previously discussed, a change in data reporting occurred in the
2000s around present-on-admission flags used in many of the AHRQ PSIs, affecting their reliability
over this time period. Setting aside these measures leaves only AHRQ PSI 4, FTR, with which
to assess the quality effects of AB 394 in these studies. For this outcome, different results were
found by Cook et al. [2012] versus Mark et al. [2013] and Spetz et al. [2013]. The first study found
no improvement in FTR with increases in nurse staffing, while the other two studies found some
improvement among hospitals in different quartiles of nurse-staffing before the law. In short, it’s
unclear whether AB 394 improved results for this outcome, but the inconsistency in results suggests
that quality improvement effects may not have been not strong. Additionally, the studies suggest that
some adverse effects may have occurred in the form of increased wait times for EDs and potentially
ICUs.
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Chapter 5
The Financial Impact on Hospital
Costs
In this chapter, I examine two consequences of AB 394 that affected hospital costs and that inform
this study—the increase in nurse staffing and the rise in nurse wages. The chapter proceeds in three
parts. The first part addresses hospitals’ increase in nurse staffing in relation to timeline events
for AB 394, using data from California’s Office of Statewide Health Planning and Development
(OSHPD). The second part presents descriptive analyses on the rise in nurse wages, again using data
from OSHPD. The final section provides a basic estimate of the law’s financial shock on hospitals
from nurse-staffing and wage increases, holding fixed non-nursing inputs, prices, and production.
5.1 Increase in nurse staffing
AB 394 succeeded in impacting the nurse-staffing levels of hospitals across the state as documented
by a number of studies [Bolton et al., 2007, Conway et al., 2008, Donaldson et al., 2005]. Post-
passage of the law, California hospitals began ramping up their nurse staffing in anticipation of the
law’s implementation date. This trend is illustrated in Figure 5.1, which shows the mean estimated
patient-to-nurse ratio over time for California hospitals’ general medical-surgical unit, the largest and
most common hospital unit.15 (Throughout this chapter, all nurse ratio data are presented in terms
of patient-to-nurse instead of nurse-to-patient for ease of interpretation.) The graph on the left of
the figure shows the mean trend aggregated across short-term general acute care (GAC) hospitals in
15Patient-to-nurse ratios are calculated as (Patient Days×26)/(Productive Hours of RNs, LVNs, and Registry
Nurses). (In calculating the ratios, I used Unruh et al. [2003]’s adjustment of 26 hours in a patient day, which
reflects that most recorded patient days are slightly longer than 24 hours.) Data for these plots were obtained from
the California Office of Statewide Health Planning and Development’s Annual Hospital Financial Dataset and were
converted from fiscal year to calendar year.
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California. This graph reveals a fairly constant patient-to-nurse ratio in the law’s pre-passage years
of 1992–1999. Post-passage of the law, hospitals began to steadily decrease their patient-to-nurse
ratios with the largest decline occurring from 2003–2004, the year in which the law was implemented.
In total, hospitals appear to have decreased their patient-to-nurse ratio by about 1.4 patients on
average from the pre-passage period to 2007.
The graph on the right of Figure 5.1 teases apart hospitals’ nurse-staffing trend by separating
hospitals into four groups based on their patient-to-nurse ratio quartile prior to AB 394’s passage. A
striking feature of this graph is the wide variation in nurse-staffing levels prior to the law’s passage
followed by a steady convergence toward a common patient-to-nurse ratio in the years thereafter.
Similar convergence trends can be seen for other types of hospital units, although the degree of
nurse-staffing variation during the pre-passage years differs.16
Figure 5.1 – Mean patient-to-nurse ratios over time for California hospitals’ general medical-
surgical units. The graph on the left depicts the mean aggregate trend while the graph on the right shows the
mean trend separated into quartiles based on hospitals’ nurse-staffing levels pre-passage of AB 394.
16Intensive care units (ICUs) generally exhibited less variation in patient-to-nurse ratios pre-passage of the law
than non-ICUs (e.g., units for pediatrics, obstetrics, general medical-surgical, or psychiatrics). This lower variation
probably reflects previous staffing requirements for these units stipulated by Health & Safety Code ξ 1294 as well as
less leeway in staffing due to patient severity. More homogeneous case-mix of ICUs across hospitals may have also
contributed to less variation among patient-to-nurse ratios pre-passage of the law.
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To confirm that decreases in patient-to-nurse ratios were driven by increased nurse labor usage
(denominator of the ratio) and not fewer patient days (numerator of the ratio), both components were
examined separately. These analyses revealed that 92% of hospitals that decreased their patient-
to-nurse ratios increased their nurse productive hours. Of these hospitals, nearly 70% experienced
an increase in patient days, necessitating a disproportionately greater increase in nurse labor usage.
Among the small subset of hospitals whose patient-to-nurse ratios increased, over half increased
their nurse labor usage, however, their patient days increased by an even greater amount. Together
with additional checks performed, these findings corroborate that the decline in hospitals’ patient-
to-nurse ratios were driven by increased nurse labor usage. Table 5.1 and Figure 5.2 present these
findings.
Number of CA Hospitals Whose Patient-to-Nurse
Ratio Decreased from 1999 to 2007
(Total N = 253)
Patient Days Total
Increased Decreased N (%)
Nurse Days
Increased 174 59 233 (92%)
Decreased 0 20 20 (8%)
Total
N 174 79 253 (100%)
(%) (69%) (31%) (100%)
Number of CA Hospitals Whose Patient-to-Nurse
Ratio Increased from 1999 to 2007
(Total N = 32)
Patient Days Total
Increased Decreased N (%)
Nurse Days
Increased 17 0 17 (53%)
Decreased 7 8 15 (47%)
Total
N 24 8 32 (100%)
(%) (75%) (25%) (100%)
Table 5.1 – Changes in patient days and nurse productive days among California hospitals. The
above tables decompose California GAC hospitals’ change in their patient-to-nurse ratios from 1999 to 2007 in
terms of changes in their patient days and nurse productive days. The vast majority of all hospitals increased
their nurse productive days.
33
1992 1995 1998 2001 2004 2007
2.
5
3.
0
3.
5
4.
0
4.
5
ln(Patient Days/Day):Quartiles
General Medical-Surgical Unit
Year
ln
(P
at
ie
nt
 D
ay
s/
D
ay
)
AB 394 Passage
AB 394 Implementation
1992 1995 1998 2001 2004 2007
1.
5
2.
0
2.
5
3.
0
ln(Nurse Days/Day):Quartiles
General Medical-Surgical Unit
Year
ln
(N
ur
se
 D
ay
s/
D
ay
)
AB 394 Passage
AB 394 Implementation
Figure 5.2 – Patient and nurse days over time for California hospitals’ general medical-surgical
units by hospital quartile for patient-to-nurse ratio. The graph on the left depicts the mean logged
patient day per day trend while the graph on the right shows the mean logged nurse productive day per day.
The data are separated and color coded according to hospitals’ patient-to-nurse ratio quartiles depicted in Figure
5.1.
5.2 Increase in nurse wages
One “unintended” consequence of California’s minimum nurse-staffing law was a dramatic rise in
nurse wages as the short-run supply of nurse labor remained inelastic to the growing demand. This
wage effect was examined by Mark et al. [2009] in a study using a difference-in-differences approach
with data from four surveys.17 I find results that support their findings using a different dataset. In
Figure 5.3, real wages are shown over time for RNs in California short-term GAC hospitals’ general
medical-surgical units, using data from the California OSHPD Annual Hospital Financial Datasets.
All data have been converted from fiscal to calendar year by weighting values by the number of
report days in their given calendar year across reports. Values have then been adjusted to 2007
dollars using the World Bank’s GDP deflator.
17The four surveys used by Mark et al. (2009) consisted of the National Sample Survey of Registered Nurses, the
Current Population Survey, the National Compensation Survey, and the Occupational Employment Statistics Survey.
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Figure 5.3 reveals a slight decline in the real wage rate for RNs from 1992–1999, followed by
a dramatic rise in their wages beginning in 2000 immediately after AB 394 was passed. Fitting a
hospital fixed effects regression of the form,
ln(wageit) = α+ β(yeart) +
∑
i=1
θi(hospitali) + εit, (5.1)
separately to the law’s pre-passage (1992–1999) and post-passage (1999–2006) periods generates the
following wage rate statistics.18 During the pre-passage period, RN real wages declined very slightly
at −0.44% per year on average (95% CI: -0.59%, -0.30%).19 Following passage of the law, this
trend changed with the RN real wage rate increasing by 4.36% per year on average (95% CI: 4.18%,
4.55%), outpacing inflation. By the law’s implementation in 2004, RN real wages were ∼24% higher
than in the pre-passage period. Six years after the law was passed, real wages had climbed to ∼35%
higher than in the pre-passage period adjusted for inflation.
Similar wage analyses were performed for LVNs and registry nurses. (Registry nurses are tem-
porary nurses whose employment is generally secured through an outside agency and are often more
expensive to hire.) As Figure 5.4 shows, LVN real wages exhibited comparable though less pro-
nounced trends to RNs. During the law’s pre-passage years of 1992–1999, the LVN real wage rate
lagged slightly behind the inflation rate at -0.25% per year on average (95% CI: -0.46%, -0.04%).
Following passage of the law, this trend reversed with real wages increasing at 3.22% per year on
average (95%CI: 2.95%, 3.41%).
Registry nurse real wages showed the same general pattern as RNs and LVNs, but with less
linearity as shown in Figure 5.4. Specifically, in the three years immediately following passage of the
law (i.e., 1999–2002), their real wage rate increased dramatically by 8.33% per year on average (95%
CI: 7.19%, 9.49%) before leveling off. This wage hike for registry nurses coincides with a spike in
their usage by hospitals, a possible indication that hospitals experienced difficulty securing adequate
nurse-staffing in the aftermath of the law.20
Similar wage trends to those in Figures 5.3 and 5.4 were found for RNs, LVNs, and registry nurses
18The regressions omitted 2007, since wages in this year appear to have leveled off.
19These declining nurse wage rates may have provided another motivation for California’s nurse unions’ intense
lobbying for minimum nurse-staffing legislation.
20In the pre-passage years 1992–1997, registry nurse real wages lagged behind the inflation rate at -2.64% per year
on average (95% CI: -3.43%, -1.84%). From 1997–1999, this trend reversed, increasing to 2.67% per year (95% CI:
0.59%, 4.80%). In the three years following immediate passage of AB 394 (1999–2002), registry nurse real wages
increased dramatically by 8.33% per year on average (95% CI: 7.19%, 9.49%). In subsequent years, this trend leveled
off and declined slightly in 2007.
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Figure 5.3 – Wages over time for RNs in California hospital general medical-surgical units.
in other units of California GAC hospitals. Although these findings cannot ascribe a causal effect
to AB 394 for the observed increase in nurse wages, the evidence is highly suggestive, particularly
when coupled with hospitals’ concurrent increases in nurse staffing at that time.
5.2.1 California AB 1107 — minimum staffing for skilled nursing facilities
Around the time that AB 394 was passed, California adopted another piece of legislation that affected
nurses across the state. Passed in July 1999 and implemented in 2000, this law, known as Assembly
Bill 1107 (AB 1107), mandated minimum staffing levels for Skilled Nursing Facilities (SNFs) [Tong,
2011]. Although AB 1107 forced SNFs to increase their staffing, it also permitted substitution of
less skilled labor (e.g., nursing aides) for more skilled labor (e.g., RNs), in contrast to AB 394. To
investigate whether AB 1107 might have contributed to the nurse wage increases in GAC hospitals,
I examined total nurse productive hours employed across California SNFs from 1997–2007. This
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Figure 5.4 – Wages over time for LVNs and registry nurses in California hospital general medical-
surgical units.
analysis revealed that SNF usage of RNs actually decreased in California during this time period,
suggesting that AB 1107 did not contribute to hospitals’ increase in RN wages. (It should also be
noted that even if the opposite trend had been observed, total RN usage by SNFs across California
was so small compared to that of GAC hospitals that any effect would have likely been slight.)
Despite the decrease in SNF RN usage, I found that SNF RN real wages exhibited the same
general trend that I observed for RNs in GAC hospitals with wages steadily increasing beginning in
2000. This finding may denote an externality of AB 394 on SNFs, increasing their nurse labor costs.
5.3 Estimate of the law’s financial shock holding fixed non-
nursing inputs, prices, and production
To gauge the magnitude of AB 394’s financial shock on hospitals and whether it could be sufficient
to prompt hospitals to close their EDs or facilities, I performed the following basic calculation.
Using data for California hospitals from 1995 (i.e., four years before the law’s passage), I applied
hospitals’ 2006 nurse wages (in real terms) and staffing ratios from their affected units. Holding
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their non-nursing inputs, prices, and production across units fixed, I then calculated the impact on
the hospitals’ nursing costs and operating margins under this stylized scenario.21
In performing this exercise, I opted to use hospitals’ 2006 nurse staffing ratios in this calculation
instead of applying the law’s mandated ratios in order to capture inventory effects that would cause
hospitals to maintain higher staffing levels to comply with the law’s continuous staffing requirement.
This also allowed capture of changes in nurse-staffing skill mix (i.e., use of RNs, LVNs, and registry
nurses). For hospitals that failed to comply with the law’s mandate in 2006, the law’s minimum
staffing level was applied. Where wages were unavailable, the median wage was applied. Table 5.2
decomposes the law’s financial impact into its nurse-staffing effect and its wage effect, presenting
each separately and then together.
Mean Median 25th Pctl 75th Pctl
Initial Value (1995)
Operating margin 1.2% 2.1% -4.2% 6.9%
Impact of Staffing
On nursing costs +19.5% +18.7% +4.7% +28.9%
On operating margin -2.3% -2.5% -4.0% -0.8%
Impact of Wages
On nursing costs +43.2% +40.7% +32.1% +51.6%
On operating margin -5.9% -5.5% -7.3% -4.1%
Impact of Staffing & Wages
On nursing costs +60.9% +57.6% +40.7% +75.1%
On operating margin -7.8% -7.8% -9.9% -5.5%
Table 5.2 – Estimate of AB 394’s financial impact, holding fixed prices, production, and non-
nursing inputs.
In 1995, the median operating margin among California hospitals was 2.1% with the 25th and
75th percentiles corresponding to -4.2% and 6.9%, respectively. These numbers reveal relatively
thin operating margins for a large portion of hospitals with many financially vulnerable. Applying
the law’s staffing requirement to these hospitals while holding fixed their 1995 non-nursing inputs,
prices, and production along with nurse wages, generated a median increase in nursing costs of
around 19%. These increased costs translated to a median decline in operating margin of 2.5%
with drops of 4% and 0.8% for hospitals in the 25th and 75th percentiles, respectively. While these
21In this analysis, I excluded hospitals that received waivers for the law. Additionally, all data were converted from
fiscal to calendar year.
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numbers are considerable, the impacts from the law’s accompanying nurse wage increases were even
larger. Applying these wage increases while holding constant other factors (i.e., nurse staffing, other
inputs, prices, production) increased median nursing costs by almost 41%, which in turn, produced
a median operating margin decline of 5.5%. For hospitals in the 25th and 75th percentiles, this
amounted to drops of 7.3% and 4.1%, respectively.
Unsurprisingly, combining the law’s staffing and wage effects while holding non-nursing inputs,
prices, and production fixed generated a sizable financial impact. Median nursing costs increased
by almost 58% while the median operating margin fell by 7.8%. For hospitals in the 25th and 75th
percentiles, operating margins fell by 9.9% and 5.5%, respectively. These numbers suggest that the
law produced a significant financial shock for hospitals to absorb. In fact, without changes to other
inputs, production, or output prices, over three quarters of hospitals would have been pushed into
the red. As shown in subsequent sections, for a significant number of the most severely affected
hospitals, these changes were not sufficient to prevent their closure.
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Chapter 6
The Impact on Hospital and
Emergency Department Closure
and Downsizing of Mental Health
Services
As previously discussed, AB 394 succeeded in increasing nurse-staffing levels in hospitals across
the state, however, it also led to a substantial rise in nurse wages as the short-run supply of
nurse labor proved inelastic to the growing demand. In this chapter, I examine the impact of
the resulting shock to hospitals’ cost functions from higher wages for nurses and the inability
to substitute away from them due to the law’s nurse ratio mandate. Specifically, I investigate
the law’s effect on three outcomes, representing potential responses to financial duress—hospital
closure, emergency department (ED) closure, and downsizing of mental health services. Exam-
ination of these outcomes provides a glimpse into how hospitals adapt and modify their service
mix in response to financial shocks. It also adds to the literature on second-order effects of AB
394, touching on implications for patients’ access to care and other consequences for their com-
munities. This work additionally ties into the literature on the determinants of hospital and
ED closure [Bazzoli and Andes, 1995, Hsia et al., 2011, Liu et al., 2011, Lynch and Ozcan, 1994,
Lynn and Wertheim, 1993, Office of Inspector General, Department of HHS, 2003, Sloan et al., 2010]
and relates to work on the downsizing of low margin services [Banks et al., 1997, 1999, Chen et al.,
2009, David and Helmchen, 2006, David et al., 2011, Norton and Staiger, 1994, Vladeck, 2006]. The
chapter proceeds in three main parts. The first part discusses the relevance of the outcome measures
and provides context for them. The second part recaps the conceptual framework for the analysis,
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discussed in Chapters 3, and presents the hypotheses to be examined and general analytic approach.
The third main part presents the analysis and results.
6.1 Relevance of the outcome measures
6.1.1 Hospital closure
Among the three outcomes examined, hospital closure represents the most extreme response to
financial distress and is generally the final action undertaken after all available rescue means and
activities have been exhausted. Although hospital closure is typically a rare event, it’s nevertheless
a relevant outcome among activities precipitated by AB 394’s shock cost. This relates to both
contextual factors, which suggested its occurrence and increased its likelihood, as well as its policy
significance as discussed below.
One of the contextual motivations for examining hospital closures are the anecdotal reports
and news articles that emerged following the law’s implementation. These complained of increased
closures in the state [Los Angeles Times , Jan. 9(2004] caused by the law’s financial burden. One of
the most frequently cited examples was Santa Teresita Hospital in Los Angeles county. According to
hospital administrators, financial pressures produced by AB 394 forced the hospital to first downsize
its bed count and eventually close its ED. This was later followed by complete closure of its acute
care medical facility in 2004.
In addition to anecdotal reports, other reasons for examining hospital closures are the numerous
studies documenting increased financial strain and closure vulnerability of U.S. hospitals in the
years preceding AB 394’s passage [AHA, 2002, Reiter et al., 2012, Shattuck Hammond Partners,
2001]. A 2002 white paper by the American Hospital Association (AHA) found that almost a third
of hospitals operated under overall negative margins [AHA, 2002]. Contributing factors included
nationwide regulations such as the Federal Balanced Budget Act of 1997, the Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, and the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor
Act of 1986. These laws impacted hospitals’ bottom lines, respectively, by mandating reductions in
Medicare reimbursements, requiring adoption of data security and storage standards, and forcing
hospitals to assess and stabilize anyone in need of emergency treatment regardless of ability to pay.
Along with these legislative pressures, hospitals faced a challenging investment environment from the
business community. Gloomy outlook reports by Moody’s Investors Service and Standard & Poor’s
Corporation had a chilling effect on investors who viewed hospitals as risky investments, which in
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turn raised interest rates and borrowing costs for hospitals’ debt financing for capital [AHA, 2002].
Within California, hospitals endured additional financial stresses. These included high HMO
penetration (54% compared to 34% nationwide), large uninsured populations (21% compared to
16% nationwide), and the 1994 Seismic Retrofit Law (California Senate Bill 1953) that required
hospitals to meet standards of structural resilience to earthquakes, necessitating capital investments
[Reiter et al., 2012, Shattuck Hammond Partners, 2001]. By 1999, the median operating margin
of California hospitals was -0.33%, below the industry heuristic of 3–5% for healthy performance
[Shattuck Hammond Partners, 2001].
In addition to the contextual reasons described above, hospital closures represent a relevant
outcome for their policy importance. These events can have significant consequences for their com-
munities. These include reduced access to care with patients forced to travel further for treatment.
For patients with urgent, time-sensitive health conditions, this added delay in treatment can have
adverse effects for their health outcomes [Buchmueller et al., 2006]. Closures can also create tem-
porary strains on nearby hospitals that are unequipped to handle increased patient flows from the
closures. This, in turn, can affect patient wait times and even outcomes. Beyond these ramifications,
hospital closures can have a significant effect on the local economy of their communities. Hospitals
are often major employers and their shuttering can create substantial job loss and reduction of per-
capita incomes and tax revenue [Holmes et al., 2006]. Finally, hospital closures can cause changes to
remaining hospitals’ market power and additionally their operations and efficiency [Lindrooth et al.,
2003]. Any of these effects are of interest to policy makers.
6.1.2 ED closure and downsizing of mental health services
Downsizing or closure of low margin services represents a less drastic and more intermediate response
to financial stress than hospital closure. Although these activities are less severe than the complete
shuttering of a facility, they can nonetheless have significant implications for patient access to care
and well being. Candidates for such closures and downsizings include EDs and mental health services
both of which have been prone to low or even negative margins as discussed below.
ED closure
Although EDs can aid hospital profits by generating inpatient admissions, they can also adversely
affect their facilities’ bottom line, depending on their payer mix. EDs are frequently the provider
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of choice for patients who are poor, sick, and uninsured or underinsured [Horwitz, 2005]. Facilities
receiving high proportions of these patients in their EDs can experience diminished profit margins for
these units, which can render them unprofitable in some instances. These payer mix considerations
were made more pronounced in the years preceding AB 394 in the form of the federal Emergency
Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act (EMTALA) of 1986. This law required that all hospitals
receiving payments from Medicare screen and stabilize any patient who arrived in their ED, regardless
of the patient’s ability to pay. As such, hospitals were forbidden from engaging in “patient dumping,”
the practice of transferring uninsured patients from private to public hospitals for financial reasons
without consideration of their medical condition. Consequently, EMTALA increased the financial
vulnerability of EDs to uninsured and underinsured patients. These effects may be present in the
findings of Hsia et al. [2011] who showed that the number of non-rural EDs declined by 30% between
1990–2009 with closure decisions driven primarily by economic factors.
EMTALA has been particularly noteworthy in California. This is due, in part, to the state’s high
population of uninsured persons compared to the rest of the country [CMA, 2001]. Additionally,
reports have noted that the state increased its enforcement of the law after 1997, several years
before AB 394’s passage [CMA, 2001]. These factors may have increased the likelihood of ED
closure, following further financial shocks from AB 394.
ED closures have, in fact, been rumored to have increased due to AB 394. These anecdotal reports
were cited by Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger in 2004 when he sought to overturn the mandated
ED nurse ratios and the revised general medical-surgical ratios scheduled for implementation in
2005 [California Department of Health Services, 2004]. Such closures can have important social
implications for patient access to care for urgent, unplanned health needs. Not only can they result
in longer distances traveled for medical care, jeopardizing health outcomes, they can also result
in crowding of nearby remaining EDs. Given that ED closures have risen nationwide since 1990
[Hsia et al., 2011], significant increases over this baseline may present worrisome implications for
California.
Downsizing of mental health services
Similar to EDs, inpatient services for mental health are generally regarded as low margin or relatively
unprofitable [Horwitz, 2005]. Drivers of this consist of a combination of factors. These include the
general financial means of mental health patients along with the nature of services provided and their
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reimbursement levels. With respect to the first of these factors, inpatient behavioral and mental
health services are often focused on poorer individuals reliant on Medicaid or who are uninsured or
underinsured, rendering payment uncertain or minimal [Evans, 2012]. For some of these individuals,
their challenging financial situations may be linked to their mental health conditions and exacerbated
by social factors such as housing instability and social isolation. (It should be noted that patients
who are treated in inpatient settings for mental health conditions comprise a subset experiencing
mental health crises. These are often patients for whom it’s been determined that they present a
risk to themselves or to others [Salinsky and Loftis, 2007].)
A second contributor to the low margins of mental health services is the nature of their services
provided. The majority of inpatient psychiatric stays are for conditions like depression or other
mood disorders (38%), substance abuse (25%), or schizophrenia or other psychoses (22%) [Owens,
2007]. (Substance abuse frequently co-occurs with other conditions, inflating its incidence among
these inpatients to over 50%.) Treatment of these conditions, in contrast to general medical-surgical
cases, typically does not involve the more lucrative, capital-intensive ancillary services like imaging,
telemetry, laboratory work, or operating room suites. Likewise, elective procedures generally don’t
apply to them. Instead, diagnostic work and treatment for inpatient mental health tend to rely
on more labor-intensive processes like patient interviews, expert interpretations, and monitoring
[Salinsky and Loftis, 2007]. For patients at risk of self-harm or harm to others, supervision and
behavioral management requirements can be greater and may require contained locked units with
higher levels of security, increasing costs [Salinsky and Loftis, 2007].
In the mid-1990s prior to AB 394’s passage, financial pressures intensified on inpatient mental
health services, increasing their susceptibility for downsizing and elimination. Contributing factors
included increased managed care penetration in Medicaid and among commercial insurers along with
reduced 3rd-party payment rates and increased utilization management [Salinsky and Loftis, 2007].
Additionally, the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 modified the cost-based reimbursement rules for
Medicare inpatient psychiatric services and imposed a national payment cap. (Medicare reimburse-
ment for these services had previously been governed by the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility
Act of 1982, which had exempted them from Medicare’s prospective payment system.) In response
to these combined factors, bed capacity for mental health services in general acute care hospitals
declined during the late-1990s [Foley et al., 2004].
Further reductions in mental health services triggered by AB 394’s cost shock are of policy inter-
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est, particularly given the previous capacity curtailment. Although new alternative forms of crisis
intervention have emerged such as intensive outpatient treatment, mobile crisis teams, and resi-
dential treatment centers, these services have not been widespread and thus have not compensated
for the prior capacity reductions [Salinsky and Loftis, 2007]. As a result, inpatient facilities have
continued to be the main care option for patients experiencing mental health crises but with bed
shortages being reported along with other issues. These issues have included increased wait times for
admission and greater reliance on law enforcement and jails to temporarily hold patients at risk to
themselves or others [Salinsky and Loftis, 2007]. Additional downsizing or elimination of inpatient
mental health services from a cost shock like AB 394 could further exacerbate these problems.
6.2 Conceptual framework
The passage of AB 394 generated a cost shock for hospitals across California by requiring an increase
of nurse-staffing levels and to do so at higher wage rates. As discussed in Chapter 3, faced with this
change to their cost function, hospitals would be expected to take actions to minimize any negative
effects on their profits. This could include changes to their service mix, such as closures of certain
units for which average costs now exceeded their average revenue. In situations where such changes
were insufficient, hospital closure could result.
For hospitals, two components could be expected to drive the extent to which AB 394 affected
their financial health and viability: 1) the size of the cost impact borne by the hospital; and 2)
the hospital’s ability to minimize the law’s negative effects on its profits. The first relates to the
immediate impact of the law. Although all hospitals and their units were affected by the resulting
nurse wage increases, some were harder hit than others. Hospitals with low nurse-staffing levels
prior to the law suffered the greatest financial hit as they had to increase their staffing the most to
comply with the law’s nurse-to-patient ratios. The second factor pertains to the degree to which
hospitals could offset and withstand AB 394’s cost shock. This, in turn, depends on a variety
of factors. These include a hospital’s ability to downsize or close its units, and the presence of
other factors that could bolster financial health such as donations, non-operating profits, market
investments, etc. Additionally, the extent to which a hospital could transfer its cost increase to
its payers could influence the law’s financial impact. This, correspondingly, is determined by its
payer mix and price-setting discretion with these payers. Hospitals that serve larger proportions
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of privately-insured patients and have greater market power relative to insurers are better able to
offset their cost increases and suffer smaller losses. I address the two components that determine
AB 394’s impact on hospital financial health by controlling for the first and testing for the second.
6.2.1 Hypotheses
The following hypotheses and accompanying corollaries were tested.
Hypothesis 1 Following the cost shock from AB 394, California hospitals will shift their
service mix based on the financial impact on units. Specifically, hospitals will
downsize or close units and services that were low margin and thus more
susceptible to being pushed into the “red,” resulting in increased ED closures
and downsizing of mental health services.
Corollary 1 If hospitals are able to offset their financial hit by shifting their service mix
and pursuing other measures, significant changes may not be observed in their
overall operating margins.
Hypothesis 2 In extreme cases where hospitals are unable to offset their financial hit from
AB 394 by shifting their service mix or pursuing other measures, hospital
closures will increase.
Corollary 2 Hospital closure, consequently, will be accompanied by declining overall
operating margins as these hospitals are unable to compensate for AB 394’s
cost shock.
Hypothesis 3 Hospitals with low nurse-staffing levels prior to AB 394’s passage will suffer
the greatest financial hit and therefore be more susceptible to ED and hospital
closure and downsizing of mental health services, ceteris paribus.
6.2.2 General approach
Due to data availability, different approaches were used to examine the hypotheses pertaining to ED
and hospital closure versus reduction in mental health services. Following this section, the remainder
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of the chapter addresses the analysis and results for ED and hospital closure first followed by those
for downsizing of mental health services.
Hospital and ED closure
Two main approaches were employed to test the above hypotheses for ED and hospital closure. For
the first approach, a database of national hospitals was used to construct a control group for a large
sample of California hospitals (i.e., treatment group), using matching techniques and data restricted
to AB 394’s pre-passage period. Hospitals were matched on a range of characteristics, including
those related to their financial health and ability to withstand cost increases. These treatment and
control groups were then compared post-passage of the law to assess the law’s effect on aggregate
ED and hospital closure in California (i.e., Hypotheses 1 and 2). In addition to analyzing these
aggregate effects, analyses were conducted to examine how California hospitals were differentially
affected based on their nurse-staffing level prior to AB 394. Specifically, hospitals with low versus
not-low nurse-staffing pre-passage of AB 394 were compared relative to their matched controls (i.e.,
counterfactuals). In this manner, the analyses tested the postulated mechanism through which AB
394 impacted hospitals (i.e., Hypothesis 3).
The second main approach focused only on California hospitals and used a different dataset.
Here, variation was exploited across these facilities’ pre-passage nurse-staffing levels, and a cross-
sectional approach was used to determine the relative effect of the law between California hospitals.
This within-California analysis served two purposes. First, it allowed estimation of differential
effects of the law between hospitals with low versus not-low nurse-staffing levels prior to AB 394’s
passage. Second, it provided a robustness check to the previous approach examining Hypothesis 3
by using a second, richer dataset and a different method. Figure 6.1 provides a schematic of these
two approaches.
In both approaches, only short-term general acute care (GAC) hospitals were used. For the re-
mainder of the chapter, I refer to the first approach as National Matching Analysis. When discussing
this approach, hospitals from California are termed treatment hospitals, while those from the rest of
the country are termed control hospitals. I refer to the second main approach in subsequent sections
as Within-California Analysis.
For all analyses, the law’s pre-treatment period was defined as before the law’s passage (i.e.,
1995–1999), while the post-treatment period was defined as after its passage. In other words, I look
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for the law’s effect beginning in 2000 (i.e., a few months after the law was passed). This approach
differs from previous studies that have looked for the law’s effect beginning in 2002 after draft
regulations were released [Cook et al., 2010, Donaldson et al., 2005, Reiter et al., 2010]. I argue
that this approach of looking for the law’s effect after its passage offers cleaner identification of its
impact, since it’s likely that hospitals, aware of the law’s passage and higher staffing requirements
“coming down the pike,” began phasing in increased staffing levels before draft regulations were
issued. This is suggested by Figure 5.3, which shows a striking increase in real wages for RNs
beginning in 2000. This trend is similarly mirrored by the left-hand graph of Figure 5.1, which
shows a gradual increase in nurse staffing starting in 2000.
CA
Hospitals
Hospitals in the
Rest of the U.S.
Matched Control
Hospitals
Matching: Pre-Passage AB 394
Matched Control
Hospitals
CA: All Hospitals
CA: Low Nurse-Staffing Hospitals
CA: Not-Low Nurse-Staffing Hospitals
Comparison: Post-Passage AB 394
(1a)
(1b)
(2)
Figure 6.1 – General approach. In the National Matching Analysis, California hospitals (i.e., treatment
group) were matched to hospitals in the rest of the country on a range of characteristics from before AB 394’s
passage to create a counterfactual. These treatment and control groups were then compared post-passage of AB
394 to determine the law’s effect. Specific analyses included the aggregate effect of the law on California as a
whole (1a) and the relative effect on California hospitals based on their nurse-staffing level pre-passage AB 394
(1b). The Within-California Analysis employed a different dataset and focused only on California hospitals.
Here differential effects between California hospitals were studied based on their pre-passage nurse-staffing level
(2).
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Downsizing of mental health services
As previously mentioned, downsizing of mental health services was analyzed using a different ap-
proach from hospital and ED closure for data availability reasons. Specifically, reduction in these
services was examined using patient volume information for California GAC hospitals over 1999–
2006. Similar to the Within-California Analysis, differential effects were assessed between hospitals
with low versus not-low nurse staffing pre-passage of AB 394. In this manner, relative effects were
examined as opposed to causal effects.
6.3 National matching analysis — hospital and ED closure
6.3.1 Data and variables
For the National Matching Analysis, the data sources included the American Hospital Association
(AHA) Annual Surveys, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) Hospital Cost Report
Files (HCRIS), and the Area Resource File (ARF). The original datasets organized hospital reports
by fiscal year. To ensure comparability, all variables were converted from fiscal year to calendar
year by weighting the values in proportion to the number of reporting days in each calendar year.
For example, if a hospital reported operating revenues of $1.2 million for the fiscal year beginning
October 1, 1999 to September 30, 2000 (12 months), it was attributed $0.3 million for the three
months of 1999 and $0.9 million for the nine months of 2000. For categorical variables, values across
the various reports corresponded well. For the few cases where discrepancies existed, the value that
was reported for the majority of months in the calendar year was used.
Matching covariates
Table 6.1 lists the set of covariates used to match California hospitals to comparable ones in the rest
of the country. These variables were chosen for their possible confounding effects on hospital and
ED closure, and consequently many reflect or are related to hospital financial status. In addition,
covariates with potential influence on hospitals’ nurse-staffing levels were included for matching.
The final set of factors consisted of hospital, market, and population characteristics.
Basic hospital-level characteristics included ownership, system membership, size, number of ED
visits, teaching status, and safety-net status. The first four reflect general operational characteristics.
Teaching status was added to control for teaching hospitals’ greater nurse-staffing needs from training
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Variable Detail
HOSPITAL BASIC CHARACTERISTICS
Ownership† not-for-profit / for-profit / govt non-federal
System membership† yes / no
Teaching status† non-teaching / major teaching / minor teaching
Safety-net† yes / no (proportion of Medicaid pts 1 sd above state mean)
Size† staffed hospital beds
ED visits† number of visits
HOSPITAL FINANCIAL CHARACTERISTICS (AVERAGE & TREND)
Operating margin§ (net income from operations)/(operating revenue)
Return on equity§ (net income)/(total assets - total liabilities) × 100
Return on assets§ (net income)/(total assets) × 100
Current ratio§ (total current assets)/(total current liabilities)
Total asset turnover§ (total revenue)/(total assets)
Total debt to net assets§ (total liabilities)/(total assets - total liabilities)
Operating revenue§ ln(operating revenue)
Operating expenses§ ln(operating expenses)
MARKET CHARACTERISTICS
Urban (MSA)† yes / no
Market concentration (HHI)†
P
i s
2
i where si =market share for firm i in its HSA (beds)
Average adjusted per capita cost∗ Medicare part A FFS reimbursement (treatment intensity)
POPULATION CHARACTERISTICS (COUNTY)
Population growth∗ 5 yr total growth
Age distribution∗ % over 65
Uninsured∗ % total
Race∗ % white
†: AHA data; §: CMS HCRIS data; *: Area Resource File
Table 6.1 – Covariates used for the National Matching Analysis. California hospitals were matched to
hospitals in the rest of the U.S. based on the above covariates averaged over the five-year pre-passage period,
1995–1999. In addition, a trend component (i.e., the slope from regressing the variable against time) was included
for all hospital financial characteristics.
doctors and treating more severe cases. Safety-net status was included to help capture a hospital’s
payor mix of indigent patients, which can affect profitability and its ability to withstand cost shocks.
This indicator was calculated based on the hospital’s proportion of Medicaid patients.
In addition, a variety of measures were included to account for hospitals’ financial health. For
these measures, I referred to an extensive but largely inconsistent literature on measuring hospital
financial performance. Because no consensus existed in the literature on a definitive set of measures
that completely captures hospitals’ financial health, a number of financial ratios were calculated to
provide as comprehensive a picture as possible. These ratios were constructed using raw financial
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metrics available in the HCRIS database and representing various dimensions: profitability, liquidity,
capital structure, and activity. From the pool of financial measures, a subset was selected (Table
6.1) based on correlation analysis (i.e., if two variables had an absolute correlation value greater
than 0.8, only one was kept).
For the market-level covariates, characteristics included urban/rural location, market concentra-
tion, and county-level Medicare Part A average adjusted per capita cost (AAPCC). All factors were
chosen for their potential influence on hospital profitability. For instance, urban/rural location was
selected to help address differences in demand and labor markets. Market concentration, calculated
as a hospital’s Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), helped adjust for market competitiveness, and
AAPCC helped to control for differences in patient acuity and practice patterns.
The population-based covariates consisted of a set of county-level characteristics that helped
adjust for demand conditions, payor mix, and patient acuity. In selecting these characteristics, a
correlation-based exclusion principle was applied similar to the financial measures. For example, the
variable poverty rate had a correlation of 0.85 with percent uninsured and hence only the latter was
included. Similarly, percent Hispanic was highly correlated with both percent white and percent
uninsured and therefore was not included. The final set of population-based covariates consisted of
population growth, percent over 65 years, percent uninsured, and percent white.
Matching was performed using data solely from the pre-passage period, 1995–1999. All numeric
covariates were averaged over this period, after excluding extreme outliers. This averaging conferred
two advantages. First, it smoothed idiosyncrasies in the data, and second, it allowed retention of
hospitals that were missing some data across these years.22 For the financial performance variables,
a trend component was additionally included, calculated as the slope from regressing the variable
against time in the pre-passage period. Together, the pre-passage average and trend captured the
level and trajectory of each financial variable.
Outcome variables
For the National Matching Analysis, the outcome variables (i.e., hospital closure and ED closure)
were determined from the AHA data. Specifically, the AHA Summary of Changes Deletion File
was used to identify hospital closures. For ED closure, I opted not to use the AHA’s ED indicator
22Matching hospitals on year-by-year covariate values over the law’s pre-passage period, 1995–1999, would have
risked matching hospitals on noise, since idiosyncrasies existed within the data and such matching would place undue
emphasis on minor fluctations from year-to-year.
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variable due to data reliability issues (i.e., incompleteness and inconsistencies). Instead, ED closure
was determined using ED visits, a more reliably coded variable. ED closure was defined as a 95%
drop in ED visits. (Hospitals that closed but had maintained EDs were also included.)
Treatment group of California hospitals
Hospitals in California had the ability to apply for waivers from the law with applications considered
on a case-by-case basis. Based on a list obtained from California’s Department of Health Services,
facilities were excluded that had been granted waivers.23 The final dataset consisted of 316 California
hospitals and 4000 potential control hospitals.
6.3.2 Statistical methods
Matching of treatment and control hospitals
Matching [Rubin, 1973] is a widely used technique for causal inference that produces comparable
treatment and control groups and reduces the effect of confounding factors. In matching, a subject
exposed to a treatment is matched to one or more subjects from a control population based on
covariates thought to be potential confounders, using data from the pre-treatment period. The
difference in responses between the treatment and matched control groups post-treatment can then
be attributed to the application of treatment rather than the effect of confounders. Thus, matching
can be viewed as an alternative to difference-in-differences (DD) regression for identification of
causal effects. Matching techniques can provide superior results to DD methods in situations where
an obvious control group does not exist for the treatment group being studied. Specifically, reliable
identification by DD rests crucially on the assumption that the researcher’s selected control group
accurately captures the counterfactual of the treatment group (i.e., parallel trends assumption). In
situations where obvious control groups do not exist, matching techniques can enable construction
of better counterfactuals by selecting the most relevant control subjects. For this reason, a matching
approach was implemented for the analysis.
Full-matching was selected for the matching algorithm, using Mahalanobis distance between
subjects with a propensity score caliper.24 Full-matching was proposed by Rosenbaum [Rosenbaum,
1991], and its effectiveness discussed by Hansen [Hansen, 2004]. Full-matching constructs optimal
23Approximately, 38 hospitals were granted waivers of some kind, many of which were rural facilities.
24Mahalanobis distance differs from regular Euclidean distance in that the former is scale-invariant and accounts
for covariances between the various covariates.
52
subsets of treatment and control subjects without restricting the number of subjects from either
group in any subset. Thus, in principle, full-matching includes the more traditional pair matching
and fixed 1 : k matching schemes.
The procedure was implemented using the R package optmatch [Hansen and Klopfer, 2006]. The
matching criterion was the minimization of the Mahalanobis distance [Mahalanobis, 1936] between
treatment and control hospitals with a propensity score caliper of 0.10. This caliper represented
the smallest value that minimized the number of unmatched treatment hospitals while maintaining
acceptable balance in all covariates.
Before After
Variable Name Matching Matching
System membership 0.231 0.131
Teaching status 0.372 0.021
Safety-net -0.018 -0.013
Size 0.085 -0.007
Emergency department visits 0.107 -0.012
Operating margin (average) -0.103 -0.013
Operating margin (trend) 0.003 -0.017
Return on equity (average) 0.024 0.000
Return on equity (trend) 0.018 0.000
Return on assets (average) 0.028 0.000
Return on assets (trend) 0.028 0.000
Current ratio (average) 0.081 0.005
Current ratio (trend) -0.077 0.005
Total asset turnover (average) 0.064 -0.011
Total asset turnover (trend) 0.029 -0.007
Total debt to net assets (average) -0.027 0.000
Total debt to net assets (trend) -0.006 0.001
Log operating revenue (average) 0.405 0.070
Log operating revenue (trend) -0.017 -0.010
Log operating expenses (average) 0.425 0.071
Log operating expenses (trend) -0.119 -0.010
Urban 0.982 0.166
Market concentration -0.390 -0.049
County AAPCC Medicare Part A 0.994 0.030
County population growth 0.139 0.072
County % seniors -0.870 -0.160
County % uninsured 1.222 0.119
County % white -0.304 0.061
Table 6.2 – Covariate balance with full-matching. The table shows the standardized differences between
the treatment and control groups before and after matching using Mahalanobis distance with a propensity score
caliper of 0.10. Hospitals were stratified by ownership (i.e., only hospitals with the same kind of ownership were
matched to each other). All variables were satisfactorily balanced after matching with standardized differences
within ±0.2.
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Comparability of the treatment and matched control groups was assessed in aggregate following
construction of the individual matches (i.e., distributions of the covariates in the two groups must be
similar). Comparability was determined using the standardized difference,25 which was calculated for
each matching covariate. The matched treatment and control groups were considered “balanced”
across the covariates if the standardized difference for each covariate fell within the commonly
accepted threshold of ±0.2.
Matches were found for 307 of the 316 treatment hospitals and 2899 of the 4000 potential control
hospitals. Table 6.2 shows the balance between the treatment and control groups before and after
matching. Hospital ownership is omitted from the table, since stratification was performed on it,
ensuring perfect matches on this variable. Satisfactory balance was achieved on all of the matching
covariates with standardized differences within ±0.2 after matching.
Figure 6.2 shows the geographic distribution of the treatment and matched control hospitals.
Counties containing treatment hospitals are colored red while those containing matched control
hospitals are colored blue. The map shows wide distribution of the matched control hospitals, which
is reassuring. If the matched controls had been drawn from a small subset of states, concerns might
exist about legislation particular to those states potentially biasing the inference results.
Figure 6.2 – Geographic distribution of treatment and matched control hospitals. Counties con-
taining treatment hospitals are colored red while those containing matched control hospitals are colored blue.
25Standardized difference measures the difference between group means in terms of their pooled variance.
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Estimating pre-passage nurse-staffing levels
Before turning to the models and their results, a description is provided in this section of one of
the focal variables—the nurse-staffing levels of California hospitals prior to AB 394’s passage. This
variable was calculated using data from California OSHPD’s Annual Hospital Financial Datasets,
converted from fiscal to calendar year. The nurse-staffing level variable was incorporated into the
National Matching Analysis dataset using a crosswalk of facility identifiers. This variable was used
to examine differential effects of subsets of California hospitals and their matched controls for Ap-
proaches 1b and 2.
The nurse-staffing variable was calculated for each California hospital taking into account its
staffing levels in five of the most common units across California short-term GAC hospitals. These
units consisted of: 1) general medical-surgical, 2) observation, 3) pediatrics, 4) psychiatric, and
5) obstetrics. (Critical and intensive care units were excluded, since they were already subject
to staffing requirements from previous legislation.26) Relative size differences between units were
controlled for using the proportion of staffed beds for each unit within each hospital. The time
period considered was the eight years prior to AB 394’s passage, 1992–1999.
The nurse-staffing level for each hospital was computed using the following hospital fixed effect
model,
0BBB@
5P
j=1
patient daysitj × 26
5P
j=1
nurse productive hrsitj
1CCCA = α0 +
5X
j=1
αj
0BBB@ staffed bedsitj5P
j=1
staffed bedsitj
1CCCA+
1999X
t=1992
αt (yeart)
+
424X
i=1
βi (hospitali) + εit (6.1)
where i indexed the hospital, j indexed the hospital unit, and t indexed the year. (Patient days were
converted to hours by multiplying by 26, an adjustment used in the nursing literature[Unruh et al.,
2003] reflecting that “patient days” are usually slightly longer than 24 hours.) The hospital fixed ef-
fect coefficients, βi, were extracted as each hospital’s overall pre-passage nurse-staffing level, adjusted
for its composition. Higher numbers signaled lower nurse staffing while lower numbers signaled higher
nurse staffing. In subsequent sections, I refer to these hospital fixed effect coefficients as hospital
26As a robustness check, three of the most common critical and intensive care units (i.e., general medical-surgical
ICU, NICU, and coronary ICU) were included in the nurse-staffing variable. The addition of these units had no
substantive effect on the analysis results.
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nurse-staffing ratings.
In addition to the continuous nurse-staffing rating variable described above, a binary indicator
was created. This variable distinguished low nurse-staffing hospitals from those with moderate
or high nurse-staffing levels. This binary indicator offered three advantages over the continuous
variable. First, it enabled results that were more easily interpretable in the analyses. Second, it
provided less noisy identification of hospitals that were more likely to have nurse-staffing ratios below
the AB 394 mandates. Third, the binary indicator was less correlated with the explanatory control
variables used in the regression models, making it less prone to collinearity problems that suppress
significance.
The binary nurse-staffing indicator was computed via k-means clustering. This partitioned hospi-
tals into three clusters (i.e., “low,” “middle,” and “high”) based on their nurse-staffing rating.27 The
clustering algorithm grouped 129, 254, and 41 hospitals into the low, middle, and high nurse-staffing
clusters, respectively. For the binary nurse-staffing indicator, hospitals in the low nurse-staffing
cluster were coded as 1 while those in the other two clusters were coded as 0.
Understanding pre-passage nurse-staffing levels
To better understand hospital characteristics associated with nurse-staffing levels before AB 394,
the pre-passage nurse-staffing rating was regressed against the explanatory control variables listed
in Table 6.3 averaged over 1995–1999. (For categorical variables, the most frequently reported value
over this period was used if discrepancies existed from year-to-year.) Table 6.4 presents the regression
results.
The regression results showed a strong association between hospitals’ pre-passage nurse-staffing
levels and many of their other characteristics. Additionally, the coefficients of these variables ex-
hibited signs that were intuitively logical. Holding other predictors constant, lower nurse staffing
pre-passage of AB 394 was associated with:
1. Larger hospital size as measured by number of available beds
2. For-profit ownership relative to not-for-profit ownership
3. Being a non-teaching hospital
4. Higher operating margin
27Three clusters were used for several reasons. First, it afforded groups easily interpreted as “low,” “middle,”
and “high.” Second, this partitioning resulted in a reasonable number of observations in each cluster. Finally, the
algorithm naturally identified three clusters even when four are specified instead.
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Variable Detail
HOSPITAL CHARACTERISTICS
Available beds † ln(available beds)
Ownership † not-for-profit / for-profit / government
System membership § yes / no
Teaching status † yes / no (min 10 FTE residents or fellows in each pre-passage yr)
Operating margin † (net income from operations)/(total operating revenue)× 100
Net PPE per licensed bed (in
2007 $100,000) †
(net property, plant, equipment, & construction-in-progress)/
(licensed beds)
MARKET CHARACTERISTICS
Managed care penetration ? (enrollees/eligibles)× 100 (county)
Market concentration (HHI) † P
i=1
s2i where si = market share of firm i in its hospital service
area (HSA) based on patient discharges
POPULATION CHARACTERISTICS
Uninsured ξ county % without health insurance
† : CA OSHPD Audited Hospital Financial Data Extract ? : Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services
§ : USC Hospital Systems File ξ : Area Resource File
Table 6.3 – Explanatory control variables for examining California hospitals’ nurse-staffing levels
prior to AB 394.
Num of obs = 391
R2 = 0.156
Robust
Nurse-Staffing Rating Coef Std Err T-stat P-value
Ln(Available Beds) 0.489 0.105 4.64 0.000 ***
Owner: For-profit 0.543 0.247 2.19 0.029 *
Owner: Government -0.168 0.179 -0.94 0.347
System Membership 0.170 0.163 1.05 0.296
Teaching -0.506 0.183 -2.77 0.006 **
Operating Margin 0.014 0.005 2.65 0.008 **
PPE per Bed -0.068 0.031 -2.18 0.030 *
Medicare Managed Care Penetration 0.014 0.005 2.94 0.004 **
Market Concentration 8.263 3.285 2.52 0.012 *
% No Health Insurance 0.056 0.028 2.00 0.046 *
Constant -3.578 0.803 -4.46 0.000 ***
* : significant at 5%; ** : significant at 1%; *** : significant at 0.1%
Table 6.4 – Characteristics associated with California hospitals’ nurse-staffing levels before AB
394. The table shows results from regressing the pre-passage nurse-staffing ratings (i.e., from the hospital fixed
effect regression) on the explanatory control variables averaged over 1995–1999.
5. Fewer fixed assets per bed
6. Higher county Medicare managed care penetration
7. Greater market concentration
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8. Higher county percentage of persons with no health insurance
These results suggest several conclusions. First, hospitals may experience inventory effects and
increasing returns to scale that allow them to use fewer nurses per patient as they increase in size
(point 1). Second, for-profit hospitals may opt for lower nurse staffing relative to not-for-profits in
order to decrease costs and boost profits consistent with their ownership status (point 2). Third,
teaching hospitals may employ higher nurse staffing as a result of the supplementary funding they
receive and the extra oversight required for teaching. They may also require more nurse labor due
the more severe patients they often receive (point 3). Fourth, decreasing nurse staffing may result
in lower costs, which in turn, could lead to higher operating margins (point 4). Fifth, hospitals
that operate in financially challenging environments or face pressures to contain costs may employ
less nurse labor as a cost-saving mechanism (points 6 and 8).28 Finally, hospitals located in more
concentrated markets where they enjoy greater monopoly power may face less competitive pressure
to use more nurses (point 7). (This final point assumes that patients and insurers view nurse staffing
as a signal of quality, which they take into consideration when selecting hospitals.)
Inference approach for examining hospital and ED closure
Hospital and ED closure were examined using two different techniques—Cox proportional hazards
regression and conditional logistic regression. The former provided a natural framework for inference
with the response (i.e., time to closure) being right-censored at 2006. Two main hazard models were
constructed, the first examining the law’s aggregate effect across California hospitals and the second
investigating differential effects. The focal variable in the first model consisted of an indicator for the
hospital being in California (i.e., the treatment group) versus being a non-California matched control
hospital. The second model separated this indicator into two groups corresponding to California
hospitals with low and not-low nurse-staffing levels prior to AB 394’s passage, respectively. Within
the context of the matching framework, these low and not-low nurse-staffing hospitals can be viewed
as having received different “doses” of treatment. The explanatory control variables in both Cox
models consisted of a subset selected by Akaike’s Information Criterion (AIC) [Akaike, 2003] from the
full set of matching covariates29 plus peak ground acceleration (PGA) interacted with an indicator
28Interestingly, the variable for Medicare managed care penetration had the second largest t-statistic of all of the
variables. The sign and significance of this variable seem somewhat consistent with the reports coming out of California
prior to AB 394’s passage, complaining that California hospitals were hiring increasing numbers of unlicensed medical
personnel due to cost cutting pressures from managed care.
29Inclusion of matching covariates in the Cox regressions controlled for any residual imbalance in them post-
matching.
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for California.30 PGA captured the expected seismic risk of hospitals with a 10% probability over
a 50-year period. Following Chang and Jacobson [2008], this variable was included to control for
financial shocks that California hospitals might experience as a result of the state’s Seismic Retrofit
Mandate (Senate Bill 1953). This law required hospitals at seismic risk to make capital investments
to ensure that their facilities could remain operational in the event of a strong earthquake. (PGA
was calculated for each hospital using data from the 2002 U.S. Geological Survey matched to the
hospital’s longitude and latitude.) Interestingly, the AIC procedure repeatedly rejected the PGA
variable in both the hospital and ED closure models, opting instead to select the California and
nurse-staffing indicators. This result suggests that AB 394 may have had a greater influence on
hospital and ED closures than the Seismic Retrofit Mandate.
The second technique employed—conditional logistic regression—was used to examine cumulative
closures to better understand AB 394’s effect over time. (Conditional logistic regression31 was
selected over regular logistic regression with matched-set fixed effects because of its ability to account
for heterogeneity in the baseline risk of matched sets.32 In addition, regular logistic regression with
fixed effects is known to produce biased estimates when the number of strata is large compared to
the size of the sample, as is the case with the matched sets.) Separate conditional logit models were
constructed for each year after the law’s passage, examining cumulative hospital and ED closures
since the law’s passage. Separate indicators were included distinguishing California hospitals with
low and not-low nurse-staffing levels pre-passage of the law relative to their non-California matched
controls. All covariates were the same as in the Cox proportional hazards model.
6.3.3 Results
Inference results for hospital closure
Table 6.5 shows the hospital closure results from the Cox proportional hazards model. The table
on the left reveals the law’s aggregate effect on California hospitals as a whole while the table
on the right displays its differential effect across California hospitals with low and not-low nurse-
staffing levels pre-passage of the law. As the left-hand table shows, California hospitals as a whole
30Copying Chang and Jacobson [2008], PGA was coded as an indicator, denoting whether a hospital’s geographic
location had a PGA value above the state’s median value. This variable was interacted with the California indicator
in the models.
31Conditional logistic regression is a variation of regular logistic regression that can account for heterogeneity among
the matched sets.
32This is analogous to cluster robust standard errors for continuous responses where heteroskedasticity across clusters
is addressed. In contrast, fixed effects only account for varying levels of intercepts across clusters.
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experienced a 2.25 times greater hazard rate of closure than their non-California matched controls,
after controlling for the matched sets and any residual imbalances in covariates. The table on the
right reveals that this increase was entirely driven by hospitals with low nurse-staffing levels prior
to AB 394’s passage, further suggesting the law’s causal effect. The hazard rate of closure for these
low nurse-staffing hospitals was 4.21 times greater than their matched controls with a p-value of
0.003. By contrast, the hazard rate for California hospitals with not-low staffing did not change
significantly. These pronounced differences are consistent with expectations and Hypothesis 3.
Aggregate CA Effect CA Low/Not-Low Staffing Breakdown
Variable Exp(Coef) P-value Variable Exp(Coef) P-value
CA 2.254 0.020 CA Low Staffing 4.212 0.003
CA Not-Low Staffing 1.728 0.170
Urban 4.781 0.004 Urban 4.551 0.005
Population Growth 0.949 0.027 Population Growth 0.949 0.028
% Uninsured 0.915 0.025 % Uninsured 0.909 0.016
% White 0.975 0.006 % White 0.974 0.004
Total Assets 0.651 0.054 Total Assets 0.668 0.072
Ln(Oper. Revenue) 0.092 0.001 Ln(Oper. Revenue) 0.094 0.001
Ln(Oper. Expense) 9.373 0.003 Ln(Oper. Expense) 8.842 0.004
Table 6.5 – Cox proportional hazard model results — closure of California hospitals relative to
their matched controls over 2000–2006. California hospitals as a whole experienced a 2.25 times greater
hazard rate of closure than their non-California matched controls, as shown by the table on the left (p=0.020).
The table on the right shows that this increase was driven entirely by a significant rise in the hazard rate for
hospitals with low nurse-staffing levels pre-passage of AB 394 (relative to their matched controls) with p=0.003
for the CA Low Staffing variable. These results point to a causal effect of AB 394 on hospital closure.
The coefficients for the explanatory control variables were largely as expected. Stronger financial
performance in the form of higher operating revenues and lower expenses was associated with reduced
hazard rates for closure. Among geographic considerations, being located in rural areas and in
counties with higher population growth and larger white populations was also linked to decreased
hazard rates. Somewhat surprisingly, being located in counties with higher percentages of uninsured
individuals was associated with lower hazard rates. In all, the results from the proportional hazards
model were consistent with expectations from Section 3.
Table 6.6 presents the inference results from the conditional logistic regression models, examining
cumulative hospital closures for each post-passage year since the law’s passage. The table on the
left shows the odds ratios for closure for California hospitals with low pre-passage nurse-staffing
levels relative to their non-California matched controls. The table on the right shows the odds ratios
for closure for California hospitals with not-low pre-passage nurse-staffing levels relative to their
non-California matched controls.
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CA Low Nurse-Staffing Hospitals CA Not-Low Nurse-Staffing Hospitals
Year Odds Ratio T-stat P-value Odds Ratio T-stat P-value
2000 1.753 0.399 0.690 1.063 0.068 0.946
2001 3.910 1.407 0.160 1.189 0.205 0.837
2002 3.381 1.314 0.189 1.025 0.030 0.976
2003 4.150 1.998 0.046 1.826 1.055 0.292
2004 6.357 3.203 0.001 2.127 1.586 0.113
2005 3.674 2.591 0.010 1.563 1.023 0.306
2006 3.687 2.690 0.007 1.682 1.298 0.194
Table 6.6 – Conditional logit model results — closure of California hospitals relative to their
matched controls by year post-passage of AB 394. The tables above present the odds of closure for
California hospitals by nurse-staffing pre-passage of AB 394 relative to their non-California matched controls.
As Table 6.6 shows, pronounced differences existed between California hospitals with low versus
not-low pre-passage nurse-staffing levels. While no significant closure effect was present for the not-
low nurse-staffing hospitals, the low nurse-staffing hospitals displayed significantly increased odds of
closure over 2003–2006. Across this four-year period, the odds of closure for these low nurse-staffing
hospitals ranged from 3.67–6.36 times greater than for their matched controls on average. It should
be noted that the timing of these effects corresponded to the same period over which nurse staffing
in California increased the most. In fact, these results were most striking for 2004, the year in which
AB 394 was implemented and California hospitals experienced the greatest increase in nurse staffing.
During this year, the odds of closure reached their highest level for California hospitals with low
nurse-staffing relative to their matched controls (odds ratio=6.36; p=0.001). This correspondence
in timing strongly suggests the influence of AB 394 on these closure activities. It is also consistent
with expectations that hospital closures would not appear immediately after the law’s passage but
instead gradually emerge as cost pressures built from increased labor costs and staffing and hospitals
attempted intermediate measures to adjust. Finally, it bears emphasis that hospital closure is a rare
and extreme step, and the fact that strong significance appeared beginning in 2003 is noteworthy.
Figure 6.3 shows the increase in hospital closure probability due to AB 394, computed using the
conditional logistic regression models. Specifically, the graphs show the mean estimated cumulative
probability of hospital closure for California GAC hospitals with and without application of AB
394 during the seven years post-passage of the law. The graph on the left pertains to California
GAC hospitals with not-low nurse-staffing levels pre-passage of the law while the graph on the
right pertains to those hospitals with low nurse-staffing levels. The black lines in both plots depict
the hospitals’ mean estimated baseline probability of closure, calculated without application of AB
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394.33 The colored lines depict the hospitals’ mean estimated probability of closure with application
of AB 394. Accordingly, the distance between the black and colored lines reflects the increase in
estimated closure probability due to AB 394.
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Figure 6.3 – AB 394’s estimated impact on hospital closure. The above graphs show the mean estimated
cumulative probability of hospital closure for California GAC hospitals with and without application of AB 394
during the seven years post-passage of the law. The graph on the left pertains to California GAC hospitals with
not-low nurse-staffing levels prior to AB 394’s passage, while the graph on the right pertains to those hospitals
with low nurse-staffing levels prior to the law’s passage. The black lines in both plots depict the hospitals’ mean
estimated baseline probability of closure, calculated without application of AB 394. The colored lines depict the
hospitals’ mean estimated probability of closure with application of AB 394.
As Figure 6.3 shows, California hospitals with not-low nurse-staffing levels exhibited little differ-
ence in their closure probabilities with and without application of AB 394, consistent with Table 6.6.
For these hospitals, the two probabilities tracked very closely with only slight separation occurring
in 2003 that moderately increased in 2004, the year the law was implemented. More specifically,
for 2004 AB 394 generated a 1.6% point increase in these hospitals’ closure probabilities over their
baseline probability of 2.6%.
For California hospitals with low pre-passage nurse-staffing levels, the closure probabilities with
33The baseline probability of closure was calculated by setting the indicator for California low and not-low nurse-
staffing hospitals equal to 0 when computing the predicted probabilities. It should be noted that the baseline proba-
bility is increasing in both graphs, because it reflects cumulative hospital closures over the law’s 6-year post-passage
period.
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and without application of AB 394 followed a similar pattern to the not-low nurse-staffing hospitals
but with more pronounced differences. In the first three years after the law’s passage, AB 394
produced a higher mean closure probability, however, this effect was not statistically significant.
In 2003, the year before the law’s implementation, AB 394’s effect noticeably increased, raising
hospitals’ closure probability by 5.72% points over their baseline probability of 0.80%. During the
following year, its impact became even more pronounced, nearly doubling. Under AB 394, hospitals
with low nurse-staffing levels experienced a closure probability that was 10.51% points higher than
their estimated baseline probability of 1.45%. In the subsequent years, this difference declined
slightly but still remained high at around 8.5% with the hospitals’ cumulative closure probability
remaining constant at around 12%.
Inference results for ED closure
Table 6.7 displays the Cox proportional hazards model results for ED closure. As shown by the table
on the left, California hospitals as a whole experienced a 2.83 times greater hazard rate of ED closure
than their non-California matched controls (p<0.001) over the post-passage period 2000–2006. This
result is consistent with Hypothesis 1 that hospitals may have chosen to close down low margin units
that may have become unprofitable post-passage of the law. The table on the right reveals that the
increase in ED closures occurred for both low and not-low nurse-staffing California hospitals relative
to their matched controls, although to a slightly greater extent for the former (i.e., 3.42 versus 2.60).
This result is in contrast to that for hospital closure where significant effects were only observed for
California hospitals with low staffing levels prior to the law’s passage. This difference, however, is
not inconsistent with expectations. ED closure represents a significantly less drastic response than
hospital closure. Given that all hospitals were affected by the law’s cost shock (i.e., through the
impact on nurse wages), it is unsurprising that both groups of hospitals might have pursued such
an intermediate measure.
Table 6.8 shows the results from the conditional logistic regression model for ED closure. For
California hospitals with low pre-passage nurse-staffing levels, borderline significance appeared in
2001 with strong significance following in subsequent years. For these hospitals, their odds of ED clo-
sure ranged from 3.00–3.83 times greater than for their matched controls over 2002–2006. California
hospitals with not-low nurse-staffing levels pre-passage of the law exhibited similar but slightly de-
layed trends. For these hospitals, borderline significance emerged one year later in 2002 with strong
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Aggregate CA Effect CA Low/Not-Low Staffing Breakdown
Variable Exp(Coef) P-value Variable Exp(Coef) P-value
CA 2.838 0.000 CA Low Staffing 3.424 0.000
CA Not-Low Staffing 2.601 0.000
Urban 6.590 0.000 Urban 6.580 0.000
Population Growth 0.958 0.010 Population Growth 0.958 0.009
% White 0.986 0.015 % White 0.986 0.015
Ln(Oper. Revenue) 0.156 0.000 Ln(Oper. Revenue) 0.160 0.000
Ln(Oper. Expense) 3.468 0.023 Ln(Oper. Expense) 3.380 0.023
Table 6.7 – Cox proportional hazard model results — ED closure among California hospitals
relative to their matched controls over 2000–2006. California hospitals as a whole experienced a 2.83
times greater hazard rate of ED closure than their non-California matched controls, as shown by the table on the
left (p<0.001). The table on the right reveals that this increase occurred for both low and not-low nurse-staffing
California hospitals relative to their matched controls, although to a slightly greater extent for the former. This
result is in contrast to that for hospital closure where only California hospitals with low staffing levels prior to
the law’s passage were affected.
significance following in subsequent years. Additionally, over the 2003–2006 period for which sig-
nificance was present, these hospitals displayed slightly smaller odds of ED closure relative to their
matched controls than their California low nurse-staffing counterparts. More specifically, for the
not-low nurse-staffing California hospitals, the odds of ED closure ranged from 2.50–2.84 compared
to their non-California matched controls. These differential effects, both timing and magnitude, for
the low and not-low nurse-staffing California hospitals are consistent with expectations. Given the
larger cost shock experienced by the former, one would anticipate an earlier and more pronounced
response by them.
CA Low Nurse-Staffing Hospitals CA Not-Low Nurse-Staffing Hospitals
Year Odds Ratio T-stat P-value Odds Ratio T-stat P-value
2000 2.273 1.012 0.312 1.643 0.865 0.387
2001 2.659 1.773 0.076 1.845 1.458 0.145
2002 3.001 2.249 0.024 2.092 1.940 0.052
2003 3.815 3.247 0.001 2.676 3.063 0.002
2004 3.825 3.761 0.000 2.837 3.661 0.000
2005 3.283 3.473 0.001 2.502 3.396 0.001
2006 3.177 3.465 0.001 2.639 3.823 0.000
Table 6.8 – Conditional logit model results — ED closure among California hospitals relative
to their matched controls by year post-passage of AB 394. The tables above present the odds of ED
closure for California hospitals by nurse-staffing pre-passage of AB 394 relative to their non-California matched
controls.
The fact that significance appeared much earlier for ED than hospital closure is consistent with
expectations. One would expect hospitals to take intermediate actions, such as downsizing or closing
units, before closing their entire facility. Finally, it is interesting to note that the odds of ED closure
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were greatest for 2004, the year in which AB 394 was implemented and nurse-staffing increased the
most, similar to hospital closure. This correspondence provides additional support to the hypothesis
that AB 394 increased ED closures among California hospitals due to its cost shock.
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Figure 6.4 – AB 394’s estimated impact on ED closure. The above graphs show the mean estimated
cumulative probability of ED closure for California GAC hospitals with and without application of AB 394
during the seven years post-passage of the law. The graph on the left pertains to California hospitals with
not-low nurse-staffing levels prior to AB 394’s passage while the graph on the right pertains to those hospitals
with low nurse-staffing levels prior to the law’s passage. The black lines in both plots depict the hospitals’ mean
estimated baseline probability of ED closure, calculated without application of AB 394. The colored lines depict
the hospitals’ mean estimated probability of ED closure with application of AB 394.
Figure 6.4 shows the mean estimated cumulative probability of ED closure for California low
and not-low nurse-staffing hospitals from the conditional logistic regression models. Both graphs
show a higher mean probability of ED closure under AB 394 throughout its post-passage period
2000–2006 but with slightly delayed significance. They also reveal that the greatest increases in
these hospitals’ closure probabilities occurred in 2004, the year of the law’s implementation. For
not-low nurse-staffing hospitals, this increase amounted to 7.34% points on average over a baseline
probability of 6.15%, more than doubling these hospitals’ mean ED closure probability in 2004. For
low nurse-staffing hospitals, this increase totaled 14.71% points on average over a baseline of 5.94%,
producing a final ED closure probability nearly 3.5 times greater than these hospitals’ baseline value.
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These results are in line with Hypotheses 1 and 3 previously stated.
In summary, the extreme response of hospital closure only occurred among California hospitals
with low nurse staffing pre-passage of the law. The intermediate action of ED closure, however, was
undertaken by both low and not-low nurse-staffing hospitals, with a slight preference to the former.
These results are consistent with Hypotheses 1, 2, and 3.
Falsification test for the closure results
To check the robustness of the hospital and ED closure findings, a falsification test was performed
using the pre-passage years. California hospitals were matched to those from the rest of the country
on the same set of covariates averaged over 1995, 1996, and 1997 with inference performed for 1998
and 1999—the two years leading up to the passage of AB 394. Using a caliper value of 0.04, matches
were found for 274 California hospitals while achieving satisfactory balance for all of the covariates.
For the two Cox models, the indicator for the hospital being in California and those for the
nurse-staffing levels failed to be significant in both the hospital and ED closure models. For the
conditional logit models by year, the indicators were not significant for any of the two inference
years. These findings lend support to the results attributed to AB 394. Tables 6.9 and 6.10 show
the inference results for the falsification tests.
(a) Hospital closure
Aggregate CA Effect
Variable Exp(Coef.) P-value
CA 1.076 0.886
Beds 0.992 0.035
Ln(Total Assets) 0.412 0.029
Ln(Oper. Revenue) 0.235 0.126
Ln(Oper. Expense) 5.043 0.101
Urban 15.926 0.000
HHI 0.128 0.001
AAPCC 1.005 0.107
% Over 65 1.142 0.050
% White 0.969 0.013
(b) ED closure
Aggregate CA Effect
Variable Exp(Coef.) P-value
CA 1.467 0.397
Beds 0.995 0.044
Ln(Total Assets) 0.445 0.000
Urban 10.275 0.000
HHI 0.119 0.000
AAPCC 1.005 0.108
% Over 65 1.118 0.063
% White 0.967 0.003
Table 6.9 – Cox proportional hazard model falsification test results.
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(a) Hospital closure
CA Low Nurse-Staffing Hospitals CA Not-Low Nurse-Staffing Hospitals
Year Odds Ratio T-stat P-value Odds Ratio T-stat P-value
1998 2.953 0.384 0.701 1.142 0.045 0.964
1999 0.639 -0.278 0.781 0.105 -1.335 0.182
(b) ED closure
CA Low Nurse-Staffing Hospitals CA Not-Low Nurse-Staffing Hospitals
Year Odds Ratio T-stat P-value Odds Ratio T-stat P-value
1998 5.152 1.380 0.168 2.829 1.144 0.253
1999 3.024 1.489 0.137 1.125 0.193 0.847
Table 6.10 – Conditional logit falsification test results.
Inference results for operating margin
To investigate Corollaries 1 and 2 from Section 6.2.1, AB 394’s effect was analyzed on hospitals’
operating margins. Specifically, the law’s effect was estimated for each post-passage year using ordi-
nary least squares (OLS) regressions with cluster robust standard errors, clustered at the matched
set level. The focal explanatory variables in these regressions consisted of indicators for California
low and not-low nurse-staffing hospitals relative to their matched controls. The explanatory control
variables consisted of a subset of the matching covariates selected by AIC.
CA Low Nurse-Staffing Hospitals CA Not-Low Nurse-Staffing Hospitals
Year Coefficient T-stat P-value Coefficient T-stat P-value
2000 2.846 1.289 0.197 -0.627 -0.612 0.541
2001 -0.434 -0.176 0.860 0.603 0.501 0.617
2002 -1.350 -0.581 0.561 0.966 0.729 0.466
2003 -2.396 -1.107 0.268 -0.520 -0.353 0.724
2004 -5.155 -2.290 0.022 0.025 0.017 0.986
2005 -3.593 -1.701 0.089 0.363 0.253 0.801
2006 -3.298 -1.573 0.116 0.324 0.191 0.848
Table 6.11 – OLS model results — operating margins (%) of California hospitals relative to their
matched controls by year post-passage of AB 394. Results were computed using cluster robust standard
errors clustered at the matched set level.
Table 6.11 presents the operating margin regression results, corresponding to Corollary 1. For
the low nurse-staffing California hospitals, no significant differences were observed in their operating
margins relative to their matched controls except for 2004, the year the law was implemented.
Operating margins for the not-low nurse-staffing California hospitals were no different from their
matched controls for any of the years. These findings suggest that in aggregate, hospitals may have
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modified their service mix and operations (e.g., production inputs, uncompensated care spending,
etc.) to mitigate the effects of AB 394’s cost shock. These results may also reflect some profit gains
by hospitals.34
When considering the law’s financial impact on California hospitals as a whole, it should be noted
that Table 6.11’s operating margin results likely understate the law’s effect due to survivorship bias
from hospital closure. This is especially probable among California hospitals with low pre-passage
nurse-staffing levels. Figure 6.5 offers a glimpse of such potential survivorship bias by providing
a sequential perspective of operating margins leading up to closure. Using data from 1995–2006
for California hospitals that eventually closed, the figure shows operating margins hovering around
−5% on average four or more years prior to closure. In their final four years, hospitals’ operating
margins begin to fall with the steepest drop occurring in the year of closure. These findings support
Corollary 2.
To further investigate Corollary 2, the operating margins were examined of California hospitals
that closed post-passage of the law relative to their non-California matched controls. Table 6.12
displays the results. The differences in operating margins between this subset of California hospitals
and their matched controls are striking, particularly when compared to the aggregate results in Table
6.11. The operating margins of these hospitals that closed post-passage were consistently lower than
those of their matched control counterparts. Over 2001–2004, the period over which significance
appeared, these California hospitals’ operating margins were as much as 9.5–16.8% lower on average
than those of their matched controls. (In 2005 and 2006, significance disappeared due to small
sample issues arising from most closures having already occurred.)35
Inference results for operating expenses and revenue
To understand the law’s impact on the components of operating margin and confirm its cost shock on
hospitals, OLS regressions were run for logged operating expenses and revenues.36 Regressions were
constructed for each post-passage year with cluster robust standard errors clustered at the matched
34Reiter et al. [2012] found results consistent with those presented above, although their analysis differed in its
study design. The authors classified hospitals into quartiles based on their nurse staffing level in 2000–2001 and used
a difference-in-differences regression approach. They found a significant decrease in hospitals’ operating margins for
the years 2005–2006 for quartiles 2 and 3 (1 being the lowest staffing quartile). In addition to focusing on a different
time period, their control group differed in that they used all hospitals in 12 hand-picked states in contrast to this
study which used a matching algorithm to pick out individual hospitals as controls from across the country.
35In further analyses that accounted for pre-passage nurse-staffing levels, it was found that low nurse-staffing
hospitals that closed were more affected than those with not-low staffing levels. The former had operating margins
14–19% lower than their matched controls while for the latter the difference was 5–17%.
36Operating expenses and revenues were logged to adjust for skewness and for ease of coefficient interpretation.
68
8 6 4 2 0
-3
0
-2
5
-2
0
-1
5
-1
0
-5
0
5
Operating Margin of Closed 
California Hospitals Prior to Closure
GAC Hospitals
Years to Closure
O
p
e
ra
ti
n
g
 M
a
rg
in
 (
%
)
Figure 6.5 – Operating margins of California GAC hospitals prior to closure.
CA Hospitals That Closed Post-Passage
Year Coefficient T-stat P-value
2000 -5.531 -1.631 0.104
2001 -9.541 -2.403 0.017
2002 -14.063 -3.759 0.000
2003 -16.812 -4.887 0.000
2004 -10.417 -2.118 0.035
2005 -9.979 -1.159 0.248
2006 -11.635 -1.065 0.288
Table 6.12 – OLS model results — operating margins (%) of California hospitals that closed
during the post-passage period relative to their matched controls by year post-passage of AB
394. Results were computed using cluster robust standard errors clustered at the matched set level.
set level. Inference results are shown in Tables 6.13 and 6.14. Table 6.13 reveals significantly
higher operating expenses for California hospitals with low pre-passage nurse-staffing levels relative
to their non-California matched controls from 2002–2006. Over this period, operating expenses for
these California hospitals were on average 39.2%, 176.4%, 97.3%, 61.6%, and 21.9% higher than
their matched controls. These results are striking, considering that hospitals were matched on the
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level and trend of their logged pre-passage operating expenses and revenues in addition to other
covariates.37 It is also interesting to note that the greatest difference occurred in 2003, the year
before the law’s implementation. This timing is consistent with the law’s expected cost shock and
the observed staffing and nurse wage increases. This difference subsequently decreased in later years
perhaps signaling adjustments made by California hospitals to their production processes and service
offerings in response to the law’s cost shock.
CA Low Nurse-Staffing Hospitals CA Not-Low Nurse-Staffing Hospitals
Year Coefficient T-stat P-value Coefficient T-stat P-value
2000 0.072 1.754 0.080 0.114 3.154 0.002
2001 0.060 1.301 0.193 0.092 2.361 0.018
2002 0.392 3.186 0.001 0.327 4.263 0.000
2003 1.764 5.580 0.000 1.422 8.120 0.000
2004 0.973 5.055 0.000 0.846 7.072 0.000
2005 0.616 3.258 0.001 0.621 5.465 0.000
2006 0.219 5.677 0.000 0.223 5.371 0.000
Table 6.13 – OLS model results — logged operating expenses of California hospitals relative to
their matched controls by year post-passage of AB 394. Results were computed using cluster robust
standard errors clustered at the matched set level.
California not-low nurse-staffing hospitals displayed comparable operating expense trends but
with significance appearing two years earlier in 2000. For these California hospitals, operating ex-
penses were on average 11.4%, 9.2%, 33.3%, 142.2%, 84.6%, 61.1%, and 22.0% higher than their
matched controls from 2000–2006. The earlier appearance of significance is consistent with expec-
tations. These hospitals’ higher initial nurse-staffing levels made them more vulnerable to the nurse
wage increases in the law’s early post-passage years. As the law’s implementation date approached,
these hospitals’ expenses continued to rise relative to their matched controls, peaking in 2003 sim-
ilar to the low nurse-staffing hospitals. Interestingly, this increase in 2003 was smaller than that
experienced by the low nurse-staffing hospitals at 142.2% versus 176.4%. This may be explained by
the not-low nurse-staffing hospitals’ greater compliance with the law’s staffing ratios—-with their
higher initial staffing levels, they did not have to undergo as pronounced staffing increases to con-
form with the law’s mandate prior to the implementation deadline of January 1, 2004. Similar to
their low nurse staffing counterparts, the difference between these hospitals’ operating costs and
their matched controls declined steadily in subsequent years, suggesting possible changes to their
production processes and services.
Table 6.14 displays the inference results from the logged operating revenue regressions. These
37See Tables 6.1 and 6.2 for the complete list of covariates used for matching and the balance achieved on them.
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results mirror the trends observed for the operating expense regressions. These patterns may reflect
increased prices to payers with downward sloping demand curves precipitated by the operating
expense increases as discussed in Section 6.2.
CA Low Nurse-Staffing Hospitals CA Not-Low Nurse-Staffing Hospitals
Year Coefficient T-stat P-value Coefficient T-stat P-value
2000 0.091 1.932 0.053 0.100 2.748 0.006
2001 0.052 1.079 0.281 0.094 2.377 0.018
2002 0.396 3.178 0.001 0.333 4.254 0.000
2003 1.750 5.513 0.000 1.422 7.903 0.000
2004 0.932 4.882 0.000 0.846 6.854 0.000
2005 0.573 3.055 0.002 0.611 5.182 0.000
2006 0.173 4.161 0.000 0.220 5.176 0.000
Table 6.14 – OLS model results — logged operating revenues of California hospitals relative to
their matched controls by year post-passage of AB 394. Results were computed using cluster robust
standard errors clustered at the matched set level.
6.4 Within-California analysis — hospital and ED closure
As a robustness check to the analyses performed in Sections 6.3.3, the Within-California Analysis
(i.e., Approach 2 from Figure 6.1) was used with data from a different, independent source—the
California OSHPD. In contrast to Approach 1b in the National Matching Analysis that allowed
calculation of differences between California low and not-low nurse-staffing hospitals and their re-
spective matched controls, Approach 2 directly assessed the difference between these two groups
within the state. It should be noted that this approach was not designed to identify the causal effect
of AB 394. Instead, it assessed the relative effect of the law between California hospitals based on
their pre-passage nurse-staffing levels.
6.4.1 Data and variables
The Within-California Analysis was primarily based on data from OSHPD in California and sup-
plemented with other sources as necessary. These additional sources included the USC Hospital
Systems File and the 2002 U.S. Geological Survey.
Focal explanatory variable
The focal explanatory variable for the analysis consisted of the low nurse-staffing indicator described
in Section 6.3.2 that captured the composition-adjusted nurse staffing level of hospitals in the years
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before AB 394’s passage.
Control variables
The explanatory control variables consisted of a subset selected from three main types—hospital,
market, and population characteristics—similar to the National Matching Analysis. Table 6.15 pro-
vides the complete list of variables considered. All variables were recorded at an annual level and
were taken from the pre-passage period, 1995–1999. Continuous variables were averaged over this
period after excluding extreme outliers that resembled coding errors. Categorical variables corre-
sponded well across years, but where discrepancies existed, the value reported for the majority of
years was used. For the financial- and population-oriented variables, a correlation rule was imple-
mented similar to the National Matching Analysis (i.e., if two variables had an absolute correlation
value greater than 0.8, only one was kept).
Variable Detail
HOSPITAL CHARACTERISTICS
Available beds † ln(available beds)
Ownership † not-for-profit / for-profit / government
System membership § yes / no
Teaching status † yes / no (min 10 FTE residents or fellows in each pre-passage yr)
Safety-net † yes / no (proportion of Medicaid & indigent patients 1 sd above
state mean)
Occupancy level † (patient days)/(available bed days)× 100
Operating margin † (net income from operations)/(total operating revenue)× 100
Current ratio † ln([current assets]/[current liabilities])
Net PPE per licensed bed (in
2007 $100,000) †
(net property, plant, equipment, & construction-in-progress)/
(licensed beds)
MARKET CHARACTERISTICS
Managed care penetration ? (enrollees/eligibles)× 100 (county)
Market concentration (HHI) † P
i=1
s2i where si = market share of firm i in its hospital service
area (HSA) based on patient discharges
Peak ground acceleration ‡ expected seismic risk w/ 10% probability over 50 years
POPULATION CHARACTERISTICS
Uninsured ξ county % without health insurance
† : CA OSHPD Audited Hospital Financial Data Extract ‡ : 2002 U.S. Geological Survey
§ : USC Hospital Systems File ξ : Area Resource File
? : Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services
Table 6.15 – Explanatory control variables considered for the Within-California Analysis.
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Outcome variables
Hospital closures were determined using information from OSHPD as well as from the Los Angeles
Times.38 Where discrepancies exist between these two sources, priority was given to the OSHPD
data. In the dataset, 33 hospitals closed in the seven years following AB 394, while 339 remained
open throughout the period.
Three variables were created to examine ED closure using data from OSHPD’s Utilization Data.
Each variable reflected a different type or definition of closure. The first captured complete cessation
of any emergency service (EMS) post-passage of AB 394 based on the hospital’s EMS license level
(i.e., standby, basic, or comprehensive). Specifically, any hospital with a standby, basic, or com-
prehensive EMS throughout 1995–1999 and which subsequently ended any EMS provision during a
post-passage year was counted as a closure. Hospital closure was also counted as ED closure condi-
tional on the hospital having some level of EMS provision prior to AB 394. The second variable was
constructed in a similar manner but examined cessation of at least basic EMS service post-passage
of AB 394.39 The last ED closure variable was constructed using ED visits. Specifically, closure
was defined as a 95% or greater drop in ED visits from the previous year.40 Hospital closure was
also counted as an ED closure for this variable, conditional on the hospital having an ED during its
pre-passage period. For all ED closure analyses, hospitals with no ED pre-passage of AB 394 were
excluded.
Analysis sample of California hospitals
Similar to the National Matching Analysis, hospitals that had received waivers for AB 394 were
excluded from the dataset for the Within-California Analysis. The final sample consisted of 338
hospitals.
38Los Angeles Times: http://projects.latimes.com/hospitals/emergency-rooms/no/closed/list/
39This variable captured hospitals that downgraded from basic or comprehensive EMS to standby or no EMS
provision. Hospital closure was also counted as a ED closure conditional on the hospital having at least a basic level
of EMS provision prior to AB 394. Hospitals with standby or no EMS provision during the pre-passage period were
excluded from the analysis.
40A similar approach was used in Kirby et al. [2006] to identify closures of different hospital service lines.
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6.4.2 Statistical methods
Regression analyses
Hospital closure during the seven years post-passage of AB 394 was modeled using logistic regres-
sion. In selecting explanatory variables for the model, competing considerations were weighed of
over-specification versus variable omission that can result in heterogeneity shrinkage bias. (Over-
specification was a particular consideration, since hospital closure is a relatively rare event.) As
previously noted, the focal explanatory variable consisted of the binary low nurse-staffing indicator
described in Section 6.3.2. The selected control variables included pre-passage operating margin
and hospital size measured as logged available beds, both of which were chosen for being strong
confounders for closure. An expanded model was investigated as well that included ownership, sys-
tem membership, and PGA to control for the Seismic Retrofit Law. In addition to these models, a
falsification test was performed to probe the robustness of the models’ findings. This test used the
same specification as the original hospital closure model but examined closure during the five years
prior to AB 394’s passage.
ED closure was modeled in a similar manner as hospital closure, using logistic regressions and
examining closure over the seven years post-passage of AB 394. The expanded specification was
used for the three ED closure outcome measures.
6.4.3 Results
Inference results for hospital closure
Table 6.16 presents the results for the hospital closure regressions. Columns 1 and 2 show results
for the two specifications examining closure during the seven years post-passage of AB 394. Both
specifications found trends consistent with expectations and suggestive of the law’s effect. The low
nurse-staffing indicator was highly significant at 1% with odds ratios of 3.27 and 3.30 for the basic
and expanded specifications, respectively. In other words, hospitals with low nurse-staffing levels
before the law possessed odds of closure that were more than three times greater than hospitals
with moderate or high nurse-staffing levels, controlling for other predictors. In fact, the pre-passage
nurse-staffing indicator was the strongest predictor of post-passage hospital closure after pre-passage
operating margin.
The signs of the significant control variables were as expected. Better pre-passage financial
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(1) (2) (3)
Post-AB 394 Post-AB 394 Pre-AB 394
Hospital Closure Odds Ratio Odds Ratio Odds Ratio
Low Nurse Staffing 3.273** 3.295** 1.703
(1.3483) (1.3901) (0.8181)
0.004 0.005 0.268
Operating Margin 0.956** 0.952*** 0.974*
(0.0125) (0.0130) (0.0128)
0.001 0.000 0.047
Ln(Available Beds) 0.591* 0.530* 0.487**
(0.1469) (0.1521) (0.1314)
0.034 0.027 0.008
Owner: For-profit 1.008
(0.4918)
0.987
Owner: Government 0.813
(0.4968)
0.735
System Membership 1.639
(0.8507)
0.341
Peak Ground Acceleration 0.8471
(0.3437)
0.683
Observations 338 338 361
Closed Hospitals 32 32 23
* : significant at 5%; ** : significant at 1%; *** : significant at 0.1%
Robust standard errors in parentheses with p-values below
Table 6.16 – Hospital closure in California — differential effects by nurse-staffing level pre-passage
of AB 394. Results were computed using logistic regressions.
performance was associated with decreased odds of closure. Specifically, a 1% increase in pre-
passage operating margin was associated with a ∼4.5% drop in the odds of closure, controlling for
other predictors. Larger size, as measured by logged available beds, was also a strong predictor linked
with decreased closure odds in the basic (Column 1) and expanded (Column 2) models. Ownership
type, system membership, and seismic risk were not significant.41
Column 3 of Table 6.16 shows results for the falsification test, examining closure during the five
years prior to AB 394’s passage. Consistent with the models in Columns 1 and 2, operating margin
and size exhibited significant and negative effects on closure with comparable magnitudes. The low
nurse-staffing indicator, however, was not significant with a p-value of 0.268. This lack of significance
41Seismic risk’s lack of significance as a predictor of hospital closure is unexpected as it differs from the findings of
Chang and Jacobson [2008].
75
lends support to the suggested effect of AB 394 in the basic and expanded models (columns 1 and
2), since low nurse-staffing level was not expected to be a strong predictor of hospital closure in the
years prior to AB 394’s passage.
Figure 6.6 shows the impact of having low nurse staffing pre-passage of AB 394 on California
hospitals’ estimated closure probabilities over 2000–2006. Closure probabilities were calculated using
the expanded specification in Column 2 in Table 6.16. As Figure 6.6 shows, the predicted probability
of closure without low pre-passage nurse staffing was generally fairly low for most hospitals with
the median, mean, and 75th percentile corresponding to 4.36%, 6.65%, and 7.26%, respectively.
With low pre-passage nurse staffing, these probabilities increased to 13.05%, 17.24%, and 20.51%,
respectively a considerable increase.
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Figure 6.6 – Impact of low nurse staffing pre-passage of AB 394 on hospital closure probability
over 2000–2006. The above plots show the distribution of hospital closure probabilities computed with and
without application of low pre-passage nurse staffing. Probabilities were calculated using the expanded logistic
regression model from Column 2 of Table 6.16. The dashed lines on the plot on the right denote the distribution
medians.
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Inference results for ED closure
Regression results for the ED closure analysis are shown in Table 6.17. For the two models examining
EMS cessation (Columns 1 and 2), the low nurse-staffing indicator failed to be significant, implying
that there were no differential effects for these outcomes between the low and not-low nurse-staffing
hospitals. This result is unsurprising given the inference results from Approach 1b, which showed
that ED closures occurred for both low and not-low nurse-staffing hospitals in California.
The ED closure model based on ED visits (Column 3 of Table 6.17) provided a different result
from those based on EMS cessation. For this visit-based outcome measure, the low nurse-staffing
indicator was significant at 5% (p=0.034) with an odds ratio of 2.52. Review of the data suggested
that this result may have been driven by hospital closures, which comprised more than 80% (i.e., 26
out of 31) of the ED closures recorded for this variable. (Hospital closures were a smaller contributor
to the EMS cessation variables.)
With respect to the explanatory control variables, the three models in Table 6.17 were consistent
in their identification of significant predictors. More specifically, higher pre-passage operating margin
and larger size were all associated with decreased odds of EMS cessation or ED closure in the law’s
post-passage period, similar to the results found for the hospital closure analysis.
Operating margins
To test whether low nurse-staffing hospitals experienced greater financial strains due to AB 394
compared to not-low nurse-staffing hospitals, an OLS regression was constructed examining hospitals’
operating margins over 1995–2006. The focal explanatory variables consisted of year fixed effects,
the binary nurse-staffing indicator, and the interaction of these two variables. The explanatory
control variables included logged available beds, ownership, occupancy level, proportion Medicare
discharges, proportion Medicaid discharges, county-level Medicare managed care penetration, and
PGA.42 Due to repeated observations for hospitals, cluster robust standard errors were used clustered
at the hospital level.
Figure 6.7 shows results from the operating margin regression. Specifically, it presents the dif-
ference in mean operating margin over time between the low versus not-low nurse-staffing hospitals,
controlling for a range of covariates. The vertical dashed lines show the confidence intervals for
42Per OSHPD recommendation, Kaiser hospitals were excluded to ensure better comparability. Other excluded
hospitals included those whose operating margins represented extreme outliers or those that had received waivers for
AB 394.
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(1) (2) (3)
Cessation of Cessation of 95% Drop in
Any EMS Basic EMS ED Visits
ED Closure Odds Ratio Odds Ratio Odds Ratio
Low Nurse Staffing 1.688 1.883 2.520*
(0.6514) (0.7416) (1.0993)
0.175 0.108 0.034
Operating Margin 0.968* 0.966* 0.952**
(0.0131) (0.01450) (0.0151)
0.017 0.022 0.002
Ln(Available Beds) 0.557* 0.325*** 0.480*
(0.1429) (0.1014) (0.1421)
0.023 0.000 0.013
Owner: For-profit 1.257 0.826 1.334
(0.5589) (0.3782) (0.6664)
0.607 0.677 0.564
Owner: Government 0.559 0.461 0.450
(0.3243) (0.3148) (0.2996)
0.316 0.257 0.230
System Membership 1.280 2.127 0.908
(0.6187) (1.0715) (0.4809)
0.610 0.134 0.856
Peak Ground Acceleration 0.745 1.088 0.803
(0.2723) (0.4112) (0.3337)
0.421 0.824 0.598
Observations 301 266 300
Closed EDs 40 39 31
* : significant at 5%; ** : significant at 1%; *** : significant at 0.1%
Robust standard errors in parentheses with p-values below
Table 6.17 – ED closure in California — differential effects by nurse-staffing level pre-passage of
AB 394. Results were computed using logistic regressions.
these differences. In the pre-passage years, the difference between the two groups remained fairly
steady with the low nurse-staffing hospitals having operating margins that were ∼2% higher than
their counterparts on average. Following passage of the law, this difference declined such that over
2000–2003 there was almost no difference in operating margins between the two groups. Begin-
ning in 2004, the year AB 394 was implemented, a dramatic downward trend emerged with low
nurse-staffing hospitals experiencing operating margins that lagged increasingly behind those of the
not-low nurse-staffing hospitals. By 2006, their margins had fallen 7% behind those of the not-low
nurse staffing hospitals on average. It should be noted that these results likely understate the law’s
financial impact on low nurse-staffing hospitals due to survivorship bias. Nevertheless, they lend
support to Hypothesis 3 that hospitals with low nurse staffing levels pre-passage of AB 394 suf-
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Figure 6.7 – Difference in operating margins over time between California hospitals with low
versus not-low nurse-staffing pre-passage of AB 394. The above graph shows the difference in mean
operating margin over time for the low versus the not-low nurse-staffing hospitals, controlling for a range of
covariates. The vertical dashed lines show the confidence interval for these differences.
fered greater financial declines following passage of the law than hospitals not in this category. The
complete regression results for the operating margin analysis are shown in Table 6.18.43
43The explanatory control variables in the operating margin regression had signs consistent with expectations. Size
as measured by logged available beds, for-profit ownership relative to not-for-profit ownership, and occupancy avail-
ability were associated with higher operating margins, controlling for other covariates. Government ownership relative
to not-for-profit ownership and higher percentages of Medicare patients and Medicare managed care penetration were
linked with lower operating margins, controlling for other covariates. Percentage of MediCal patients and PGA were
significant only at 10% and were negatively correlated with operating margin consistent with expectations.
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Num of obs = 3762
R2 = 0.1320
Robust
Operating Margin (%) Coef. Std. Err. T-stat P-value
Low Nurse Staffing 2.856 1.309 2.18 0.030 *
I(1996) 0.083 0.458 0.18 0.857
I(1997) -0.526 0.690 -0.76 0.446
I(1998) -2.392 0.740 -3.23 0.001 **
I(1999) -3.395 0.789 -4.3 0.000 ***
I(2000) -3.369 0.856 -3.93 0.000 ***
I(2001) -1.872 0.832 -2.25 0.025 *
I(2002) -1.752 0.850 -2.06 0.040 *
I(2003) -3.510 0.950 -3.69 0.000 ***
I(2004) -3.159 0.996 -3.17 0.002 **
I(2005) -1.523 0.947 -1.61 0.108
I(2006) -1.683 0.987 -1.7 0.089
I(1996) × (Low Nurse Staffing) -1.266 1.035 -1.22 0.222
I(1997) × (Low Nurse Staffing) -0.693 1.427 -0.49 0.628
I(1998) × (Low Nurse Staffing) -0.359 1.555 -0.23 0.818
I(1999) × (Low Nurse Staffing) -0.457 1.496 -0.31 0.760
I(2000) × (Low Nurse Staffing) -2.329 1.724 -1.35 0.177
I(2001) × (Low Nurse Staffing) -3.211 1.682 -1.91 0.057
I(2002) × (Low Nurse Staffing) -3.567 1.772 -2.01 0.045 *
I(2003) × (Low Nurse Staffing) -3.296 1.920 -1.72 0.087
I(2004) × (Low Nurse Staffing) -6.137 1.916 -3.2 0.001 **
I(2005) × (Low Nurse Staffing) -8.194 1.784 -4.59 0.000 ***
I(2006) × (Low Nurse Staffing) -10.486 2.262 -4.64 0.000 ***
Ln(Available Beds) 2.707 0.737 3.67 0.000 ***
Owner: For-profit 3.928 1.089 3.61 0.000 ***
Owner: Government -4.550 1.351 -3.37 0.001 **
Occupancy Availability 0.144 0.032 4.45 0.000 ***
% Medicare Discharges -0.083 0.035 -2.38 0.018 *
% MediCal Discharges -0.059 0.033 -1.79 0.075
Medicare Managed Care Penetration -0.105 0.036 -2.9 0.004 **
Peak Ground Acceleration -1.512 0.908 -1.66 0.097
Constant -12.373 4.328 -2.86 0.004 **
* : significant at 5%; ** : significant at 1%; *** : significant at 0.1%
Table 6.18 – Examining California hospitals’ operating margins over 1995–2006 by nurse-staffing
level pre-passage of AB 394. The above table shows the OLS regression results with cluster robust standard
errors clustered at the hospital level.
6.5 Downsizing of mental health services analysis
6.5.1 Data and variables
Analysis of mental health service reduction was primarily based on two datasets from California’s
OSHPD—the Inpatient Discharge Dataset and the Audited Hospital Financial Data Extracts. Data
was also used from the 2002 U.S. Geological Survey for information on PGA.
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Explanatory variables
Similar to the Within-California Analysis for hospital and ED closure, the focal explanatory variable
consisted of the low nurse-staffing indicator described in Section 6.3.2, which captured California
hospitals’ composition-adjusted nurse-staffing level in the years before AB 394’s passage. The ex-
planatory control variables consisted of the expanded set used in the Within-California Analysis.
Outcome variables
Downsizing of mental health services was proxied using hospital decreases in patient volumes for
Major Diagnostic Category (MDC) 19 (Mental Diseases and Disorders). Reductions were based on
patient volumes instead of hospital staffed beds for psychiatric units for two reasons. First, MDC
categories were coded more reliability in the inpatient dataset than staffed beds were reported in
the financial data extracts. Second, patient volumes more completely captured hospital services to
mental health patients, since hospitals may choose to treat them in general medical-surgical “scatter
beds.”
Downsizing of mental health services was defined as a percentage decrease in patient volume
that occurred during any post-passage year from 2000-2006 relative to 1999 that met a specified
threshold. Three thresholds were examined corresponding to minimum reductions of 70%, 80%, and
90%.
In addition to examining decreases in patient volumes for MDC 19, volume reductions were
examined for MDC 19 and 20 (Alcohol/Drug Use or Induced Mental Disorders) combined.
Analysis sample of California hospitals
The analysis sample consisted of California GAC hospitals that did not received waivers for AB
394 and had a minimum volume of patients with MDC 19 in 1999. In selecting the threshold for
this, competing considerations were weighed of having adequate patient volume to assess meaningful
percentage changes and not excluding hospitals that may be more willing to eliminate services for
these patients. Several thresholds were examined including 10, 20, and 30 patients.
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6.5.2 Statistical methods
Regression analyses
Downsizing of mental health services during the seven years post-passage of AB 394 was examined
using logistic regressions similar to the Within-in California Analysis of hospital and ED closure. As
previously noted, the focal explanatory variable consisted of the binary low nurse-staffing indicator,
while the control variables consisted of the explanatory variables used in the expanded models of the
Within-California Analysis. The results of the models were used to examine the impact of low nurse
staffing pre-passage of AB 394 on hospitals’ predicted probability of reducing their mental health
services.
6.5.3 Results
Inference results for downsizing of mental health services
Table 6.19 presents the regression results for mental health service reductions for the three decline
thresholds for MDC 19. Results are shown for hospitals with a minimum volume of 10 MDC 19
patients in 1999. Across the three thresholds, the low nurse-staffing indicator was significant at 5%
or 1% with significance increasing for the lower thresholds. Hospitals with low versus not-low nurse
staffing pre-passage of AB 394 had increased odds of mental health service reductions that ranged
from 2.3 to 2.6 times greater across the decline thresholds, controlling for other covariates. Other
significant predictors included size and for-profit and government ownership relative to non-for-profit
ownership—all of which were associated with decreased odds of service reduction although the latter
was only marginally significant for some thresholds. Similar trends were observed for the models
examining patient volumes combining MDC 19 and 20 and requiring different minimum patient
volumes in 1999, but with significance appearing at 10% for the low nurse-staffing indicator.
Table 6.20 displays the predicted probability of reductions in mental health services over 2000–
2006 for California hospitals with and without low nurse staffing prior to AB 394. Results are
presented using the same specifications as in Table 6.19. As shown in the table, hospitals with
low nurse staffing pre-passage of the law had a 15.1% higher probability on average of reducing
their patient volumes for mental services by at least 70% compared to hospitals without low nurse
staffing (32.0% vs. 16.9%, respectively), adjusting for other predictors. This probability difference
was slightly smaller for minimum patient volume reductions of 80% and 90% at 14.2% and 9.7%,
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(1) (2) (3)
≥70% ≥80% ≥90%
Mental Health Service
Reduction Reduction Reduction
Patient Volume Odds Ratio Odds Ratio Odds Ratio
Low Nurse Staffing 2.599** 2.689* 2.290*
(0.9543) (1.0458) (0.9466)
0.009 0.011 0.045
Operating Margin 0.999 0.985 0.980
(0.0153) (0.0160) (0.0166)
0.943 0.354 0.237
Ln(Available Beds) 0.248*** 0.360** 0.400***
(0.0804) (0.1243) (0.1392)
0.000 0.003 0.008
Owner: For-profit 0.344* 0.526 0.368
(0.1744) (0.2632) (0.1892)
0.035 0.199 0.052
Owner: Government 0.383 0.241* 0.279
(0.2090) (0.1690) (0.2086)
0.079 0.042 0.088
System Membership 0.842 1.056 0.969
(0.3463) (0.4771) (0.4782)
0.677 0.903 0.949
Peak Ground Acceleration 1.611 1.871 1.946
(0.5780) (0.7315) (0.8310)
0.184 0.109 0.119
Observations 223 223 223
Hospitals w/ Reductions 49 40 30
* : significant at 5%; ** : significant at 1%; *** : significant at 0.1%
Robust standard errors in parentheses with p-values below
Table 6.19 – Reduction of patient volumes in California hospitals for mental health services —
differential effects by nurse-staffing level pre-passage of AB 394. Results were computed using logistic
regressions and examining patient volume declines for MDC 19. Hospitals were required to have a minimum
volume of 10 MDC 19 patients in 1999.
respectively (27.3% vs. 13.1% and 20.0% vs. 10.3% for low vs. not-low nurse staffing hospitals).
These results provide suggestive evidence that California hospitals may have reduced their mental
health services in response to the law’s cost shock, consistent with Hypothesis 1. As previously noted,
however, this analysis only assessed relative effects between California hospitals. Further research
may be warranted to better understand the aggregate effect on California hospitals as a whole.
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w/ Low w/o Low Marginal Effect of
Nurse Nurse Low Nurse Staffing
Patient Volume
Staffing Staffing [A] − [B]
Reduction [A] [B] mean (min, max)
≥70% 32.0% 16.9% 15.1% (1.5%, 23.4%)
≥80% 27.3% 13.1% 14.2% (1.2%, 24.2%)
≥90% 20.0% 10.3% 9.7% (0.9%, 20.4%)
Table 6.20 – Mean predicted probability of reduction in mental health services over 2000–2006
for California hospitals with and without low nurse staffing pre-passage of AB 394. Results were
computed using logistic regressions and examining patient volume declines for MDC 19. Hospitals were required
to have a minimum volume of 10 MDC 19 patients in 1999.
6.6 Discussion
This analysis fills a gap in the literature on AB 394 and its effects on hospital service mix changes
and closures in California. After confirming increases in nurse staffing and wages across California,
I showed that hospital and ED closure significantly increased in California post-passage of AB 394.
Specifically, the hazard rate of hospital and ED closure more than doubled following passage of the
law.
The analyses produced striking results after disaggregating hospitals based on their nurse-staffing
level prior to AB 394’s passage. In particular, it showed that hospitals that had low pre-passage
nurse-staffing levels and therefore suffered the greatest financial shock from the law, had dramatically
increased odds of hospital closure. Specifically, these hospitals possessed increased odds of closure
that were 3.7 to even 6.4 times larger than their matched control hospitals over the period 2003–
2006. In fact, closures among these low nurse-staffing hospitals were the driving factor behind the
aggregate closure results for the state. The sizable magnitude of these closure effects was evident
when examining these hospitals’ closure probabilities. In 2004, the year the law was implemented and
its greatest cost shock occurred, California low nurse-staffing hospitals faced a closure probability
that was 10.51% higher on average than their estimated baseline closure probability of 1.45%.
Differential effects for ED closures were less pronounced than for hospital closure. The analyses
found increased odds of ED closure for both low and not-low nurse-staffing hospitals, but with
earlier significance and greater magnitudes for the former. These results were supported by the
Within-California Analysis.
Differential effects were also observed across California hospitals for reductions in mental health
services post-passage of AB 394. Specifically, the analyses found that hospitals with low versus not-
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low nurse-staffing levels prior to the law had increased odds of patient volume reductions for these
services over 2000–2006 . It should be noted, however, that these analyses only examined relative
effects between California hospitals, in contrast to the hospital and ED closures analyses that also
assessed causal effects using matched controls.
Finally, the analyses demonstrated that in aggregate, both low and not-low nurse-staffing hospi-
tals’ operating margins did not deviate significantly from their counterfactuals. These results suggest
that most hospitals were able to pursue measures to adapt to the rising variable costs generated
by AB 394. As expected, hospitals that were unable to offset this cost shock and consequently
closed, exhibited declining operating margins relative to their matched control counterfactuals. In
particular, the analyses showed sharply declining operating margins for these hospitals in the four
years leading up to their closure.
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Chapter 7
The Impact on Patient Hospital
Choice
As previously shown, AB 394 produced significant changes for California hospitals both through
its nurse-staffing and skill-mix requirements as well as the resulting nurse wage increases. As hos-
pitals adjusted to these disruptions, they may have pursued operational changes along a variety
of dimensions. In this chapter, I investigate the nature of the demand response to these changes.
Specifically, I examine whether AB 394’s shock caused changes in hospital use patterns among
consumers.
7.1 The demand response to AB 394
The question of whether patients were responsive to the collection of changes taking place across
hospitals due to the law is interesting on multiple levels with implications for patients, hospitals,
and policymakers. These include the following, which are further detailed below:
1. Patient ability to perceive operational changes by hospitals and respond,
2. Patient valuation of AB 394’s impact across hospitals, and
3. Second-order effects of the law for hospitals.
On a fundamental level, examination of the demand response to AB 394 sheds light on whether
patients are sensitive in general to changes in hospitals’ care processes with possible implications
for the strength or weakness of non-price demand-side competition. This type of competition is
often thought to be weak in inpatient settings due to asymmetric information on the part of pa-
tients from a variety factors. Such factors include the complexity and multiple facets of health
care services, which shift them toward experience or credence goods and complicates their as-
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sessment. Additionally, health care services often tend to be non-repeat purchases or have some
switching costs involved if repeated use is involved, which further impedes evaluation and compar-
ison. These factors lead to a dearth of readily available and reliable information. Despite these
characteristics, studies have found persuasive evidence that patients do take non-price attributes
into account when selecting hospitals. For instance, studies have shown that hospital amenities
[Goldman and Romley, 2010], advanced technologies [Gaynor and Vogt, 2003, Tay, 2003], and lower
mortality rates [Luft et al., 1990, Mukamel and Mushlin, 1998] are associated with higher hospital
demand. Additionally, Kessler [2005] has found that patients will travel farther distances to attend
hospitals with higher quality of care.
The demand response to AB 394’s impact is also significant as it reveals how patients valued
hospitals’ changes in response to the law. Such valuations could have been positive, negative, or
neutral. For instance, if the law improved hospitals’ non-price attributes relative to their competitors,
the response could have been positive, controlling for other factors. Such improvements might have
included better quality of care, nurse responsiveness, or gains in patient experience from shifts in
style of care.44 While positive effects may have occurred, it is also possible that the law produced
changes that were negatively received by patients. For instance, if the law induced hospitals to hire
cheaper less experienced or lower quality nurses to save on expenses while still adhering to the “letter
of the law,” patients may have responded adversely. Other changes that might be poorly received
include hospital cost containment measures or downgrading investments in inputs. It should be
noted that the demand response assessed in this section reflects patients’ perceived quality with
respect to the law as opposed to the law’s impact on quality of care. (As noted in Chapter 3, quality
of care may inform patient perceived quality but is not the same thing.) In this way, the law provides
an opportunity to contrast patient perceived quality with quality of care.
Finally, the demand response to AB 394’s impact is also relevant because of its implications for
hospitals. Changes in patient flow as consumers “vote with their feet” can signal modifications to
hospitals’ market shares and correspondingly their revenues and profits. For instance, a positive
response by groups of patients could indicate an a mitigating effect on the law’s cost shock. Con-
versely, a negative effect could reveal an adverse impact on hospital financials not only from the cost
side with hiring more nurses and at higher wage rates but also from the revenue side.
44Such shifts may have included moving from more materials-intensive to more labor-intensive care with reduced use
of urinary catheters, feeding tubes, and physical restraints and instead greater use of nurses to perform the required
tasks, prompted by the law’s nurse staffing increases. A paper by Cawley et al. [2006] documented such shifts in care
in a study that analyzed the impact of nurse wage increases on skilled nursing facilities.
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7.2 Conceptual framework and general approach
As previously shown, AB 394 generated a substantial shock to the operations of California hospitals
both through its input requirement for nurses and the resulting wage increase for nurses. This shock
was felt to varying degrees by hospitals across California based on their pre-passage nurse-staffing
levels. As hospitals adjusted by reorienting their production processes and service mix, patients
faced an altered hospital landscape.
This chapter examines the demand response to this altered hospital landscape in the greater Los
Angeles region for traditional Medicare patients with Part A coverage over 1999–2002 and 2003–
2006. In crafting this analysis, a number of assumptions were employed related to patient demand.
The first was the standard assumption that patients choose hospitals that maximize their utility.
This forms the basis of the empirical approach using McFadden’s discrete choice models, which have
been applied in numerous studies examining hospital choice [Capps et al., 2003, Gaynor and Vogt,
2003, Geweke et al., 2003, Gowrisankaran and Town, 1999, Ho, 2006, Kessler and McClellan, 2000,
2002, Luft et al., 1990, Tay, 2003, Town and Vistnes, 2001]. Second, I postulated that patients face
a basic trade-off in their hospital choice decisions between travel time (i.e., time-to-treatment) and
hospital “quality,” broadly defined as non-proximity attributes. Faced with this trade-off, I posited
that patients seeking non-urgent discretionary services would place greater weight on the latter than
patients with sudden, urgent health needs. As a result, these discretionary service patients would
exhibit more elastic demand responses to the changes induced by AB 394 than their counterparts with
urgent, unplanned health needs. This variation was used to look for differential demand responses
across patients and as a falsification test for the results. The third assumption was that demand
responses to changes precipitated by AB 394 would be more pronounced in the later period of 2003–
2006 than the earlier period of 1999–2002. This was based on the observed trends and activities
surrounding the development and implementation of the law as discussed in Chapters 2, 5, and 6.
More specifically, the early period spanned the 4-year stretch from one year before the law’s passage
to two years after its passage when draft regulations were starting to be introduced. This comprised
a time when nurse staffing and wages had just begun to increase as shown in Figures 5.1 and 5.3 and
significant effects on operating margins and closure were not yet observed (Tables 6.6 and 6.11). The
later period, by contrast, spanned the 4-year stretch from the year before the law’s implementation
when draft regulations were finally passed to two years after the law’s initial implementation. This
period was characterized by much more dramatic increases in nurse staffing and wages as hospitals
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sought to comply with the law’s staffing ratios by its implementation deadline. These trends were
also accompanied by corresponding decreases in hospital operating margins and increased closures
for facilities that had had low versus not-low nurse staffing levels prior to the law. Based on these
trends, if the law had an impact on patient choice, it should have occurred more noticeably in the
later period when greater changes occurred rather than in the earlier one. Comparing results for
these two time periods therefore provided a further check of the results.
Identification of the demand response to changes precipitated by AB 394 came from exploiting
variation across hospitals related to their nurse-staffing level pre-passage of the law. More specifically,
hospitals with low versus moderate or high nurse-staffing levels pre-passage of the law were expected
to have experienced greater disruptions to their operations as a result of the law. These differential
effects related to hospitals’ nurse-staffing levels pre-passage of AB 394 were captured in the analysis
via two hospital-level variables—1) the low nurse-staffing indicator described in Section 6.3.245 and
2) the hospital closure propensity over the law’s post-passage period, as predicted by the hospital’s
pre-passage nurse-staffing level and other characteristics (see Section 6.4.3).46 Combined use of these
two variables teased apart separate after-effects of the law to allow for different demand responses to
them. The closure propensity captured the financial strain the law imposed that increased hospital
closure probability, while the low nurse-staffing indicator captured all other effects. Separate use of
just the latter identified the net demand response to the law.
7.2.1 Hypotheses
The above assumptions formed the basis of the following hypotheses that were tested.
Hypothesis 1 Discretionary service patients will exhibit greater demand responses than
urgent service patients to changes across the hospital landscape from AB 394.
45As described in Section 6.3.2, the low nurse-staffing indicator was based on data from AB 394’s pre-passage period
and accounted for a hospital’s nurse-staffing levels across the five largest and most common units that were affected
by the law. In addition, the indicator adjusted for the relative size of these units within the given hospital (i.e., the
hospital’s composition). In this manner, it identified those hospitals that likely sustained the greatest changes from
the law at the facility-level. For hospitals that had received waivers for the law and were therefore not subject to its
staffing mandate, the indicator was set to 0.
46Hospital closure propensity in the six years following passage of AB 394 (i.e., 2000–2006) was estimated using
a variation of the logistic regression models presented in Section 6.4. Predictors consisted of hospital characteristics
from the law’s pre-passage period, including the aforementioned low nurse-staffing indicator, operating margin, size
as captured by logged available beds, and hospital ownership. In contrast to the models in Section 6.4, hospitals that
had received waivers for the law were also included with the low nurse-staffing indicator modified accordingly.
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Hypothesis 2 The demand response to changes related to AB 394 will be more pronounced
in the later period of 2003–2006 than in the earlier period of 1999–2002,
consistent with the greater changes observed in the later period.
Hypothesis 3 Different demand responses may be observed for the after-effects of AB 394.
In particular, those associated with law’s adverse effects on hospital closure
and hospitals’ inability to successfully adapt will be negatively received.
7.3 Data sources and study sample
7.3.1 General study population
The study sample was restricted to Medicare patients with traditional Part A coverage (as opposed
to Medicare Advantage patients). This conferred a number of advantages. First, it simplified
construction of patients’ hospital choice sets, since these patients were not constrained by networks
of private insurance plans. Second, it provided greater reliability of the hospital proximity covariates
that were estimated using patients’ zip code of residence.47 Construction of these variables presumed
that patients traveled to hospitals from their homes, an assumption that may be more apt among
Medicare patients than privately-insured patients who may spend a large portion of their time at
their workplace. Finally, focus on Medicare patients obviated inclusion of hospital prices in the
models, since these patients don’t face variable prices based on hospital choice.48 This eliminated
the challenge of inferring negotiated prices and teasing apart AB 394’s demand response based on
price versus non-price changes (e.g., production and operational changes).
In addition to restricting the study population to Medicare patients, I excluded patients who were
not admitted from home. Such admission types may signal a lack of patient discretion in selecting
their hospitals and a higher illness severity. Additionally, hospital proximity covariates were likely
inappropriate for these patients, since they were not traveling from their place of residence. Finally,
I also excluded patients who attended hospitals that were more than 1000 kilometers from their
47Three proximity covariates were included in the models: 1) patient driving time to the hospital, 2) patient driving
time-squared, and 3) a binary indicator for the hospital with the shortest driving time from the patient’s residence.
These variables were estimated using the centroid of the patient’s zip code of residence.
48Neither patient prices nor hospital networks for insurance plans were readily available in the data.
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zip code of residence centroid, since these patients may have been out of town at the time of their
hospitalization.49
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Figure 7.1 – Geographic distribution of hospitals in California by nurse-staffing level prior to
AB 394. Each dot on the map represents a general acute care hospital with the color denoting the hospital’s
nurse-staffing level pre-passage of AB 394. The hospital that appears to be in the ocean off the coast of Los
Angeles is located on Santa Catalina Island.
The study sample was further limited to patients in and around the Los Angeles county region, an
area that included Orange, Ventura, Riverside, San Diego, Kern, and San Bernardino counties. This
region was selected for multiple reasons. First, it contained a high concentration of hospitals with
significant variation in nurse-staffing levels prior to AB 394, as shown in Figures 7.1 and 7.2. This
region was additionally selected for its large but computationally manageable number of patients
and the relatively small land size of its zip codes that enabled less noisy approximations of patients’
49This would have inhibited construction of their hospital choice sets and travel times as their location was unknown.
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travel times to hospitals.50 Finally, the greater Los Angeles region has been extensively studied
in hospital choice analyses [Gaynor and Vogt, 2003, Geweke et al., 2003, Gowrisankaran and Town,
1999, Luft et al., 1990, Romley and Goldman, 2008, Tay, 2003, Town and Vistnes, 2001], making its
particulars better understood.
Figure 7.2 – Geographic distribution of hospitals in the greater Los Angeles area by nurse-staffing
level pre-passage of AB 394. Each dot on the map represents a general acute care hospital with the color
denoting the hospital’s nurse-staffing level pre-passage of AB 394. The hospital that appears to be in the ocean
is located on Santa Catalina Island.
The study time period spanned 1999–2006, an interval that covered AB 394’s pre- and post-
passage periods. Patient-level data were obtained from California’s OSHPD while hospital charac-
teristics were obtained from other data sources, including OSHPD’s audited Financial Data Extracts.
7.3.2 Patient subgroups
As previously mentioned, two main types of patients were contrasted: 1) those seeking non-urgent
discretionary services and who were therefore more likely to actively choose their hospital based
on non-proximity attributes and 2) those who were less likely to actively choose their hospital due
to the urgency and sudden emergence of their care needs. As noted earlier, if patients were, in
50Travel time to a given hospital was calculated from a patient’s zip code of residence centroid to the hospital, using
Google Geocoding.
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fact, responsive to operational changes undertaken by hospitals, such effects should have been more
strongly present among the former than the latter.51
For the subset of patients seeking non-urgent discretionary treatments, I focused on patients
undergoing elective surgeries. These patients made attractive candidates, since they were more
likely to actively select their own hospitals. For them, time was “on their side,” which affected their
decision-making in two notable ways. First, it allowed them to place greater weight on hospital
quality attributes broadly defined and less importance on proximity, which represented more of a
convenience than a time-to-treatment consideration. Second, it permitted them to “shop around”
and more thoroughly understand the quality attributes of their choices before deciding on a facility.
For the discretionary service subset, I focused on patients receiving elective hip or knee replace-
ment surgery. For both patient types, these respective surgeries were required to be the patient’s
principal procedure. Also, revision surgeries were excluded to help ensure a more homogeneous
population. Finally, the sample was limited to patients with admissions scheduled more than 24
hours in advance to better guarantee that their surgery was elective and that their chosen hospital
represented a deliberate and researched choice.
These elective surgery patients were contrasted with patients who are less likely to actively choose
their hospitals due to the suddenness and urgency of their medical conditions. For these patients,
rapid treatment was essential, and this need could influence their hospital choice in two ways. First,
it could motivate patients or their agents (e.g., paramedics or ambulance operators) to place a greater
premium on shorter travel time relative to other hospital attributes. Second, the sudden emergence
of their condition and need for immediate care could impede assessment of their complete set of
hospital options. This, in turn, could prompt selection of the nearest hospital by default given the
lack of more complete information. Of these two factors, the first was arguably more influential,
however, both decreased patients’ sensitivity to hospitals’ non-proximity attributes. These patients
were thus expected to be less responsive to changes induced by the AB 394 shock and served as a
falsification check.
For patients with sudden, urgent conditions, I focused on heart attack (acute myocardial infarc-
tion) patients for whom the condition constituted their principal diagnosis and their admission was
scheduled less than 24 hours in advance. I also examined non-elective hip replacement patients for
51It may be argued that patients’ hospital selection may not reflect their own choice but instead represent their
physician’s referral. A counter-argument to this objection, however, is that patients likely take into consideration
physicians’ referrals choices when selecting their physician.
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whom the surgery represented their principal procedure and their admission was scheduled less than
24 hours in advance. For these patients, the procedure was required to be a primary as opposed to
a revision surgery.
Patient Group Scheduled ICD-9 Code
Discretionary service patients (elective surgeries):
Hip replacement Yes PPx: 81.51, 81.52
Knee replacement Yes PPx: 81.54
Urgent service patients (severe emergent conditions):
Hip replacement No PPx: 81.51, 81.52
Acute myocardial infarction No PDx: 410.0–410.9
Table 7.1 – ICD-9 procedure and diagnosis codes for the patient groups.
Table 7.1 lists the ICD-9 procedure and diagnosis codes used to construct the patient groups
described above. Further details are provided below.
Hip replacement patients
Hip replacement is considered a major surgery and is generally undertaken only once other therapies
and pain medications have failed. The procedure involves replacement of the hip joint with a pros-
thetic implant and can take the form of partial or total replacement. In the case of the former, the
femoral head is replaced with a ball component made of ceramic or metal. In the latter, the replace-
ment is also accompanied by the introduction of a synthetic socket that resides in the acetabulum
and is made of plastic, ceramic, or metal. Hip replacements can be elective or urgent, depending on
the circumstances. Elective surgeries are most often performed to relieve chronic arthritis pain that
results from inflammation and destruction of the joint’s articular cartilage and inhibits mobility.52
Urgent surgeries, by contrast, are most often prompted by acute events such as hip fractures that
result in physical damage to the joint and necessitate immediate repair.53
Hip replacement patients are an attractive study population for the analysis. The procedure is one
of the most common orthopedic surgeries and has a high prevalence among Medicare patients, making
it both noteworthy and relevant. Within the greater Los Angeles region, Medicare patients composed
52Within the study sample, more than 86% of elective hip replacement patients had principal diagnoses of osteo-
or rheumatoid-arthritis. The second most common principal diagnosis was necrosis of bone tissue caused by poor
circulation, which totaled around 5.6%.
53Within the study sample, over 87% of urgent surgery hip replacement patients possessed principal diagnoses for
fractures.
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around 30% of all inpatients but accounted for two-thirds of these surgeries over 1999–2006.54 Hip
replacement surgery also offers the advantage of being performed at almost all hospitals. Within the
study population, nearly 90% of hospitals offered it, a number that remained essentially constant over
the period 1999–2006. This widespread availability conferred a broad analysis base that enhanced
generalizability of the models’ results and variation in hospital characteristics (i.e., the study sample
wasn’t restricted to a narrow, self-selected subset of hospitals).55 A third benefit of studying hip
replacement patients is that their care options did not change much over this time period—hip
replacement surgery remained essentially their only care option aside from medical management.56
This constancy was important as it helped to avoid bias in the analysis from misleading drops
in admission counts due to hospitals shifting to other emerging treatment substitutes.57 An final
advantage of focusing on hip replacement patients is that the surgery can be elective or urgent,
as previously noted, a feature that lends itself particularly well to this study by offering natural
comparison groups. Among Medicare patients in the greater Los Angeles region, about half (i.e.,
52%) of all principal procedure hip replacements were elective over the period 1999–2001. This
number increased slightly in subsequent years to around 56% and then 59% in 2006, driven by an
increase in these types of surgeries.
Knee replacement patients
Knee replacement is a major surgical procedure in which the surfaces of the knee joint are replaced
with metal or plastic components to relieve pain and disability and facilitate continued motion of
the joint. The surgery is often prompted by trauma or various forms of arthritis, including osteo,
rheumatoid, or psoriatic arthritis that can cause significant pain and limited mobility. The surgery
can be performed as either a total or partial knee replacement. In the case of the former, the joint
surfaces of all three compartments of the knee (i.e., medial, lateral, and patellofemoral) are replaced
while in the latter, replacement is limited to one compartment. The vast majority of surgeries tend to
involve total replacement in which the front of the knee is exposed, the quadriceps muscle is detached
from the femor, and the bones of the joint are resurfaced for replacement. Knee replacement differs
54Medicare patients accounted for around 53–60% of elective hip replacement surgeries and around 80% urgent
hip replacement surgeries over 1999–2006. Raw counts for these two groups were nearly equivalent for the Medicare
population.
55This was in contrast to an elective surgery like coronary artery bypass graft. This intensive procedure was only
performed by a limited subset of larger, wealthier “high-tech” hospitals, limiting variation across hospitals.
56Medical management typically consists of anti-inflammatory drugs, pain medication, and mobility aids.
57Such issues could arise with an elective procedure like coronary artery bypass graft, which declined in use over
1999–2006 as percutaneous coronary intervention (PCI) became a preferred substitute.
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from hip replacement in that the procedure is almost exclusively elective. Among Medicare patients
receiving this surgery in the greater Los Angeles region, it was the principal procedure for over 90%
of them with admissions scheduled more than 24 hours in advance.
Knee replacement patients offer many of the same advantages as hip replacement patients for this
study. These include the procedure’s high occurrence rate and strong prevalence among Medicare
patients, who accounted for 60% of these surgeries in the greater Los Angeles region over 1999–
2006. The procedure also offers the advantage of being available at most hospitals. Around 85% of
available hospitals in the study population performed it, a number that remained fairly constant over
the study timeframe. Additionally, alternative treatment options and substitutes did not emerge for
it during this time period that could bias the analysis. In fact, knee replacement not only remained
the predominant inpatient care option for its patients but dramatically increased in number, nearly
doubling, a trend that has been attributed to technology improvements driving demand.
Heart attack patients
Heart attacks or acute myocardial infarctions (AMIs) represent medical emergencies that occur from
partial disruption of the blood supply to the heart. They typically result from blockage of a coronary
artery following rupture of an atherosclerotic plaque, an unstable mass of cholesterol and fatty acids
in the wall of an artery. If not addressed within sufficient time, these blockages and lack of blood
supply can cause severe damage to the heart and even death. Immediate treatment with aspirin or
sublingual nitroglycerine can greatly improve a patient’s prognosis as well as additional therapies
such as thrombolysis or percutaneous coronary intervention (PCI), a procedure in which a catheter is
fed through the blood vessels to unblock the artery. Upon stabilization, more extreme interventions
such as CABG may also be performed.
AMI patients offer a good contrast to elective surgery patients due to the suddenness and urgency
of their care needs.58 For these patients, time to treatment can spell the difference between life
and death. They are also attractive study candidates due to the condition’s high incidence rate
and presence among Medicare patients. Within the greater Los Angeles region, heart attack was
the fourth most common cardiac condition59 over the study time period with 53% of victims being
Medicare patients. Additionally, heart attack patients were admitted by all hospitals with emergency
58Among Medicare heart attack patients in the greater Los Angeles region, over 95% were unscheduled admissions.
Within this subset, acute myocardial infarction was the principal diagnosis for nearly 70% of them.
59It was surpassed only by heart failure, cardiac dysrhythmias, and other forms of ischemic heart disease.
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departments, allowing for a broad analysis base.
7.4 Statistical methods
7.4.1 General approach
The analysis was conducted using a two-part approach. The first part consisted of a conditional logit
model, examining patient hospital choice where the regressors corresponded to hospital proximity
variables, their interactions with patient characteristics, and hospital fixed effects (FEs). The second
part consisted of an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression where the hospital FEs from the first
part were regressed on a set of hospital characteristics, including the low nurse-staffing indicator and
hospital closure propensity. This two-part approach was used in lieu of a single conditional logit
model with hospital characteristics to circumvent collinearity issues between these variables and the
hospital FEs that obscured interpretation of coefficients, including the low nurse-staffing indicator.
The two-part models were run separately for the discretionary versus urgent services patients for
the two time periods (i.e., 1999–2002 and 2003–2006). For each of these groups, separate coefficients
were allowed for their patient subgroups (e.g., elective hip replacement, elective knee replacement,
etc.). Additional details are provided in the subsequent sections.
7.4.2 Part 1: conditional logit models
The underlying utility framework for the conditional logit models on patient hospital choice assumed
that patient i’s utility from visiting hospital h was given by
Uih = u(Pih,Yi,Zh|α,β) (7.1)
where Pih were hospital proximity variables, Yi were observed patient characteristics, Zh were
hospital fixed effects, and α and β were coefficients. In this framework, patients chose hospitals to
maximize their utility, so that if patient i chose hospital h then for all other hospitals h′ in his choice
set
Uih = u(pih,Yi,Zh|α,β) ≥ Uih′ = u(pih′,Yi,Zh′|α,β). (7.2)
Based on the above utility function, the basic model specification used for the patient groups for
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the two time periods (i.e., 1999–2002 and 2003–2006) was
Uijh =
J∑
j=1
αj (Pih + dihYi)j + βZh + εijh (7.3)
where j indexed the patient subgroup (i.e., elective hip or knee replacement for discretionary service
patients and AMI and non-elective hip replacement for urgent service patients), dih was the proximity
variable for patient driving time to hospital h, and εijh represented patients’ unobserved idiosyncratic
tastes, which were assumed to be independent and identically distributed Type 1 extreme value. The
full set of hospital proximity variables and patient characteristics included in Pih and Yi, respectively,
are shown in Table 7.2.
Variable Detail
HOSPITAL PROXIMITY (Pih)
Driving time † estimated driving time from the patient’s home (min)
Driving time2 † squared driving time from the patient’s home
Closest hospital † yes / no (based on driving time from the patient’s home)
PATIENT CHARACTERISTICS (Yi)
Gender ? male / female
Age ? patient age (yrs)
Race ? white / non-white
† : Google Geocoding and OSHPD Patient Discharge Data
? : OSHPD Patient Discharge Data
Table 7.2 – Hospital proximity variables and patient characteristics used in the conditional logit
models.
Choice set construction
Hospital choice sets were constructed for each patient in the discretionary and urgent service groups.
Hospitals were included in a patient’s choice set if they were located within 50 kilometers of the
patient’s zip code of residence centroid and offered treatment relevant to the patient during their
calendar year of admission. For instance, hospitals included in the choice set of a knee replacement
patient were required to have treated other knee replacement patients during the same calendar
year. For urgent service patients, hospitals were further restricted to those with active emergency
departments (EDs) during the patient’s quarter of admission. (Nearly all urgent service patients
(i.e., 98%) selected hospitals with EDs.) Operation of a hospital’s ED during a given quarter was
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inferred from the hospital’s patient-level admission source data.
The choice set for each patient was fine tuned at the quarter-level to adjust for hospital closures.
For example, hospitals that closed during the second quarter of 2003 were dropped from patient
choice sets from the third quarter of that year onwards. In addition to this refinement, minimum
patient volumes over the early and later analysis periods were required for the different model
specifications to enable estimation of hospital FEs and model convergence.
7.4.3 Part 2: OLS models
OLS models were constructed for the hospital FEs from the conditional logit models for the dis-
cretionary and urgent services patients’ two time periods. Explanatory control variables considered
for the models included the following hospital characteristics for the given time period: number of
licensed beds, facility ownership, safety-net status, teaching status, system membership, and peak
ground acceleration.60 (Continuous variables were averaged over the four-year period.) Among these
variables, a subset was selected based on explanatory power to avoid overfitting the models. These
included number of licensed beds, facility for-profit ownership, and safety-net status.
The focal explanatory variables consisted of the low nurse-staffing indicator and the hospital
closure propensity, as described in Section ??. The low nurse-staffing indicator was included in
the OLS models separate from the hospital closure propensity as well as in combination with it.
The former gauged the net demand response to the law. The latter teased apart separate demand
effects—those associated with the law’s financial strain on hospitals that increased their closure
probability versus all other changes it imposed.
Three sets of OLS models were run for the discretionary and urgent service groups for the two
time periods. These models used different sets of the hospital FEs to help gauge consistency of
results and enable comparisons between the early and later time periods within the discretionary
and urgent service groups and across these groups. The first set of models was performed using
all available hospital FEs for the given patient group and time period. The second set was more
restrictive, limiting the subset of hospitals to those with FEs available for both time periods for the
given patient group. The final set was the most restrictive, requiring the subset of hospitals to have
FEs available for both time periods as well as for both patient groups.
60These hospitals characteristics were unlikely to be affected by AB 394’s shock and therefore posed little risk of
attenuating any demand response to the law picked up by the focal variables.
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7.5 Results
7.5.1 Baseline analyses — hospital choices of discretionary vs. urgent
service patients
Before constructing the two-part models, baseline analyses were conducted examining the assump-
tion underlying Hypothesis 1—that discretionary service patient should have exhibited greater de-
mand responsiveness to the changes precipitated by AB 394 than urgent service patients. As pre-
viously discussed, this followed from expectations regarding how these patients trade-off hospital
proximity (and hence time-to-treatment) against other attributes in their facility choice decisions.
To examine this, two analyses were conducted, examining the degree to which discretionary ver-
sus urgent service patients value hospital proximity differently as revealed by their hospital choice
decisions. Less weight placed on proximity would suggest greater consideration accorded to other
attributes and thus a more elastic demand response to AB 394. Correspondingly, greater weight
placed on it would imply less emphasis accorded to other attributes and thus a more inelastic demand
response to AB 394.
The two analyses performed are described in the subsequent sections. The first compared dis-
cretionary versus urgent service patients’ choice of hospital in terms of relative closeness, while the
second compared the explanatory power of proximity variables in hospital choice models for these
two groups. Both analyses were based on data from the Medicare Part A study population in the
greater Los Angeles area in 1999.
Patient choice of hospital by relative closeness
Table 7.3 presents results for the first analysis, examining patients’ hospital choice decisions in terms
of their relative closeness as measured by driving time. Specifically, the table shows the cumulative
percentage of patients selecting hospitals within a particular closeness ranking. For instance, among
elective hip replacement patients, 64.1% selected hospitals that were among the four closest facilities
to them. Also included in the table for reference are the median driving time and driving distance
for hospitals by closeness ranking.
The different importance attached to hospital proximity by discretionary versus urgent service
patients was strongly in the analysis results. Elective surgery patients with scheduled admissions
appeared far more willing to pass over closer hospitals to attend ones farther away that also offered
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DISCRETIONARY SERVICE URGENT SERVICE
PATIENTS PATIENTS
Elective Hip Replacement Unscheduled Hip Replacement
Chosen Drive Time Drive Dist Chosen Drive Time Drive Dist
Hospital Cum % (Min) (Km) Cum % (Min) (Km)
Closest 28.8% 7.2 4.9 50.4% 6.6 4.3
2nd Closest 46.0% 10.7 8.7 71.0% 9.8 8.1
3rd Closest 57.8% 13.1 12.3 79.4% 12.0 10.9
4th Closest 64.1% 15.0 14.5 85.1% 13.6 13.3
5th Closest 68.4% 16.5 16.1 87.7% 15.1 14.7
6th Closest 72.1% 17.2 18.2 89.8% 15.8 16.8
7th Closest 74.5% 18.2 19.6 91.1% 16.8 17.1
8th Closest 76.3% 19.1 20.3 92.0% 17.3 18.7
Patients 2,255 2,025
Elective Knee Replacement Unscheduled AMI Admission
Chosen Drive Time Drive Dist Chosen Drive Time Drive Dist
Hospital Cum % (Min) (Km) Cum % (Min) (Km)
Closest 30.4% 7.1 4.8 49.1% 6.7 4.4
2nd Closest 48.7% 10.6 9.0 68.9% 9.8 8.1
3rd Closest 59.1% 12.8 12.4 78.6% 12.0 10.6
4th Closest 65.6% 14.9 14.8 83.6% 13.4 12.6
5th Closest 70.3% 16.4 16.8 86.8% 14.7 14.4
6th Closest 73.5% 16.5 18.1 88.9% 15.5 16.1
7th Closest 76.2% 17.3 18.3 90.5% 16.4 16.6
8th Closest 77.8% 18.1 19.9 91.7% 17.1 18.0
Patients 3,501 6,980
Table 7.3 – Patient hospital choice by relative closeness in terms of driving time. The above tables
were based on the Medicare Part A study population in the greater Los Angeles region in 1999. The tables show
the cumulative percentage of patients selecting hospitals within a particular closeness ranking, along with the
median driving time and driving distance for hospitals with that ranking.
the service. Urgent unscheduled admission patients, by contrast, seemed much more inclined to
select hospitals closer to home. This difference was dramatically illustrated in the two types of hip
replacement patients and was particularly evident in the percentage of patients who selected the
hospital closest to their residence. For elective hip replacement patients with scheduled admissions,
this percentage was relatively low at around 29%. For their urgent unscheduled counterparts, this
number was substantially higher at around 50%, an increase of over 30% points. These differences
persisted throughout the rest of the table. For instance, among elective hip replacement patients,
fewer than half selected one of their two closest hospitals, whereas for urgent surgery patients 71%
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did. This pattern was present when examining the proportion of patients who passed over 8 or
more hospitals to attend a facility farther away that provided the surgery. For the elective surgery
patients, this number was relatively high at over 23%, whereas for their urgent surgery counterparts,
it was dramatically lower at only 8%. These differences did not appear to be driven by large travel
time discrepancies between the two groups. In fact, median travel times for hospitals with the same
closeness ranking seemed to be fairly comparable. Similar trends were present for the elective knee
replacement patients and unscheduled AMI patients.
The differences in hospital choice decisions between the discretionary versus urgent service pa-
tients were in-line with expectations. The patterns suggested that urgent service patients, for whom
time-to-treatment was critical, placed considerably more weight on relative closeness than the elec-
tive surgery patients for whom it represented more of a convenience. Elective surgery patients for
whom time-to-treatment was not critical and were better able to “shop around” correspondingly
appeared to place greater emphasis on non-proximity attributes than the urgent service patients.
Explanatory power of proximity variables in hospital choice decisions
The second analysis compared hospital proximity considerations for discretionary versus urgent ser-
vice patients using a broader set of variables than in the first analysis. For this approach, conditional
logit models were constructed to examine how much variation in patients’ hospital choice decisions
could be explained by three proximity variables—driving time, driving time-squared, and an indi-
cator for whether the hospital was the closest in terms of driving time. This was then compared
across the subgroups for the discretionary versus urgent service patients.
The analysis was based on a bootstrap-type approach in which 1,200 patients were randomly
sampled from each patient subgroup (e.g., elective hip replacement, elective knee replacement, etc.).
A conditional logit regression was then run for each subgroup’s sample using the previously men-
tioned proximity covariates as regressors, and the McFadden R-squared value was computed. (This
goodness of fit measure reflected the model’s explained variability and improvement over the null
model.61) This process was iterated 500 times, and the distribution of each subgroup’s pseudo
R-squared values was plotted. Results are shown in Figure 7.3.
Figure 7.3 shows a distinct clustering of the McFadden R-squared distributions for the discre-
tionary and the urgent services patients with marked separation between the two groups. The former
61Similar to a non-pseudo R-squared from an OLS regression, the McFadden R-squared statistic ranges from 0 to
1. Its formula is as follows: R2McF = 1− ln(LM )/ln(L0).
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Explanatory Power of Proximity Variables: 
 Closest Hospital, Driving Time, and Driving Time-Squared
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Figure 7.3 – McFadden R-squared distributions for the patient subgroup regressions including
only proximity covariates. The McFadden R-squared distributions were computed using a bootstrap ap-
proach in which 1,200 patients were randomly sampled from each patient group. Conditional logit regressions
were then run using the proximity covariates (i.e., closest hospital indicator, travel time, and travel time-squared)
as regressors. The process was iterated 500 times. The vertical dashed lines show the mean for each patient
group.
were clustered in the vicinity of 0.24 while the latter were co-located significantly higher at around
0.44. Consistent with Hypothesis 1, these results point to a considerably larger role of hospital
proximity in explaining facility choice decisions for patients with urgent, unplanned health needs
than those seeking elective surgeries.
7.5.2 Two-part model results
Part 1: conditional logit models for patient hospital choice
Results for the first part of the two-part models are shown in Tables 7.4 and 7.5 for the discretionary
and urgent service groups, respectively. In each table, the regression results are presented separately
for the early and later time periods. Overall, the results were consistent with expectations and
displayed similar trends for the discretionary and urgent service groups. Hospitals involving longer
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(a) Discretionary service patients: early period (1999–2002)
McFadden R2 = 0.5151
Hospital Choice Coef. Std. Err. Z-stat P-value
Elective hip replacement
Closest hospital 0.1950 0.0395 4.94 0.000 ***
Drive time (min) -0.2373 0.0168 -14.15 0.000 ***
Drive time2 0.0021 0.0001 15.48 0.000 ***
Interaction w/ drive time
Age (yrs) -0.0007 0.0002 -3.79 0.000 ***
Female -0.0083 0.0035 -2.37 0.018 *
White 0.0164 0.0073 2.25 0.024 *
Elective knee replacement
Closest hospital 0.2340 0.0345 6.78 0.000 ***
Drive time (min) -0.2716 0.0149 -18.28 0.000 ***
Drive time2 0.0023 0.0001 20.03 0.000 ***
Interaction w/ drive time
Age (yrs) -0.0004 0.0002 -2.22 0.026 *
Female -0.0050 0.0028 -1.76 0.079
White 0.0158 0.0047 3.37 0.001 **
Hospital FEs – – – –
* : significant at 5%; ** : significant at 1%; *** : significant at 0.1%
(b) Discretionary service patients: later period (2003–2006)
McFadden R2 = 0.5592
Hospital Choice Coef. Std. Err. Z-stat P-value
Elective hip replacement
Closest hospital -0.0305 0.0374 -0.82 0.414
Drive time (min) -0.2375 0.0171 -13.93 0.000 ***
Drive time2 0.0023 0.0001 17.45 0.000 ***
Interaction w/ drive time
Age (yrs) -0.0010 0.0002 -5.04 0.000 ***
Female -0.0097 0.0036 -2.67 0.008 **
White 0.0149 0.0074 2.03 0.042 *
Elective knee replacement
Closest hospital -0.0278 0.0295 -0.94 0.346
Drive time (min) -0.2922 0.0136 -21.50 0.000 ***
Drive time2 0.0024 0.0001 24.61 0.000 ***
Interaction w/ drive time
Age (yrs) -0.0004 0.0002 -2.38 0.017 *
Female -0.0072 0.0026 -2.73 0.006 **
White 0.0083 0.0042 1.99 0.047 *
Hospital FEs – – – –
* : significant at 5%; ** : significant at 1%; *** : significant at 0.1%
Table 7.4 – Part 1 conditional logit results for hospital choice: discretionary service patients. The
above tables show results for the early (1999–2002) and later (2003–2006) periods for the discretionary service
patients.
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(a) Urgent service patients: early period (1999–2002)
McFadden R2 = 0.6564
Hospital Choice Coef. Std. Err. Z-stat P-value
Non-elective hip replacement
Closest hospital -0.1249 0.0367 -3.41 0.001 **
Drive time (min) -0.3826 0.0276 -13.84 0.000 ***
Drive time2 0.0039 0.0001 26.43 0.000 ***
Interaction w/ drive time
Age (yrs) -0.0007 0.0003 -2.21 0.027 *
Female -0.0106 0.0053 -1.99 0.046 *
White 0.0066 0.0084 0.79 0.429
AMI
Closest hospital 0.0330 0.0258 1.28 0.201
Drive time (min) -0.4334 0.0149 -29.12 0.000 ***
Drive time2 0.0039 0.0001 32.84 0.000 ***
Interaction w/ drive time
Age (yrs) -0.0006 0.0002 -3.31 0.001 **
Female -0.0065 0.0031 -2.06 0.039 *
White 0.0257 0.0048 5.41 0.000 ***
Hospital FEs – – – –
* : significant at 5%; ** : significant at 1%; *** : significant at 0.1%
(b) Urgent service patients: later period (2003–2006)
McFadden R2 = 0.6549
Hospital Choice Coef. Std. Err. Z-stat P-value
Non-elective hip replacement
Closest hospital -0.0164 0.0368 -0.45 0.656
Drive time (min) -0.4198 0.0279 -15.06 0.000 ***
Drive time2 0.0040 0.0001 26.87 0.000 ***
Interaction w/ drive time
Age (yrs) -0.0003 0.0003 -1.04 0.299
Female 0.0063 0.0051 1.24 0.215
White 0.0077 0.0079 0.97 0.332
AMI
Closest hospital 0.0998 0.0265 3.77 0.000 ***
Drive time (min) -0.4374 0.0142 -30.83 0.000 ***
Drive time2 0.0039 0.0001 35.45 0.000 ***
Interaction w/ drive time
Age (yrs) -0.0005 0.0002 -2.82 0.005 **
Female -0.0113 0.0031 -3.65 0.000 ***
White 0.0383 0.0045 8.43 0.000 ***
Hospital FEs – – – –
* : significant at 5%; ** : significant at 1%; *** : significant at 0.1%
Table 7.5 – Part 1 conditional logit results for hospital choice: urgent service patients. The above
tables show results for the early (1999–2002) and later (2003–2006) periods for the urgent service patients.
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driving times were less likely to be selected by patients but at a diminishing rate. Additionally, older
patients, women, and minorities tended to value longer driving times more negatively than younger
patients, men, and white patients, respectively, other factors being equal. In most cases, hospitals
that were closest to the patient in terms of driving time were more likely to be selected, controlling
for other factors. The one exception to this was the non-elective hip replacement group in the early
period.
Among the two patient groups, the McFadden R-squared statistic was higher for the urgent
service group than for the discretionary service group. For the former, this statistic measured 0.66
and 0.65 for the early and later periods, respectively, while for the latter it was 0.52 and 0.56 for these
respective time periods. These differences may reflect the proximity variables, which comprised the
main explanatory variables in the models apart from the hospital FEs. As shown in the previous
analyses in Section 7.5, these proximity variables had greater explanatory power for the urgent
service patients than for the discretionary service ones.
Although the McFadden R-squared statistics were lower for the discretionary service patients
than for the urgent service group, their values were still fairly high. This was particularly noticeable
when compared to the earlier proximity analysis in Section 7.5 where their R-squared values ranged
around 0.24. These higher R-squared statistics in the models incorporating hospital FEs suggest
the importance of facility characteristics beyond proximity in discretionary service patients’ choice
decisions. (The hospital FEs also seemed to improve the model fit for the urgent service patients
but to a lesser extent.)
Part 2: OLS models for the hospital FEs
Results for the second part of the two-part models are shown in Tables 7.6–7.10. Specifically, Tables
7.6 and 7.8 show results for the discretionary and urgent service patients, respectively, for the two
time periods, using the full set of available hospital FEs. For discretionary service patients, this
corresponded to 87 hospitals in the early period and 100 in the later period. For urgent service
patients, 130 hospitals were included in the early period and 123 in the later period. Tables 7.7
and 7.9 show results for the discretionary and urgent service patients, restricted to hospitals with
FEs in both time periods for the patient group. For discretionary service patients, 83 hospitals were
included, while for urgent service patients, 117 hospitals were included. The final set of results based
on hospitals with FEs in both time periods for both patient groups is shown in Table 7.10.
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Early Period Later Period
(1999–2002) (2003–2006)
Hospital FE (1) (2) (3) (4)
Discretionary Service Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef.
Low Nurse Staffing -0.055 0.378 0.115 0.783**
(0.281) (0.333) (0.255) (0.276)
0.845 0.260 0.654 0.006
Closure Propensity (%) – -0.064 – -0.074***
(0.033) (0.019)
0.056 0.000
Licensed Beds 0.002** 0.002* 0.003*** 0.002**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
0.001 0.043 0.000 0.001
Safety-net -1.325** -1.533*** -1.418** -1.477**
(0.388) (0.391) (0.459) (0.536)
0.001 0.000 0.003 0.007
Owner: For-profit -0.832* -0.749* -1.048** -1.043***
(0.322) (0.333) (0.291) (0.287)
0.012 0.027 0.001 0.000
Constant 3.713*** 4.156*** 4.998*** 5.604***
(0.297) (0.386) (0.299) (0.317)
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Hospitals 87 87 100 100
Adjusted R2 0.270 0.282 0.383 0.439
* : significant at 5%; ** : significant at 1%; *** : significant at 0.1%
Robust standard errors in parentheses with p-values below
Table 7.6 – Part 2 OLS results for hospital FEs: discretionary service patients. Results are shown
for the early and later periods for specifications with and without the hospital closure propensity variable. The
models for the early and later periods were also run including the closure propensity variable without the low-
nurse staffing indicator (not shown). For these models, the closure propensity variable failed to be significant in
either period.
Results for the discretionary service patients were similar across the different subsets of hospital
FEs. For the early period, the low nurse-staffing indicator was consistently insignificant across the
model specifications. For the later period, a different pattern was observed. When included without
the closure propensity variable, the low nurse-staffing indicator was again insignificant, but when
included with it, significance appeared for both variables. (When the closure propensity variable
was included without the low nurse-staffing indicator, it also failed to be significant in both the
early and later periods.) For the later period models with both focal variables, the low nurse-
staffing indicator exhibited a positive effect, revealing that patients in this later period were more
likely to select hospitals that had had low nurse-staffing levels before AB 394, controlling for closure
propensity and other variables. In contrast, the closure propensity variable exhibited a negative
effect, indicating that patients in the later period were less likely to choose hospitals with higher
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Early Period Later Period
(1999–2002) (2003–2006)
Hospital FE (1) (2) (3) (4)
Discretionary Services Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef.
Low Nurse Staffing 0.005 0.367 0.005 0.797*
(0.280) (0.331) (0.280) (0.325)
0.986 0.272 0.986 0.016
Closure Propensity (%) – -0.054 – -0.115**
(0.031) (0.039)
0.085 0.004
Licensed Beds 0.002** 0.002* 0.002** 0.002*
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
0.002 0.036 0.002 0.045
Safety-net -1.311** -1.492** -1.311** -1.700**
(0.458) (0.468) (0.458) (0.484)
0.005 0.002 0.005 0.001
Owner: For-profit -0.745* -0.678* -0.745* -0.816*
(0.322) (0.338) (0.322) (0.332)
0.024 0.049 0.024 0.016
Constant 3.713*** 4.076*** 3.713*** 6.121***
(0.319) (0.390) (0.319) (0.396)
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Hospitals 83 83 83 83
Adjusted R2 0.247 0.252 0.319 0.369
* : significant at 5%; ** : significant at 1%; *** : significant at 0.1%
Robust standard errors in parentheses with p-values below
Table 7.7 – Part 2 OLS results for hospital FEs in both early and later periods: discretionary
service patients. Hospitals were restricted to those with FEs available in both the early and later periods.
Results are shown for the early and later periods for specifications with and without the hospital closure propen-
sity variable. The models for the early and later periods were also run including the closure propensity variable
without the low-nurse staffing indicator (not shown). For these models, the closure propensity variable failed to
be significant in either period.
closure propensities, controlling for other variables. These findings persisted in models that excluded
hospitals that closed during the study time period. Overall, these results suggest that AB 394 may
have had variable effects on hospitals as perceived and valued by patients. On the one hand, its
cost shock that diminished hospitals’ financial viability and increased their closure probability was
associated with an adverse demand response. On the other hand, the law also appears to have been
associated with positive effects as evidenced by the low nurse-staffing indicator. The appearance of
significance for the two focal variables only when both were included together in the later period
points to their relationship through the low nurse-staffing indicator and their representation of two
sides of AB 394’s effects on low nurse-staffing hospitals.
Results for the urgent service patients were similar across Tables 7.8 and 7.9. Consistent with
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Early Period Later Period
(1999–2002) (2003–2006)
Hospital FE (1) (2) (3) (4)
Urgent Services Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef.
Low Nurse Staffing -0.295 0.340 -0.048 0.457
(0.326) (0.390) (0.322) (0.352)
0.367 0.384 0.882 0.196
Closure Propensity (%) – -0.073** – -0.061**
(0.020) (0.020)
0.001 0.003
Licensed Beds 0.00003 -0.00088 0.00051 -0.00013
(0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007)
0.962 0.214 0.493 0.847
Safety-net -1.590** -1.720*** -2.125*** -2.283***
(0.487) (0.432) (0.374) (0.399)
0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000
Owner: For-profit -1.294*** -1.311*** -1.457*** -1.463***
(0.349) (0.344) (0.338) (0.336)
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Constant 7.458*** 8.036*** 7.421*** 7.862***
(0.342) (0.369) (0.321) (0.319)
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Hospitals 130 130 123 123
Adjusted R2 0.155 0.186 0.233 0.248
* : significant at 5%; ** : significant at 1%; *** : significant at 0.1%
Robust standard errors in parentheses with p-values below
Table 7.8 – Part 2 OLS results for hospital FEs: urgent service patients. Results are shown for the
early and later periods for specifications with and without the hospital closure propensity variable.
Hypotheses 1 and 2, no pronounced differences were observed between the early and later periods for
the focal variables. The low nurse-staffing indicator failed to be significant in both time periods for
the specifications with and without the hospital closure propensity. The closure propensity exhibited
different results. When included without the low nurse-staffing indicator, it failed to be significant
(results not shown). When included with the indicator, however, the variable displayed significantly
negative effects for both periods. The drivers of this result are unclear, however, they may include
ED closures that weren’t fully controlled for with the quarter-level refinements to patients’ choice
sets. As shown in Chapter 6, ED closures occurred in both the early and later periods and had
greater occurrence among hospitals that had had low nurse-staffing prior to AB 394.
Table ?? displays results for the subset of hospitals with FEs in both the early and later time
periods for both the discretionary and urgent service groups. This subset perhaps presents the
clearest comparison of the demand response to AB 394 across the two time periods and patient
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Early Period Later Period
(1999–2002) (2003–2006)
Hospital FE (1) (2) (3) (4)
Urgent Services Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef.
Low Nurse Staffing -0.076 0.504 -0.094 0.427
(0.344) (0.365) (0.336) (0.371)
0.825 0.170 0.780 0.252
Closure Propensity (%) – -0.069*** – -0.063**
(0.018) (0.020)
0.000 0.002
Licensed Beds 0.00012 -0.00061 0.00045 -0.00024
(0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0007)
0.861 0.369 0.567 0.742
Safety-net -1.859*** -2.008*** -1.965*** -2.096***
(0.424) (0.418) (0.455) (0.477)
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Owner: For-profit -1.392*** -1.411*** -1.498*** -1.527***
(0.371) (0.371) (0.358) (0.358)
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Constant 7.405*** 7.899*** 7.490*** 8.077***
(0.357) (0.360) (0.339) (0.337)
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Hospitals 117 117 117 117
Adjusted R2 0.165 0.186 0.197 0.213
* : significant at 5%; ** : significant at 1%; *** : significant at 0.1%
Robust standard errors in parentheses with p-values below
Table 7.9 – Part 2 OLS results for hospital FEs in both early and later periods: urgent service
patients. Hospitals were restricted to those with FEs available in both the early and later periods. Results are
shown for the early and later periods for specifications with and without the hospital closure propensity variable.
groups. In this subset, the same trends were again present for the discretionary service patients that
had been observed in the other hospital FE subsets (Tables 7.6 and 7.7). The low nurse-staffing
indicator and closure propensity failed to be significant in the early period but exhibited significantly
positive and negative effects, respectively, in the later period. For the urgent service patients, both
focal variables, interestingly, failed to be significant in either period.62
The signs and significance of the explanatory control variables were generally consistent with
expectations and stable across the time periods for the discretionary and urgent service patients.
For both patient groups, facilities that were safety-nets or had for-profit ownership were less likely to
be selected by patients, controlling for other factors. Additionally, for discretionary patients, larger
62In fact, for the urgent service patients only one variable was significant in their regressions, resulting in very low
adjusted R-squared values of 0.023 and 0.082 for the early and later periods, respectively. By contrast, the adjusted
R-squared values for the discretionary service patients were much higher at 0.246 and 0.375 for the early and later
periods, respectively. These findings were consistent with discretionary patients placing more weight on non-proximity
hospital characteristics in contrast to urgent service patients.
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Discretionary Services Urgent Services
Period Period
Early Later Early Later
(1999–2002) (2003–2006) (1999–2002) (2003–2006)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Hospital FE Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef.
Low Nurse Staffing 0.295 0.812* 0.236 0.437
(0.343) (0.336) (0.463) (0.512)
0.392 0.018 0.612 0.396
Closure Propensity (%) -0.038 -0.110** -0.046 -0.094
(0.031) (0.040) (0.065) (0.055)
0.219 0.007 0.479 0.093
Licensed Beds 0.002** 0.002** 0.001 0.0004
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
0.005 0.008 0.555 0.686
Safety-net -1.244* -1.773** -1.357 -1.841**
(0.585) (0.611) (0.697) (0.629)
0.037 0.005 0.056 0.005
Owner: For-profit -0.714* -0.797* -0.726 -0.785
(0.337) (0.348) (0.524) (0.506)
0.037 0.025 0.170 0.125
Constant 3.857*** 5.939*** 7.387*** 7.907***
(0.349) (0.354) (0.612) (0.536)
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Hospitals 79 79 79 79
Adjusted R2 0.246 0.375 0.023 0.082
* : significant at 5%; ** : significant at 1%; *** : significant at 0.1%
Robust standard errors in parentheses with p-values below
Table 7.10 – Part 2 OLS results for hospital FEs in both early and later periods for both patient
groups. Hospitals were restricted to those with FEs available in both the early and later periods for both
discretionary and urgent service groups. Results are shown for the early and later periods for the discretionary
and urgent service groups.
facilities as measured by licensed beds were more likely to be chosen, controlling for other factors.
This variable, by contrast, was not significant for the urgent service patients.
7.6 Discussion
Results from the 2-part models suggest support for the hypotheses in Section 7.2.1. The discre-
tionary service patients exhibited a clearer demand response to changes precipitated by AB 394,
as captured by the focal variables, than the urgent service patients. This was evidenced not only
by the significance observed for these variables but also importantly by the timing of it. These
effects coincided with the later period of 2003–2006, during which the greatest changes related to
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the law occurred. These included the largest increases in nurse staffing and nurse wages, as well
as the largest relative decreases in operating margins for low nurse-staffing hospitals. By contrast,
no significance was observed for the focal variables during the earlier period of 1999–2002, during
which much more modest changes occurred. It is interesting, however, that in this early period
marginal significance at 10% was observed for the closure propensity variable for some models of
the discretionary service patients. This finding is consistent with the initial increase in nurse wages
that was observed during this period, which may have created financial stress for some facilities. In
contrast to the discretionary service patients, the urgent service patients exhibited no change toward
the focal variables from the early to the later periods. For these patients, the low nurse-staffing in-
dicator remained insignificant throughout all models and subsets of hospital FEs, consistent with
these patients’ reduced sensitivity to non-proximity (and hence time-to-treatment) considerations.
The hospital closure propensity variable similarly exhibited no difference in significance for them
from the early to the later period among hospitals present in both time periods.
Results from the models for discretionary service patients suggest a neutral net demand response
to the changes related to AB 394. This response, however, belies the more varied reaction to the
law’s different after-effects, as captured by the two focal variables. As shown in the models, both
negative and positive responses occurred. The former, perhaps unsurprisingly, was associated with
the law’s cost shock that increased hospitals’ propensity to close. As previously discussed, these
financial stresses were felt more acutely by hospitals that had had low nurse-staffing levels prior to
the law’s passage and had to increase their staffing levels by a greater extent to comply with the
law’s ratios. It’s unclear to what extent this negative demand response impacted these hospitals’
financial state or if private-payer patients had a similar response.
From the analysis, it’s also uncertain what the mechanism was behind the negative demand
response associated with hospitals’ propensity to close for the discretionary service patients. Possi-
bilities may include hospital cost containment measures that affected patients or physicians in ways
that were poorly received. These may have included hospitals limiting physicians’ choice sets of
implants to help control costs. Studies have shown that implant devices could account for over 50%
of the reimbursement for a patient and that implant costs were increasing at a faster rate than Medi-
care reimbursement for joint replacement surgeries over the study time period[Wilson et al., 2008].63
63While Medicare reimbursement for total joint replacement rose by 27% over 1991–2008, the average selling price
for hip implants rose by 132% over 1996–2006 [Wilson et al., 2008]. Additionally, hospitals’ Medicare reimbursement
for implant devices were bundled into their fixed DRG payments for joint replacement surgery. This was in contrast
to arrangements with private payers with whom hospitals often had carve outs to address the costs of the devices.
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Reports have noted hospital efforts to try to direct physicians to devices seen as more cost-effective
but that these attempts have often been poorly received with physicians regarding them as intrusive
and at the expense of high quality patient care [Wilson et al., 2008].
As previously mentioned, AB 394 appears to have also elicited a positive demand response among
the discretionary service patients. It’s unclear what the mechanism was behind this positive effect
captured by the low nurse-staffing indicator in the later period. One possibility is the increase in
nurse staffing experienced by hospitals that had had low staffing level prior to the law. For joint
replacement patients, nurses play a critical role in their healing process and prevention of compli-
cations. This may, in turn, prompt patients and their referring physicians to consider facilities’
nurse-staffing levels in their hospital selection. In fact, inpatient nurses are heavily involved in all
perioperative phases of a joint replacement patient’s hospital stay [Turner, 2011]. This includes the
preoperative coordination of bloodwork, tests, and patient communication as well as the immediate
postoperative phase during which intense monitoring is required of the incisional area and patient
vitals. Nurses also serve as the primary coordinators of care in the days following surgery. This
includes managing and assisting patients in their initial movement activities and therapist appoint-
ments, providing instructional guidance on their home self-care, such as wound management, and
helping to coordinate follow-up visits. These activities may cause patients to value hospital increases
in nurse staffing in their choice decisions.
In summary, results from the analysis point to the variation across patients in their level of
demand responsiveness to changes undertaken by hospitals. Specifically, patients seeking elective
discretionary services may be much more responsive to hospital changes and non-proximity attributes
than patients with urgent, sudden health needs. This, in turn, has implications for the ability of
hospitals to compete on non-price attributes (e.g., quality) for these different types of patients. In
addition to the variation across patients, the results highlight the complex set of after-effects that
regulations can spark and provide a preliminary glimpse of those for AB 394. Many unanswered
questions, however, remain. These include to what extent were these responses shared by other
patient types and groups. Also, it’s uncertain to what extent the demand response affected hospital
financials and what were the driving mechanisms behind it. These questions, though beyond the
scope of this current analysis, may warrant future attention.
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Chapter 8
Conclusion
California’s minimum nurse staffing law raises a wide breadth of topics. These include the structure
and design of legislation for quality improvement, rent-seeking through political means, hospital
behavior under input constraints and resulting cost function changes, and patient responsiveness to
changes undertaken by hospitals as a result of legislation. These issues have relevance for a variety
of stakeholders including policymakers, researchers, hospitals, and patients.
8.1 Recap of study findings and contributions
This study contributes to the literature on the topics mentioned above in a number of ways. This
includes discussion around the design of the law with respect to its stated objective of quality
improvement, considering it in an economic framework. In doing so, issues of production efficiency
and incentives for quality improvement were addressed.
This study also offers new empirical analyses around the law. These include new descriptive
analyses, examining the increase in nurse wages in California. Additionally, this study provides
the first examination of the law’s impact on hospital and emergency department closure (ED) and
downsizing of mental health services precipitated by its impact on costs. Using a combination of
matching and other techniques, I find compelling evidence that AB 394 led to a significant increase in
hospital and ED closures. Specifically, California hospitals had a 2.25 and 2.84 times greater hazard
rate of hospital and ED closure, respectively, in the years following the law’s passage compared to
their matched controls. For hospital closure, the hazard rate was driven entirely by hospitals that
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had had low nurse-staffing levels prior to the law and thus had to incur greater staffing increases
to comply with its nurse ratio mandate. For these hospitals, their hazard rate of closure was more
than 4 times greater than their matched controls. For ED closure, significantly higher hazard rates
were observed for both low and not-low nurse-staffing hospitals in California compared to their
matched controls but with stronger effects for the former. Examining hospital and ED closures
across the individual years post-passage of the law provided additional evidence suggestive of the
law’s causal effect. This analysis revealed that the timing of hospital closures strongly corresponded
to the period around the law’s implementation deadline when nurse staffing and wages increased
the most, consistent with expectations. A similar trend was observed for ED closures but with their
closure increases beginning slightly earlier, consistent with their being a more intermediate and less
drastic response to financial stress. In addition to hospital and ED closure, suggestive evidence was
found for downsizing of mental services by California hospitals in response to the law. Specifically,
the analyses found that hospitals with low nurse-staffing pre-passage of AB 394 had over 2.5 times
higher odds of substantially reducing their patient volumes for these services than hospitals with
not-low nurse staffing levels. It should be noted that due to data availability, only relative effects
among California hospitals were assessed for this outcome in contrast to the hospital and ED closure
outcomes.
In addition to assessing hospital closures and service mix changes with respect to EDs and mental
health services, this study provides the first examination of patients’ demand response to hospitals’
changes precipitated by the law. Findings from this analysis point to variation across patients.
Specifically, the results suggest that patients seeking elective discretionary services may be much
more responsive to hospital changes and non-proximity attributes than patients with urgent, sudden
health needs. The results also highlight the law’s different after-effects that sparked divergent patient
responses. For instance, among discretionary service patients, the law’s increase on hospital closure
propensity had a negative effect, while the other changes it produced were received positively.
8.2 Final thoughts
From a policy perspective, the study findings around hospital and ED closures and service mix
changes may pose worrisome implications for a community’s access to care. It should be noted,
however, that the study focused only on closures of hospitals and EDs and downsizing of mental
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health services around the time of the law’s passage. Examination of hospitals, EDs, and psychiatric
units and facilities that opened post-passage of the law was beyond the scope of analysis. A cursory
investigation, however, suggests that the number of new short-term general acute care hospitals
that opened in California between 2000–2006 was quite small. Finally, it should also be noted that
hospital closure was not the only potential response to extreme financial distress. Mergers and
acquisitions were other possibilities. These activities were not included in the analysis due to the
difficulty in determining whether such events were motivated by financial distress or other reasons.
The way that AB 394 unfolded in California after its passage offers an instructive lesson in the
multifaceted consequences that can occur with regulatory action. The study results suggest that
policymakers elsewhere should consider different legislative approaches than specific nurse-to-patient
ratios if quality improvement is the primary objective. Mandated levels of a production input like
nurses may not necessarily improve quality, even if that input is an important component for it.
While other papers have shown that AB 394 did produce positive effects such as improved nurse
workloads and job satisfaction, the findings from this study reveal that it also touched off a chain
of unintended consequences that affected Californians’ access to care.
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